SCRE 608

(a) Opinion and Reputation Evidence of Character. The credibility of a witness may be attacked or

supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the

evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful

character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by

opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.

(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of

attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609,

may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative

of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning

the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for

truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.

The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not operate as a waiver

of the accused's or the witness' privilege against self-incrimination when examined with respect to

matters which relate only to credibility.

(c) Evidence of Bias. Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be shown to impeach the

witness either by examination of the witness or by evidence otherwise adduced.

Note:

Except for the addition of subsection (c), this rule is identical to the federal rule.

Subsection (a) of this rule permits a witness' truthfulness to be impeached by opinion

or reputation evidence. The general rule in South Carolina is that a witness' general

reputation for truth and veracity is placed in issue when taking the witness stand. See

State v. Major, 301 S.C. 181, 391 S.E.2d 235 (1990); State v. Robertson, 26 S.C. 117, 1

S.E. 443 (1887); State v. Hale, 284 S.C. 348, 326 S.E.2d 418 (Ct. App.1985), cert. denied,

286 S.C. 127, 332 S.E.2d 533 1985). Formerly, although evidence of a person's general

reputation in the community was admissible, opinion testimony was not admissible.

State v. Groome, 274 S.C. 189, 262 S.E.2d 31 (1980); In re: Greenfield's Estate, 245 S.C.

595, 141 S.E.2d 916 (1965). The provision prohibiting bolstering of a witness until after

the witness' credibility is attacked is consistent with prior South Carolina law. State v.

Lynn, 277 S.C. 222, 284 S.E.2d 786 (1981); Woods v. Thrower, 116 S.C. 165, 107 S.E. 250

(1921). However, there was an exception allowing bolstering prior to attack when the

witness was a stranger to the community. State v. Lynn, supra; Woods v. Thrower,

supra. This exception is not included in the rule.

As to subsection (b), no South Carolina cases have been found which permit cross-examination regarding specific acts to show truthfulness. The use of specific acts to

attack credibility is similar to prior South Carolina case law which allowed a witness to

be cross-examined about prior bad acts if they constituted crimes of moral turpitude.

State v. Outlaw, 307 S.C. 177, 414 S.E.2d 147 (1992); State v. Major, 301 S.C. 181, 391

S.E.2d 235 (1990); State v. McGuire, 272 S.C. 547, 253 S.E.2d 103 (1979). The cross-examiner was required to take the answer given by the witness and could not use

extrinsic evidence or other testimony to prove the bad act. State v. Outlaw, supra;

State v. Major, supra. Additionally, the inquiry could only go so far as to bring out the

general nature of the misconduct and could not go into specific details. State v.

Outlaw, supra; State v. Major, supra.

Subsection (b), like its federal counterpart, does not set forth what conduct may

adversely affect a witness' credibility. The former case law standard, which allowed

impeachment if the conduct was a crime of moral turpitude, is not the appropriate

standard in light of the Court's decision to abandon the moral turpitude standard

under Rule 609. Instead, the trial courts should be guided by the decisions of the

federal courts which limit inquiry into those specific instances of misconduct which are

"clearly probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness" such as forgery, bribery, false

pretenses, and embezzlement. See Weinstein's Evidence, 608[05] (1994). This will

reduce the kinds of misconduct which can be inquired into from that permitted under

prior law. Further, this rule, like the prior case law, does not allow a cross-examiner to

go on a "fishing expedition" in the hopes of finding some misconduct. State v.

McGuire, supra. The decision whether to allow such impeachment remains in the

discretion of the trial judge. Id.

Subsection (c) was added to address impeachment by showing bias or impartiality.

State v. Brewington, 267 S.C. 97, 226 S.E.2d 249 (1976); North Greenville College v.

Sherman Const. Co., Inc., 270 S.C. 553, 243 S.E.2d 441 (1978).