N.J. Model Criminal Jury Charge, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1)

Revised 1/9/12

AGGRAVATED ASSAULT - SERIOUS BODILY INJURY

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1)

In Count of the indictment, the defendant(s) is (are) charged with the crime

of aggravated assault in that (he/she/they) allegedly on

in the

(Date) (Municipality)

(READ PERTINENT LANGUAGE OF INDICTMENT)

The defendant(s) is (are) accused of violating a section of our State statutes that reads as

follows:

A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he . . . (a)ttempts to

cause serious bodily injury to an other, or causes such injury

purposely or knowingly or under circumstances manifesting

extreme indifference to the value of human life recklessly causes

such injury.

Under this statute, the defendant(s ) can be found guilty if (he/she/they) EITHER

caused

serious bodily injury to another OR attempted to cause serious bodily injury to another.

To find the defendant(s) guilty of aggravated assault for causing serious bodily injury to

another, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:

1. That the defendant(s) caused serious bodily injury to another; and

2. That the defendant(s) acted purposely or knowingly or acted recklessly under

circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.

The first element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the

defendant(s) caused serious bodily injury to another.

Serious bodily injury means bodily injury wh ich creates a substantial risk of death or

which causes serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impa irment of the function

of any bodily member or organ.

The second element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the

defendant(s) acted purposely or knowingly or acted recklessly under circumstances manifesting

AGGRAVATED ASSAULT -

SERIO

US BODILY INJURY

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1)

extreme indifference to the value of human life.

A person acts purposely with respect to the result of his/her conduct if it is his/her

conscious object to cause such a result. A person acts purposely if he/she acts with design, with a

specific intent, with a particular object or purpo se, or if he/she means to do what he/she does

(e.g., “I did it on purpose”).

A person acts knowingly with respect to the result of his/her conduct if he/she is aware

that it is practically certain that his/her conduct will cause such a result.

A person acts recklessly with respect to the result of his/her conduct if he/she consciously

disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur from his/her conduct. The

risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature an d purpose of the actor’s

conduct and the circumstances known to the actor, its disregard involves a gross deviation from

the standard of conduct that a r easonable person would observe in the actor’s situation. One is

said to act recklessly if one acts with recklessn ess, with scorn for the consequences, heedlessly,

fool-hardily.

The phrase “under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human

life” does not focus on the state of mind of the actor, but rather on th e circumstances under

which you find that he/she acted. If, in light of all th e evidence, you find that the conduct of the

defendant(s) resulted in a probab ility as opposed to a mere possibi lity of serious bodily injury,

then you may find that (he/she/they) acted under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference

to the value of human life.

1

1 In State v. Curtis, 195 N.J. Super. 354, 364-65 (App. Div. 1984), certif. den., 99 N.J. 212 (1984), the Court

found, in the context of aggravated manslaughter, that the difference between recklessness under circumstances

manifesting extreme indifference to human life and mere recklessness is the difference between the probability as

opposed to the possibility that a certain result will occur. The Supreme Court endorsed Curtis in State v. Breakiron,

108 N.J. 591, 605 (1987). The case law has applied the Curtis probability standard to the aggravated-assault statute.

State v. Scher, 278 N.J. Super. 249, 272 (App. Div. 1994), certif. den., 140 N.J. 276 (1995); State v. Oriole, 243 N.J.

Super. 688, 693 (Law Div. 1990). Please note that in the aggravated-assault statute the Legislature has used the term

“extreme indifference to the value of human life” while th e aggravated-manslaughter st atute speaks in terms of

“extreme indifference to human life.” Therefore, the indifference referred to in the aggravated-assault statute would

appear not to relate to whether the victim lives or dies but rather to the value of the victim’s life.

AGGRAVATED ASSAULT -

SERIO

US BODILY INJURY

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1)

In determining whether the defendant(s) acte d purposely or knowingly or acted recklessly

under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, you may

consider the nature of the act(s) itself(themse lves) and the severity of the resulting injury

(injuries).

(NOTE: When the actual victim is one other than the intended victim, the jury should be

instructed that it is immaterial that the actual victim was not the intended victim).

If you find that the State has proved each element beyond a reasonable doubt, then you

must find the defendant(s) guilty. All jurors do not have to agree unanimously concerning which

form of serious bodily injury aggravated assault is present so long as all believe that it was one

form of serious bodily injury or the other. However, for a defendant to be guilty of serious bodily

injury aggravated assault, all jurors must agree that the defe ndant either knowingly or purposely

or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life

caused serious bodily injury to (insert victim’s name).

If you find that the State has failed to pr ove any element beyond a reasonable doubt, then

you must find the defendant(s) not guilty of the char ge of aggravated assault in that (he/she/they)

caused serious bodily injury to another.

As I previously instructed you, the defenda nt(s) can be found guilt y if (he/she/they)

EITHER

caused serious bodily injury to another OR attempted to cause serious bodily injury to

another.

To find the defendant(s) guilty of attempting to cause serious bodily injury to another, the

State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant(s) purposely

2 attempted to cause

serious bodily injury to anot her. If you find be yond a reasonable doubt th at the defendant(s)

attempted to cause serious bodily injury, it does not matter whether such injury actually resulted.

2 When a person actually causes serious bodily injury, it does not matter whether his mental state is

purposeful, knowing or reckless (under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life).

When, however, the person attempts to cause, but does not cause, serious bodily injury, he must act purposefully.

Cf. State v. McAllister, 211 N.J. Super. 355, 362 (App. Div. 1986).

AGGRAVATED ASSAULT -

SERIO

US BODILY INJURY

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1)

The law provides that a person is guilty of attempt if, acting purposefully, he/she:

(select appropriate section)

1. Engaged in conduct that would constitute the offense if the attendant circumstances

were as a reasonable person would believe them to be;

(or)

2. Did (or omitted to do) anything with th e purpose of causing serious bodily injury to

another without further conduct on his/her part. This means that the defendant(s) did something

designed to cause serious bodily injury without having to take any further action.

(or)

3. Did (or omitted to do) anything that, und er the circumstances as a reasonable person

would believe them to be, was an act (or omission) constituting as substantial step in a course of

conduct planned to culminate in his/her commissi on of the crime. The step taken must be one

that is strongly corroborative of the defendant’s criminal purpose. The accused must be shown to

have had a firmness of criminal purpose in light of the step(s) he/she had already taken. These

preparatory steps must be substantial and not just very remote preparatory acts.3

Serious bodily injury means bodily injury wh ich creates a substantial risk of death or

which causes serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impa irment of the function

of any bodily member or organ.

A person acts purposely with respect to the result of his/her conduct if it is his/her

conscious object to cause such a result. A person acts purposely if he/she acts with design, with a

specific intent, with a particular object or purpo se, or if he/she means to do what he/she does

(e.g., “I did it on purpose”).

If you find that the State has proved be yond a reasonable doubt th at the defendant(s)

3 State v. Fornino, 223 N.J. 531, 538 (App. Div. 1988), certif, den., 111 N.J. 570 (1988); cert. den., 488 U.S.

859, 109 S.Ct. 152, 102 L.Ed. 2d 123 (1988).

AGGRAVATED ASSAULT -

SERIOUS BODILY INJURY

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1)

attempted to cause serious bodily injury to another, then you must find the defendant(s) guilty.4

If you find that the State has failed to prove beyond a reas onable doubt that the

defendant(s) attempted to cause serious bodily injury to another, then you must find the

defendant(s) not guilty.5

4 Where appropriate, renunciation should be charged. N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1(d).

5 In second degree aggravated assa ult cases involving the use of a deadly weapon, it may be appropriate to

instruct the jury on the following lesser offenses: third degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(2); fourth

degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(3); and simple assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1a(1) and (2). State v. Villar ,

292 N.J. Super. 320, 326-330 (App. Div. 1996), rev’d. o.g., 150 N.J. 503, 517 n. 4 (1997). See also, State v. Sloane,

111 N.J. 293, 301 (1988). These offenses may be charged as lesser offenses even though third degree aggravated

assault, fourth degree aggravated assault and a(2) disorder ly persons simple assault contain an element (a deadly

weapon) that is not an element of second degree aggravated assault. State v. Villar , supra; State v. Sloane , supra.

When these lesser offenses are to be charged, the trial co urt and counsel should construct a sequence of the lesser

offenses to be charged. State v. Villar, 150 N.J. at 517 n. 4.