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N.J. Model Criminal Jury Charge, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(13)

Aggravated Assault – Strangulation of a Victim of Domestic Violence

activein force · 2023-11-13 – presentas-observed

Approved 11/13/2023

AGGRAVATED ASSAULT – STRANGULATION OF

A VICTIM OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(13)1

In Count __________ of the Indictment, the defendant(s) is (are) charged with the crime

of aggravated assault in that he/she/they allegedly on __________ in the _________________

(Date) (Municipality)

(READ PERTINENT LANGUAGE OF INDICTMENT)

The defendant(s) is (are) accused of violating a section of our state statutes that reads as

follows:

Knowingly or, under circumstances manifesting extreme

indifference to the value of human life, recklessly obstructs the

breathing or blood circulation of a person who, with respect to the

actor, meets the definition of a victim of domestic violence . . ., by

applying pressure on the throat or neck or blocking the nose or

mouth of such person, thereby causing or attempting to cause bodily

injury.

To find th e defendant(s) guilty of aggravated assault under this section, the State must

prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:

1. That the defendant(s) obstructed the breathing or blood circulation of [name of

person] by applying pressure on t he throat or neck or blocking the nose or mouth

of [name of person];

2. That the defendant(s) acted knowingly or , under circumstances manifesting

extreme indifference to the value of human life, recklessly;

3. That [name of person] meets the definition of a victim of domestic violence; and

4. That the defendant(s) thereby caused, or attempted to cause, bodily injury to [name

of person].

The first element that the State must prove is that the defendant(s) obstructed the breathing

or blood circulation of [name of person.] by applying pressure on the throat or neck or blocking

1 N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(13) took effect on November 13, 2017.

AGGRAVATED ASSAULT – STRANGULATION OF A VICTIM OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(12)

the nose or mouth of [name of person].

The second element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the

defendant(s) acted knowingly or , under circums tances manifesting extreme indifference to the

value of human life, recklessly.

A person acts knowingly with respect to the nature of his/her conduct or the attendant

circumstances if he/she is aware that his/her conduct is of that nature o r that such circumstances

exist or if he/she is aware of a high probability of their existence. A person acts knowingly with

respect to the result of his/her conduct if he/she is aware that it is practically certain that his/her

conduct will cause such a result.

A person acts recklessly with respect to the result of his/her conduct if he/she consciously

disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur from his/her conduct. The

risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s

conduct and the circumstances known to the actor, its disregard involves a gr oss deviation from

the standard of conduct that a reasonable per son would observe in the actor’s situation. One is

said to act recklessly if one acts with recklessness, with scorn for the consequences, heedlessly,

fool-hardily.

The phrase “under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human

life” does not focus on the state of mind of the actor, but rather on the circumstances under which

you find that he/she acted. If, in light of all the evidence, you find that the conduct of the

defendant(s) resulted in a probability as opposed to a mere possibility of bodily injury, then you

may find that he/she acted under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of

human life.2

2 In State v. Curtis, 195 N.J. Super. 354, 364–65 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 99 N.J. 212 (1984), the court

found, in the context of aggravated manslaughter, that the difference between recklessness under

circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life and mere recklessness is the difference

between the probability as opposed to the possibility that a certain result will occur. The Supreme Court

endorsed Curtis in State v. Breakiron , 108 N.J. 591, 605 (1987). The case law has applied the Curtis

probability standard to the aggravated-assault statute. State v. Scher, 278 N.J. Super. 249, 272 (App. Div.

1994), certif. denied, 140 N.J. 276 (1995); State v. Oriole , 243 N.J. Super. 688, 693 (Law Div. 1990).

Please note that in the aggravated-assault statute the Legislature has used the term “extreme indifference to

the value of human life,” while t he aggravated -manslaughter statute speaks in terms of “extreme

indifference to human life.” Therefore, the indifference referred to in the aggravated-assault statute would

AGGRAVATED ASSAULT – STRANGULATION OF A VICTIM OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(12)

In determining whether the defendant(s) acted knowingly or under circumstances

manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life , recklessly, you may consider the

nature of the act(s) itself (themselves) and the severity of the resulting injury (injuries).

Knowing and reckless are conditions of the mind that cannot be seen and can only be

determined by inferences drawn from the defe ndant’s (defendants’) conduct, words or acts. A

state of mind is rarely susceptible of direct proof but must ordinarily be inferred from the facts.

Therefore, it is not necessary that the State produce witnesses to testify that an accused said that

he/she had a certain state of mind when he/she engaged in a particular act. It is within your power

to find that such proof has been furnished beyond a reasonable doubt by inference, which may

arise from the nature of the defendant’s (defendants’) acts and conduct, from all that he/she/they

said and did at the particular time and place, and from all surrounding circumstances.

The third element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that [name of

person] meets the definition of a victim of domestic violence.3 In order for the State to prove this

element, the State must first prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant(s) caused bodily

injury to [name of person], and that the defendant(s) acted knowingly or under circumstances

manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, recklessly. The State must then prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that

(CHOOSE AS APPROPRIATE)4

(Relationship Class One)

[name of person] is 18 years of age or older or an emancipated minor and the defendant(s) is [name

appear not to relate to whether the victim lives or dies but rather to the value of the victim’s life.

3 N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d).

4 The definition of “victim of domestic violence” as contained in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d) refers to a specified

person, protected under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991, who “has been subjected to

domestic violence” by another specified person. The possible relationships between the parties as

enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d) are separated into three classes for purposes of this model charge. The

term, “domestic violence,” as referenced in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d), is defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a) as the

occurrence of one or more of seventeen predicate acts inflicted upon a person protected under the Prevention

of Domestic Violence Act of 1991 by an adult or an emancipated minor. Since this model cha rge only

concerns obstruction of breath/blood circulation aggravated assault to a person who, with respect to the

actor, meets the definition of a victim of domestic violence, each of the seventeen predicate acts as

enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:25 -19(a) need not be considered by a jury with regard to whether [name of

person] meets the definition of a victim of domestic violence.

AGGRAVATED ASSAULT – STRANGULATION OF A VICTIM OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(12)

of person’s] spouse, former spouse, or any other person who is a present hou sehold member or

was at any time a household member. Emancipated minor means a person who is under 18 years

of age but who has been married, has entered military service, has a child or is pregnant or has

been previously declared by a court or an administrative agency to be emancipated.5

(Relationship Class Two)

[name of person] , regardless of age, has a child in common with the defendant(s), or [name of

person], regardless of age, anticipates having a child in common with the defendant(s), if one of

the parties is pregnant.

(Relationship Class Three)

[name of person], regardless of age, has had a dating relationship with the defendant(s).

(CHARGE IN ALL CASES)

The fourth element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the

defendant(s) caused, or attempted to cause, bodily injury.

Bodily injury is defined as physical pain, illness, or any impairment of the physical

condition of another.

To establish that the defendant(s) caused bodily injury, the State must prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that [name of person] would not have suffered bodily injury but for the

defendant(s) conduct6.

To establish that the defendant(s) attempted to cause bodily injury to [name of person], the

law provides that a person has attempted to cause bodily injury if, acting purposely, he/she:

(CHOOSE AS APPROPRIATE)

1. Engaged in conduct that would constitute the offense if the attendant circumstances

were as a reasonable person would believe them to be;

(or)

5 N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(e).

6 N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3a(1). If proximate cause is an issue, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3c should be charged.

AGGRAVATED ASSAULT – STRANGULATION OF A VICTIM OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(12)

2. Did (or omitted to do) anything with the purpose of causing bodily injury to another

without further conduct on his/her part. This means that the defendant(s) did something designed

to cause bodily injury without having to take any further action.

(or)

3. Did (or omitted to do ) anything that, under the circumstances as a reasonable person

would believe them to be, was an act (or omission) constituting a substantial step in a course of

conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime. The step taken must be one that is

strongly corroborative of the defendant’s (defendants’) criminal purpose. The accused must be

shown to have had a firmness of criminal purpose in light of the step(s) he/she had already taken.

These preparatory steps must be substantial and not just very remote preparatory acts.7

A person acts purposely with respect to the result of his/her conduct if it is his/her conscious

object to cause such a result. A person acts purposely if he/she acts with design, with a specific

intent, with a particular object or purpose, or if he/she means to do what he/she does.

In determining whether the defendant(s) acted purposely, you may consider the nature of

the act(s) itself (themselves) and the severity of the resulting injury (injuries).

Purpose is a condition of the mind that cannot be seen and can only be determined by

inferences drawn from the defendant’s (defendants’) conduct, words or acts. A state of mind is

rarely susceptible of direct proof but must ordinarily be inferred from the facts. Therefore, it is

not necessary that the State produce witnesses to testify that an accused said that he/she had a

certain state of mind when he/she engaged in a particular act. It is within your power to find that

such proof has been furnished beyond a reasonable doubt by inference, which may arise from the

nature of the defendant’s (defendants’) acts and conduct, from all that he/she said and did at the

particular time and place, and from all surrounding circumstances.

(CHARGE IN ALL CASES)

All jurors do not have to agree unanimously concerning which form of aggravated assault

is present so long as all believe that it was one form of aggravated assault or the other. However,

7 State v. Fornino, 223 N.J. Super. 531, 538 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 570 (1988), cert. denied,

488 U.S. 859, 109 S. Ct. 152, 102 L. Ed. 2d 123 (1988).

AGGRAVATED ASSAULT – STRANGULATION OF A VICTIM OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(12)

to be guilty of aggravated assault, all jurors must agree that the defendant(s) either knowingly or,

under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, recklessly

obstructed the breathing or blood circulation of [name of person] by applying pressure on the throat

or neck or blocking the nose or mouth of [name of person].; thereby causing or attempting to cause

bodily injury to a person who, with respect to the actor, meets the definition of a victim of domestic

violence;

If you find that the State has proved each element beyond a reasonable doubt, then you

must find the defendant(s) guilty.

If you find that the State has failed to prove any element beyond a reasonable doubt, then

you must find the defendant(s) not guilty.

History

Approved 11/13/2023

Provenance

Source
njcourts.gov
Retrieved
2026-08-20
Edition
2026-08-20
Content hash
df96c0bfc6f5c0169a2781f6ad7f201d721c162f6b6158e041abb9011dc78896
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