WI · rules

SCR 60.03

A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge's activities

activein force · 2019-02-25 – presentact-effective-date

(1) A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act

at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity

and impartiality of the judiciary.

COMMENT

Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges.

A judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety. A judge must expect to be the

subject of constant public scrutiny. A judge must therefore accept restrictions on the judge's conduct

that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly.

The prohibition against behaving with impropriety or the appearance of impropriety applies

to both the professional and personal conduct of a judge. Because it is not practicable to list all

prohibited acts, the proscription is necessarily cast in general terms that extend to conduct by judges

that is harmful although not specifically mentioned in the chapter. Actual improprieties under this

standard include violations of law, court rules or other specific provisions of this chapter. The test

for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception

that the judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and

competence is impaired.

Restrictions on the personal conduct of judges cannot, however, be so onerous as to deprive

them of fundamental freedoms enjoyed by other citizens. Care must be taken to achieve a balance

between the need to maintain the integrity and dignity of the judiciary and the right of judges to

conduct their personal lives in accordance with the dictates of their individual consciences.

In striking this balance the following factors should be considered:

(a) the degree to which the personal conduct is public or private;

(b) the degree to which the personal conduct is a protected individual right;

(d) the degree to which the personal conduct is indicative of bias or prejudice on the part of

the judge;

(e) the degree to which the personal conduct is indicative of the judge's lack of respect for

the public or the judicial/legal system.

See also Comment to sub. (3).

(2) A judge may not allow family, social, political or other

relationships to influence the judge's judicial conduct or judgment. A

judge may not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the private

interests of the judge or of others or convey or permit others to convey

the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.

A judge may not testify voluntarily as a character witness.

COMMENT

Maintaining the prestige of judicial office is essential to a system of government in which

the judiciary functions independently of the executive and legislative branches. Respect for the

judicial office facilitates the orderly conduct of legitimate judicial functions. Judges should

distinguish between proper and improper use of the prestige of office in all of their activities. For

example, it would be improper for a judge to allude to his or her judgeship to gain a personal

advantage such as deferential treatment when stopped by a police officer for a traffic offense.

Similarly, judicial letterhead must not be used for conducting a judge's personal business.

A judge must avoid lending the prestige of judicial office for the advancement of the private

interests of others. For example, a judge must not use the judge's judicial position to gain advantage

in a civil suit involving a member of the judge's family. As to the acceptance of awards, see SCR

60.05 (4) (e) 1.

Although a judge should be sensitive to possible abuse of the prestige of office, a judge

may, based on the judge's personal knowledge, serve as a reference or provide a letter of

recommendation. Such a letter should not be written if the person who is the subject of the letter is

or is likely to be a litigant engaged in a contested proceeding before the court. However, a judge

must not initiate the communication of information to a sentencing judge or a probation or

corrections officer but may provide to such persons information for the record in response to a

formal request.

Judges may participate in the process of judicial selection by cooperating with appointing

authorities and screening committees seeking names for consideration and by responding to official

inquiries concerning a person being considered for a judgeship.

A judge must not testify voluntarily as a character witness because to do so may lend the

prestige of the judicial office in support of the party for whom the judge testifies. Moreover, when a

judge testifies as a witness, a lawyer who regularly appears before the judge may be placed in the

awkward position of cross-examining the judge. A judge may, however, testify when properly

summoned. Except in unusual circumstances where the demands of justice require, a judge should

discourage a party from requiring the judge to testify as a character witness.

(3) A judge may not hold membership in any organization that

practices invidious discrimination on the basis of race, gender, religion

or national origin.

History

COMMENT Membership of a judge in an organization that practices invidious discrimination gives rise to perceptions that the judge's impartiality is impaired. Whether an organization practices invidious discrimination is often a complex question to which judges should be sensitive. The answer cannot be determined from a mere examination of an organization's current membership rolls but rather depends on how the organization selects members and other relevant factors, such as that the organization is dedicated to the preservation of religious, ethnic or cultural values of legitimate common interest to its members or that it is in fact and effect an intimate, purely private organization whose membership limitations could not be constitutionally prohibited. Whether an organization, club or group is "private" depends on a review of the following factors: 1) size; 2) purpose; 3) policies; 4) selectivity in membership; 5) congeniality; and 6) whether others are excluded from critical aspects of the relationship. An organization that is not "private" is generally said to discriminate invidiously if it arbitrarily excludes from membership on the basis of race, religion, sex or national origin persons who would otherwise be admitted to membership. See, New York State Club Ass'n Inc. v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 101 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1988); Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987), 95 L. Ed. 2d 474; Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). Organizations dedicated to the preservation of religious, fraternal, sororal, spiritual, charitable, civic or cultural values which do not stigmatize any excluded persons as inferior and therefore unworthy of membership are not considered to discriminate invidiously. Public manifestation by a judge of the judge's knowing approval of invidious discrimination on any basis gives the appearance of impropriety and diminishes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. When a judge has reason to believe that an organization to which the judge belongs engages in invidious discrimination that would preclude membership under sub. (3) or under SCR 60.03, the judge may, in lieu of resigning, make immediate efforts to have the organization discontinue its invidiously discriminatory practices but must suspend participation in any other activities of the organization. If the organization fails to discontinue its invidiously discriminatory practices as promptly as possible, the judge must resign from the organization.

Provenance

Source: www.wicourts.gov
Retrieved: 2026-09-23
Edition: 2026-09-23
Content hash: 1ae2d40ab311a607eabd8fcbb55b29d33c2fe7785a4fed52c14d13fe02075802

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