N.J. Model Civil Jury Charge 6.11

6.11 PROXIMATE CAUSE — ROUTINE TORT CASE WHERE

NO ISSUES OF CONCURRENT OR INTERVENING

CAUSES, OR FORESEEABILITY OF INJURY OR HARM

(Approved 08/99; Revised 04/16)

NOTE TO JUDGE

This charge is designed to address proximate cause in the routine tort

case when there is no issue as to concurrent or intervening causes or

foreseeability. Its most recent revision is the result of the Supreme

Court’s opinion in Komlodi v. Picciano, 217 N.J. 387, 422-23

(2014), where it stated:

The two forms of causation – “but for” and “substantial

factor” – are mutually exclusive. A “but for” charge is

appropriate when there is only one potential cause of the

injury or harm. See Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman, P.C.,

145 N.J. 395, 417 (1996) (“In the routine tort case, ‘the

law requires proof that the result complained of

probably would not have occurred “but for” the

negligent conduct of the defendant.’” (citation

omitted)). In contrast, the “substantial factor” test is

given when there are concurrent causes potentially

capable of producing the harm or injury. Id. at 419–20.

Thus, “a tortfeasor will be held answerable if its

‘negligent conduct was a substantial factor in bringing

about the injuries,’ even where there are ‘other

intervening causes which were foreseeable or were

normal incidents of the risk created.’” Brown v. United

States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 171 (1984) (quoting

Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 203 (1959)). A

substantial factor is one that is “not a remote, trivial or

inconsequential cause.” Model Jury Charge (Civil) §

6.13.

As a result of the above language in Komlodi, the Committee omitted

the “substantial factor” language from this charge. When the

evidence presented during the trial may suggest one or more

concurrent causes bringing about the harm or injury, Model Jury

Charge (Civil) 6.12 should be used.

By proximate cause, I refer to a cause that in a natural and continuous

sequence produces the accident/incident/event and resulting injury/loss/harm and

without which the resulting accident/incident/event or injury/loss/harm0F 1 would

not have occurred.1F 2 A person who is negligent is held responsible for any

accident/incident/event or injury/loss/harm that results in the ordinary course of

events from his/her/its negligence.2F 3 This means that you must find that the

resulting accident/incident/event or injury/loss/harm to [name of plaintiff or other

party] would not have occurred but for the negligent conduct of [name of

defendant or other party].3F4

If you find that but for [name of defendant or other party]’s negligence the

accident/incident/event or injury/loss/harm would not have occurred, then you

1When charging proximate cause on liability, use accident/incident/event, as appropriate.

When charging proximate cause on damages, use injury/loss/harm, as appropriate.

2Vuocolo v. Diamond Shamrock Chem., 240 N.J. Super. at 294; Cruz-Mendez v. ISU, 156

N.J. 556 (1999). This language has been disapproved in those cases where there are concurrent

or intervening causes of harm, Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman, 145 N.J. 395, 419 (1996), but can

still be employed in the routine case when a claim of concurrent or intervening cause is not

raised.

3Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 203 (1959).

4The “but for” test for the routine case is derived from Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman, 145

N.J. 395, 417 (1996); and Camp v. Jiffy Lube #114, 309 N.J. Super. 305 (App. Div. 1998). See

also Cruz-Mendez v. ISU, supra.

should find that [name of defendant or other party] was a proximate cause of

[name of plaintiff]’s injury/loss/harm.