5th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr. (Civil) 10.9

Confinement — Convicted Prisoner)

1,2

Plaintiff [name] claims that the conditions of [his/

her] confinement in [specify jail, prison, or other facility] violated [his/her] Eighth Amendment constitutional

right to be protected from cruel and unusual

punishment. More precisely, Plaintiff [name] claims

that Defendant [name] violated [his/her] Eighth Amendment rights by: [specify alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement].

To recover damages for the alleged constitutional

violation[s], Plaintiff [name] must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:

1.

3

the prison conditions resulted in an extreme

deprivation of the minimal measure of life’s

necessities; and

4

1The Eighth Amendment applies to claims made by convicted

inmates; the Fourteenth Amendment applies to claims made by pretrial

detainees. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson , 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2475 (2015); see

Instructions 10.11 and 10.12.

2Other factual scenarios may require modified instructions. See, e.g. ,

DeMarco v. Davis , 914 F .3d 383, 387–88 (5th Cir. 2019) (access to courts);

Brown v. Taylor , 911 F .3d 235, 245–46 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (retaliation); Butts v. Martin , 877 F .3d 571, 558–89 (5th Cir. 2017) (retaliation);

Lewis v. Sec’y of Pub. Safety & Corrs. , 870 F .3d 365, 368–69 (5th Cir.

2017) (Fourth Amendment search); Davis v. Davis , 826 F .3d 258, 264–65

(5th Cir. 2016) (free exercise under First Amendment and Religious Land

Use and Institutionalized Persons Act); Wilkerson v. Goodwin , 774 F .3d

845, 851–59 (5th Cir. 2014) (procedural due process); Stauffer v. Gearhart ,

741 F .3d 574, 584–86 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (free exercise under

First Amendment).

3The “under color of law” element is usually conceded in the Eighth

Amendment context. It is omitted to avoid unnecessary confusion. If the

issue is disputed, it should be addressed as the first element. Further

instructions defining this element are found in Instruction 10.2.

4Hudson v. McMillian , 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (“[E]xtreme deprivations

are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.”).

10.9CIVIL RIGHTS — 42 U.S.C. § 1983

113

2. Defendant [name] acted with deliberate

indifference.

5

As to the first element, it is not enough that the

conditions were restrictive or even harsh. This is part

of the penalty that criminal offenders pay. You may

find that the conditions of Plaintiff [name]’s confinement amounted to an extreme deprivation—and were

therefore cruel and unusual punishment—only if they

posed an unreasonable risk of serious damage to

Plaintiff [name]’s health or safety. In deciding whether

Plaintiff [name] has proved an extreme deprivation,

you should ask whether society considers the risk that

the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it violates

contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone

unwillingly to such a risk.

6

Deliberate indifference in this context means that

the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety. The official must: (1) be aware

of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm exists; and (2) must

draw that inference.

7

Deliberate indifference may be

inferred if the risk of harm is obvious.

8,9

5Wilson v. Seiter , 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991).

6Helling v. McKinney , 509 U.S. 25, 35–36 (1993). This represents the

objective component of the test. See Hudson , 503 U.S. at 8–9.

7Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Corroborating evidence is required before a jury may infer that an inmate’s use of prison

grievance procedures puts a prison official on notice that a substantial

risk of serious harm existed. Ball v. LeBlanc , 792 F .3d 584, 595 (5th Cir.

2015) (“[A] prison administrator who has received an administrative remedy request is not necessarily made aware, without factual corroboration,

that there is a substantial risk of serious harm.”).

8Hope v. Pelzer , 536 U.S. 730, 737–38 (2002) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 842) (“We may infer the existence of this subjective state of mind from

the fact that the risk of harm is obvious.”).

9Although the objective and subjective tests apply in all Eighth

Amendment contexts, the wording may be altered depending on the

specific claim. For example, in a failure-to-protect context, the Fifth Circuit

has noted: