3d Cir. Model Jury Instr. (Civil) 4.1

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Last updated March 2026

not affect how the jury is instructed.8 1

8 Exhaustion of remedies doctrine provides one example. In general, there is no

requirement that a Section 1983 plaintiff exhaust state -law remedies or state administrative

processes before suing under Section 1983. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (“The

federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and

refused before the federal one is invoked.”), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982) (“[E]xhaustion of

state administrative remedies should not be required as a prerequisite to bringing an action

pursuant to § 1983.”). Exhaustion requirements do apply to prisoner claims regarding prison

conditions under Section 1983 and other federal laws. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (provision of the

Prison Litigation Reform Act, or PLRA, stating that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to

prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined

in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available

are exhausted”). But the Court of Appeals has made clear that PLRA exhaustion presents a

question that can be resolved by the judge. See Small v. Camden Cty., 728 F.3d 265, 269, 271 (3d

Cir. 2013); see also Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2018) (setting procedures

to govern district -court fact -finding on question of PLRA exhaustion). On the other hand, the

Supreme Court has held, “as a matter of statutory interpretation that parties have a right to a jury

trial on PLRA exhaustion when that issue is intertwined with the merits of a claim that falls under

the Seventh Amendment.” Perttu v. Richards, 605 U.S. 460, 468 (2025). Perttu does not overrule

the general principle that the court resolves questions of exhaustion, but instead carves out an

exception for issues that are also involved in the merits. Cf. id . at 483 (Barrett, J., dissenting)

(noting that the question whether the Seventh Amendment requires jury trials for all disputes about

exhaustion “might be very difficult” but was not within the question presented and that “Richards

has presented no evidence that intertwinement with the merits was relevant to the jury-trial right”).