3d Cir. Model Jury Instr. (Civil) 4.11.2

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Last updated March 2026

perhaps because the defendants took the position that Colburn governed. See Brief for Correction 1

Officers, 2016 WL 5846656, at *23 (quoting Colburn as “set[ting] forth a clear standard for 2

establishing liability in prison suicide cases”); Brief for Dr. Rathore, Dr. Eidsvoog, and MHM, 3

Inc., 2016 WL 5845936, at *14 & n.5 (relying on Colburn and noting that while it was a pre-trial 4

detainee case, it “still applies to a convicted prisoner whose Eighth Amendment protections have 5

attached”). See also Mullin v. Balicki , 875 F.3d 140, 149, 158- 59 (3d Cir. 2017) (describing 6

Palakovic as “clarify[ying] our vulnerability- to-suicide precedent,” and explaining that a 7

“vulnerability-to-suicide claim, which is simply a more specific articulation of the Eighth 8

Amendment rule that prison officials must not be deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's serious 9

medical needs, requires showing (1) the existence of a particular vulnerability to suicide, (2) that 10

a prison official knew or should have known of the individual's particularly vulnerability, and (3) 11

that the official acted with reckless or deliberate indifference to the particular vulnerability.”); 12

Kedra v. Schroeter , 876 F.3d 424, 440 (3d Cir. 2017) (describing Palakovic as holding that the 13

deliberate indifference standard in the prison suicide context is objective and that “the relevant 14

inquiry for both substantive due process claims and Eighth Amendment claims [is] whether the 15

prison official knew or should have known of the individual's particular vulnerability.”) 16

17

In light of the apparent tension between the decision in Farmer and the decisions in 18

Palakovic, Mullin, and Kedra , the committee has decided to retain the Instruction’s actual 19

knowledge requirement, and to offer an alternative in the relevant footnote to the Instruction. See 20

also Clark v. Coupe , 55 F.4th 167, 179 (3d Cir. 2022) (stating that this element of the Eighth 21

Amendment standard “is subjective” and citing Farmer). 22

23

Under the Farmer deliberate indifference standard, even “officials who actually knew of a 24

substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded 25

reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. 26

27

Causation. Although the standard stated in Woloszyn does not explicitly include an element 28

of causation, district court opinions have applied a causation test. See, e.g., Foster v. City of 29

Philadelphia, 2004 WL 225041, at *7 (E .D. Pa. 2004) (“[B]ecause Massey's failure to act 30

consistent with Police Department Directives on High -Risk Suicide Detainees (requiring 31

communication of suicidal tendencies to the supervisor and all other police officials coming into 32

contact with the detainee) could be found to be found to be a factor contributing to Foster's suicide 33

attempt, Plaintiff has made the requisite causal nexus. ”); id. at *8 (“ Because a reasonable jury 34

could find that Foster's suicide attempt could have been prevented had Moore monitored Foster 35

more closely, Plaintiff has made the requisite causal nexus.” ); Owens, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 382- 83 36

(“Because the omissions complained of could be found to have been among the factors resulting 37

in the non- deliverance of the pass [to see a psychiatrist] at a time contemporaneous to the last 38

sighting of Gaudreau alive, plaintiffs have made a showing of the requisite causal nexus.” ). 39

Including the element of causation seems appropriate; as the Court of Appeals stated regarding 40