3d Cir. Model Jury Instr. (Civil) 4.7.1

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Last updated March 2026

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 492 (1991) (holding that 1

a prosecutor’s “appearance in court in support of an application for a search warrant and the 2

presentation of evidence at that hearing” were “protected by absolute immunity”). Moreover, 3

“supervision or training or information- system management” activities can qualify for absolute 4

immunity – even though such acts are administrative in nature – if the administrative action in 5

question “is directly connected with the conduct of a trial.” Van De Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 6

855, 861-62 (2009); see id. at 858-59 (holding that absolute immunity “extends to claims that the 7

prosecution failed to disclose impeachment material ... due to: (1) a failure properly to train 8

prosecutors, (2) a failure properly to supervise prosecutors, or (3) a failure to establish an 9

information system containing potential impeachment material about informants”). Absolute 10

immunity does not apply, however, “[w]hen a prosecutor performs the investigative functions 11

normally performed by a detective or police officer,” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273, or when a 12

prosecutor “provid[es] legal advice to the police,” Burns, 500 U.S. at 492, 496.93 13

93 See also Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 120, 131 (1997) (prosecutor lacked absolute

immunity from claim asserting that she “ma[de] false statements of fact in an affidavit supporting

an application for an arrest warrant,” because in so doing she “performed the function of a

complaining witness” rather than that of an advocate); Roberts v. Lau, 90 F.4th 618, 623 (3d Cir.

2024) (holding, on the face of the complaint, that a prosecutor “functioned as an investigator, not

an advocate, when he identified and tracked down” a witness and “solicited [that witness’] false

testimony”); Weimer v. County of Fayette, Pennsylvania, 972 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding

that a district attorney was entitled to absolute immunity for her alleged conduct in deciding to file

and approving the criminal complaint against Weimer, but not for her alleged direction of the

investigation at the crime scene nor for her investigation into witness statements).

In Odd v. Malone , 538 F.3d 202 (3d Cir. 2008), “prosecuting attorneys obtained bench

warrants to detain material witnesses whose testimony was vital to murder prosecutions. Although

the attorneys diligently obtained the warrants, they neglected to keep the courts informed of the

progress of the criminal proceedings and the custodial status of the witnesses.” Id . at 205. The

Court of Appeals held that a prosecutor sued “for failing to notify the relevant authorities that the

proceedings in which the detained individual was to testify had been continued for nearly four

months,” id., did not qualify for absolute prosecutorial immunity; the court based this holding on

the facts of the case, including the fact that the judge who issued the material witness warrant had

directed the prosecutor to notify him of any delays in the murder prosecution but the prosecutor

had failed to do so. Id. at 212-13. The Odd court also held (a fortiori) that a different prosecutor

sued “for failing to notify the relevant authorities that the material witness remained incarcerated

after the case in which he was to testify had been dismissed,” id . at 205, lacked absolute

prosecutorial immunity. See id. at 215. In Schneyder v. Smith , 653 F.3d 313 (3d Cir. 2011), the

Court of Appeals on a subsequent appeal adhered to its ruling that the prosecutor who allegedly