3d Cir. Model Jury Instr. (Civil) 4.9

118

Last updated March 2026

1

Other relevant factors may include “the possibility that the persons subject to the police 2

action are violent or dangerous, the duration of the action, whether the action takes place in the 3

context of effecting an arrest, the possibility that the suspect may be armed, and the number of 4

persons with whom the police officers must contend at one time.” Kopec v. Tate , 361 F.3d 772, 5

777 (3d Cir. 2004). See also Williams v. City of York, 967 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that it 6

was reasonable for officers responding to a shots-fired call to (1) throw the plaintiff to the ground 7

because she ran and pounded on the door of a house rather than comply with an order to get on the 8

ground and (2) fail to loosen her handcuffs because the defendants were not notified she was in 9

pain); Davenport v. Borough of Homestead, 870 F.3d 273, 280 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that a police 10

shooting was reasonable because “video evidence indisputably shows a heavy pedestrian presence 11

during the course of the pursuit,” and the driver “continuously swerved between inbound and 12

outbound lanes, which ultimately led to his colliding with three other vehicles”) ; Bletz v. Corrie, 13

974 F.3d 306 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that the use of deadly force against a household pet is 14

reasonable if the pet poses an imminent threat to the law enforcement officer’s safety, viewed from 15

the perspective of an objectively reasonable officer). Cf . Anglemeyer v. Ammons , 92 F.4th 184, 16

192 (3d Cir. 2024) (holding that the evidence was sufficient for an excessive force claim where 17

jury could conclude that the plaintiffs were “plainly unarmed, substantially outnumbered, 18

cooperative, . . . in their own home, [and] not suspected of any wrongdoing or facing arrest”); 19

Rush v. City of Philadelphia, 78 F.4th 610 (3d Cir. 2023) (holding that the evidence was sufficient 20

for an excessive force claim where a jury could conclude that the driver “posed no immediate 21

safety threat and was not violent or dangerous, . . . was unarmed, was outnumbered six-to-one, and 22

. . . suffered the most severe physical injury possible—death”); Peroza-Benitez v. Smith, 994 F.3d 23

157 (3d Cir. 2021) (holding that it was unreasonable to punch plaintiff who was hanging from a 24

second story window, causing him to fall, and to tase him once he was unconscious on the ground); 25

El v. City of Pittsburgh , 975 F.3d 327 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that it was unreasonable to slam 26

plaintiff into a wall and take him to the ground where the potential crime at issue was not severe, 27

there was no immediate safety threat, the plaintiff was neither resisting arrest nor trying to flee, 28

was unarmed, not violent or dangerous, was outnumbered six to two, suffered physical injury, and 29

the situation unfolded over a few minutes, not a few tense and dangerous seconds); Jefferson v. 30

Lias, 21 F.4th 74 (3d Cir. 2021) (holding that it was unreasonable to shoot at a suspect fleeing in 31

a vehicle, who had not otherwise displayed threatening behavior, when it was no longer reasonable 32

for an officer to believe his or others’ lives were in immediate peril from the suspect’s flight); id . 33

at 88 (stating that “it should by now be crystal clear that, except for a narrow set of circumstances 34

that police agencies have already carefully defined, it is never reasonable for a police officer to 35

open fire on a suspect fleeing in a motor vehicle”) (emphasis in original) (concurring opinion 36

joined by all three members of the panel). See also Jacobs v. Cumberland County, 8 F.4th 187 (3d 37

Cir. 2021) (holding, under the Due Process Clause, that it was unreasonable to strike pretrial 38

detainee while he was defenseless and obeying orders). 39

40