3d Cir. Model Jury Instr. (Civil) 5.2.1

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Last updated March 2026

Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Castleberry v. STI 61

Grp., 863 F.3d 259, 264 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting, in a Section 1981 case, that although circuit 62

precedent had used various formulations, “[t]he correct standard is ‘severe or pervasive’ “). 63

The Supreme Court in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S.75, 80 (1998), 64

noted that an employer is not liable under Title VII for a workplace environment that is harsh for 65

all employees; generalized harassment is not prohibited by Title VII. See also Jensen v. Potter , 66

435 F.3d 444, 449 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Many may suffer severe harassment at work, but if the reason 67

for that harassment is one that is not prescribed by Title VII, it follows that Title VII provides no 68

relief.”) 69

The pattern instruction follows Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 778 (1998), 70

in which the Court stated that “isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to 71

discriminatory changes of the terms and conditions of employment.” Compare Moody v. Atl. City 72

Bd. of Educ., 870 F.3d 206, 215 (3d Cir. 2017) (finding evidence that met the “severe” test where 73

plaintiff alleged that her supervisor “expected [her] to give sexual favors in exchange for work, 74

touched [her] against her wishes, made sexual comments to her, and exposed himself to her”) with 75

Nitkin v. Main Line Health, 67 F.4th 565, 571-72 (3d Cir. 2023) (holding in the summary judgment 76

context that seven incidents “spread out over a span of over three-and-a-half years” and consisting 77

only of verbal statements to or in plaintiff ’s presence that fell short of “proposition[ing] her for a 78

date or sex” could not be found actionable). See also Doe by & through Doe v. Boyertown Area 79

School District, 897 F.3d 518, 521, 534-35 (3d Cir. 2018) (finding Title VII precedents persuasive 80

in applying Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 and holding that school district’s policy 81

“allowing transgender students to use bathrooms and locker rooms that are consistent with the 82

students’ gender identities” did not create a hostile environment for cisgender students). 83