5th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr. (Civil) 10.8

Care — Convicted Prisoner)

1

Plaintiff [name] asserts that Defendant [name]

violated [his/her] Eighth Amendment right to adequate

medical care.

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. An

[officer/official] violates the Eighth Amendment if [his/

her] conduct demonstrates deliberate indifference to a

prisoner’s serious medical needs.

2

To recover damages for this alleged constitutional

violation, Plaintiff [name] must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:

1.

3

Plaintiff [name] was exposed to a substantial

risk of serious harm;

2. Defendant [name] displayed deliberate indifference to that risk; and

3. Defendant [name]’s deliberate indifference

harmed Plaintiff [name].

4,5

1Other instructions apply to cases involving medical care of pretrial

detainees. See Hare v. City of Corinth , 74 F .3d 633, 644–50 (5th Cir. 1996)

(en banc); see also Instructions 10.11 and 10.12.

2Easter v. Powell , 467 F .3d 459, 463 (5th Cir. 2006).

3The “under color of law” element is usually conceded in the Eighth

Amendment context. It is omitted to avoid unnecessary confusion. If the

issue is disputed, then the issue should be addressed as the first essential

element. Further instructions defining this element are found in Instruction 10.2.

4McCarty v. Zapata Cty. , 243 F . App’x 792, 794 (5th Cir. 2007) (per

curiam) (citing Mace v. City of Palestine , 333 F .3d 621, 625 (5th Cir. 2003))

(“[P]laintiff must establish resulting injuries.”); Victoria W. v. Larpenter ,

369 F .3d 475, 483 (5th Cir. 2004) (explaining prima facie case).

5If the claim is that health care was improperly delayed, then the

court should instruct the jury that “[a] delay in medical care violates the

Eighth Amendment only if it is due to deliberate indifference and results

in substantial harm,” Smith v. Milhauser , 444 F . App’x 812, 813 (5th Cir.

10.8CIVIL RIGHTS — 42 U.S.C. § 1983

109

To satisfy the first element, the illness or injury

must be so serious that the failure to treat it posed a

substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff [name]’s

health.

7

This element asks whether, based on all of the

circumstances that were present, a reasonable person

would view a failure to treat the illness or injury or a

failure to provide adequate health care to be a denial of

the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.

8

This

inquiry is what a reasonable person would have concluded and does not consider Defendant [name]’s state

of mind.

The second element—deliberate indifference—

requires proof of egregious conduct.

9

Only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth

Amendment.

10

Plaintiff [name] must prove Defendant

[name] knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to

Plaintiff [name]’s health or safety. In other words,

Plaintiff [name] must prove Defendant [name]: (1) was

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn

Oct. 14, 2011) (citing Mendoza v. Lynaugh , 989 F .2d 191, 195 (5th Cir.

1993)), but also that “[t]he pain suffered during the delay itself . . . can

constitute a substantial harm,” Westfall v. Luna , 903 F .3d 534, 551 (5th

Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (citing Alderson v. Concordia Par . Corr . Facility ,

848 F .3d 415, 422 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam)). If necessary , these instructions may be modified or limited in wrongful death cases to reflect the

state’s wrongful death statute. See Slade v. City of Marshall , 814 F .3d

263, 264 (5th Cir. 2016) (“[A] plaintiff seeking to recover on a wrongful

death claim under § 1983 must prove both the alleged constitutional deprivation required by § 1983 and the causal link between the defendant’s

unconstitutional acts and omissions and the death of the victim, as

required by the state’s wrongful death statute.” (quoting Phillips ex rel.

Phillips v. Monroe Cty. , 311 F .3d 369, 374 (5th Cir. 2002))).

7Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Helling v.

McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)).

8Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Hudson v. McMil-

lian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298; Rhodes v. Chapman ,

452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)) (holding that “the deprivation alleged must be,

objectively , ‘sufficiently serious’; a prison official’s act or omission must

result in the denial of ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’ ’’).

9Cooper v. Johnson , 353 F . App’x 965, 968 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)

(“A defendant’s conduct must rise ‘to the level of egregious conduct.’ ”

(quoting Gobert v. Caldwell , 463 F .3d 339, 351 (5th Cir. 2006))).

10Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297).