3d Cir. Model Jury Instr. (Civil) 4.12.1

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Last updated March 2026

therefore, questions about the driver’s criminal history were not tied to the mission of the traffic 1

stop and impermissibly extended the stop). See also United States v. Hurtt, 31 F.4th 152 (3d Cir. 2

2022) (holding that questions about a driver’s occupation, destination, and identities of passengers 3

were all legitimate parts of inquiring into the driver’s sobriety and therefore did not unjustifiably 4

delay the stop, but that pausing the sobriety test in order to ensure the safety of another officer who 5

put himself in danger by getting into the truck and kneeling on the front seat did unjustifiably 6

extend the stop); United States v. Garner, 961 F.3d 264, 271- 72 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that the 7

earliest the “Rodriguez moment” happened was when the trooper began asking the stopped driver 8

“about his employment, family, criminal history, and other conduct unrelated to the traffic stop,” 9

and that, by this time, the trooper had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity beyond the traffic 10

offense because the rental car did not have the typical bar code, had air fresheners clipped on every 11

vent, and was traveling along a drug trafficking corridor; the rental agreement had expired two 12

weeks earlier; and the driver seemed extremely nervous); United States v. Wilson, 960 F.3d 136, 13

145-46 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that “less than ten minutes” after the car was pulled over and while 14

waiting to hear from dispatch, the stop was still justified for traffic enforcement, and by then the 15

officer had reasonable suspicion because the three men “were driving through North Carolina in a 16

rental car they had picked up the day before in Philadelphia, but the person named in the rental 17

agreement was not in the car,” the men “said they were going to Georgia for a week, but the car 18

was rented for a month and they had no luggage,” and “gave conflicting stories about their trip’s 19

purpose,” and one “confessed to having a lot of cash in the car”); United States v. Thompson, 772 20

F.3d 752, 759 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that an officer had reasonable suspicion for a drug sniff after 21

a traffic stop because the defendant was “visibly nervous, with a shaky voice and a vein on his 22

neck pulsating rapidly,” his “answers to questions came out hesitatingly,” and the amount of his 23

luggage “appeared to be inconsistent with the stated length of the trip”). 24

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“Traffic stops are especially fraught with danger to police officers, so an officer may need 26

to take certain negligibly burdensome precautions in order to complete his mission safely.” 27

Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356 (cleaned up). The Court of Appeals has held that a two-minute criminal 28

history check supported by objectively reasonable safety concerns was permissible as one such 29

negligibly burdensome precaution. United States v. Hunter , 88 F.4th 221, 226 (3d Cir. 2023). It 30

acknowledged that “under other circumstances, a criminal record check may be unreasonable if it 31

is more than negligibly burdensome and thus exceeds the stop’s mission.” Id. at 226. 32

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As to roadside questions, in United States v. Ross , 151 F.4th 487, 496 (3d Cir. 2025), the 34

Court of Appeals “recognized that [such] questioning can be placed into . . . four categories . . . 35

three of which pass constitutional muster, and the fourth of which, if not supported by reasonable 36

suspicion that the driver has committed a crime independent of the traffic violation, violates the 37

Fourth Amendment.” The four categories are: (1) small talk, including common greetings and 38

courtesies; (2) infraction -related inquiries; (3) safety -related inquiries; and (4) off -mission 39

inquiries. Id. at 496- 99. It placed an officer’s compliment regarding a driver’s expensive watch 40