3d Cir. Model Jury Instr. (Civil) 4.7.2

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Last updated March 2026

established law, the most analogous precedent favored the officer ); Safford Unified School Dist. 1

No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2644 (2009) (“[T]he cases viewing school strip searches 2

differently from the way we see them are numerous enough, with well -reasoned majority and 3

dissenting opinions, to counsel doubt that we were sufficiently clear in the prior statement of 4

law.”); Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3 (2013) (summarily reversing for failure to recognize qualified 5

immunity and stating that it is “especially troubling” that the court of appeals “would conclude 6

that [the officer] was plainly incompetent – and subject to personal liability in damages – based on 7

actions that were lawful according to courts in the jurisdiction where he acted”). In Urda v. Sokso, 8

146 F.4th 311 (3d Cir. 2025), the Court of Appeals cautioned against overreading its prior decision 9

in Andrews v. Scuilli , 853 F.3d 690, 705 (3d Cir. 2017), explaining that Andrews “cannot mean 10

that courts may define clearly established law abstractly [because] that reading would conflict with 11

a landslide of Supreme Court precedent.” 146 F.4th at 315. See also Otero v. Kane, 161 F.4th 189, 12

194 (3d Cir. 2025) (holding that it was not enough that the shock- the-conscience standard was 13

clearly established because the right has to be defined based on the particular facts); Weimer v. 14

County of Fayette , 972 F.3d 177, 191 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that prosecutor is protected by 15

qualified immunity because, while well established in the circuit that police and corrections 16

officers have duty to protect a victim from another officer’s use of excessive force, “we have not 17

extended this duty to prosecutors who fail to intervene to prevent police from conducting 18

unconstitutional investigations”); James v. New Jersey State Police, 957 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2020) 19

(holding that officer was protected by qualified immunity because case was most similar to Kisela, 20

officer knew that the man he shot (1) had violated a restraining order; (2) possessed a firearm that 21

he had brandished within the last hour; and (3) was reportedly mentally ill and may have been off 22

his medication, and distinguishing Bennett v. Murphy, 274 F.3d 133 (3d Cir. 2002), in part because 23

of this knowledge); Davenport v. Borough of Homestead, 870 F.3d 273, 282 (3d Cir. 2017) 24

(holding that police officers were protected by qualified immunity because of the “near absence of 25

cases” dealing with the rights of a passenger involved in a dangerous vehicle pursuit); Fields v. 26

City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 361-62 (3d Cir. 2017) (because other cases recognizing a first 27

amendment right to photograph the police were arguably distinguishable, they did not establish 28

that right clearly enough to overcome qualified immunity); Ray v. Township of Warren, 626 F.3d 29

170, 177 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that the inapplicability of the community caretaking doctrine to 30

warrantless entries into homes was not clearly established in light of, inter alia, “the conflicting 31

precedents on this issue from other Circuits); Marcavage v. National Park Serv., 666 F.3d 856, 32

857, 859-60 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that plaintiff’s conviction for misdemeanors stemming from 33

events at issue supported qualified immunity defense of arresting officer and his supervisor, even 34

though conviction was later reversed). See also City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 502, 35

504 (2019) (holding that the formulation of the clearly established right by the court of appeals—36

the “right to be free of excessive force”—“was far too general”); Wh ite v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 37

552 (2017) (reiterating the need to avoid a high level of generality and stating that the factual 38

uniqueness of the case “alone should have been an important indication” that the defendant did not 39

violate clearly established law); Mann v. Palmerton Area Sch. Dist., 872 F.3d 165, 174 (3d Cir. 40