NJ · jury_instructions
N.J. Model Civil Jury Charge 5.52
Professional Liability Of An Architect/ Engineer
5.52 PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY OF AN ARCHITECT/ENGINEER
(Approved 11/95)
A. General Duty Owing
In this action plaintiff contends that defendant was negligent because he/she
did not comply with the standard of car e that the law imposes upon him/her while
performing the work of his/her contract with __________________. Plaintiff
contends that as a result of defendant's negligence plaintiff suffered injury for which
damages are sought.
To decide this case properly you must know the standard of care imposed by
law against which defendant's responsibilities as an architect should be measured.
An architect represents that he/she has and will use the degree of knowledge,
skill, judgment and taste ordinarily possessed and used by the average architect in the
profession.1 Further, the architect’s conduct must be measured by the standard
architectural practice, in the same or similar communities, at the time the architect
was performing his/her services. Thus an architect has the duty to have and to use
that degree of judgment, knowledge, skill a nd taste which architects of ordinary
ability possess and exercise, in the same or similar communities, at the time the
1 This charge is equally appropriate for othe r design professionals, such as: engineers, land
surveyors, professional planners, etc. However, the term “taste” would be deleted from the standard
applicable to professional engineers and other non-aesthetically oriented design professionals.
architect performs his/her services. This is the standard by which to judge the
architect in this case.
The law does not expect or require pe rfection. Unsatisfactory results, alone,
are not necessarily evidence of lack of skill or proper care. Thus, if you find that the
architect has exercised that degree of knowledge, skill, judgment and taste which is
possessed and used by the average archit ect, you may not find him/her liable for
negligence even though unsatisfactory results may have occurred.
Further, where, according to standard architectural practice, the work involves
matters to be subjected to the judgment of the architect, the architect is allowed to
exercise that judgment. An architect is not liable if, in the exercise of that judgment,
in accordance with accepted standard, a bad result occurs. If in the exercise of his/her
judgment an architect selects one or two or more courses of action, each of which
under the circumstances has substantial support as proper practice in the architectural
profession, the architect is not negligent even if the course chosen produces a poor
result.
However, an architect who departs fro m standard architectural practice cannot
excuse himself/herself from the consequences by stating it was an exercise of his/her
judgment. If the exercise of an architect's judgment causes him/her to do that which
standard architectural practice forbids, he/she is negligent. Similarly, an architect is
negligent if his/her judgment causes hi m/her to omit doing something which under
the circumstances is required by standard architectural practice.
Simply stated, then, the obligation or duty which the law imposes on an
architect is to bring to his/her client that knowledge, skill, judgment and taste
ordinarily possessed and exercised in sim ilar situations, in the same or similar
communities, in his/her field at the time of the undertaking. If you find that the
defendant has complied with this standard, he/she is not liable to the plaintiff,
regardless of the result of his/her work. On the other hand, if you find that the
defendant has departed from this standard of care, and that such departure has resulted
in injury or damage, then you should find the defendant liable for his/her negligence.
Cases:
For a definition and discussion of th e scope of the duties owed by an
architect to his/her client, see Sykes v. Propane Power Corp., 224 N.J.
Super. 686 (App. Div. 1988); Walker Rogge, Inc. v. Chelsea Title and
Guar. Co., 222 N.J. Super. 363 (App. Div. 1988), aff’d, 116 N.J. 517
(1989); Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 299A (1975);
Bloomsburg Mills v. Sordoni Construction Co., 164 A.2d 201, 203 (Pa.
1960); Bonadiman-McCain, Inc. v. Snow, 6 Cal Rrtr. 52, 60 (Cal App.
1960); Paxton v. Alameda Cty., 259 P.2d 934 (Cal. App. 1953); Chapel
v. Clark, 76 N.W. 62 (Mich. 1898); Coombs v. Beede, 36 A. 104, 104-
105 (Me. 1896). With respect to the f act that an architect is not an
insurer, guarantor or warrantor of a perfect result, see Wills v. Black &
West Architects, 344 P.2d 581 (Okla. 1959); Major v. Leary, 268 N.Y.S.
413 (App. Div. 1934).
B. Expert Testimony to Prove Standard of Care 2
Negligence is conduct that falls below a standard of care required by law for
the protection of persons or property from foreseeable risks of harm.
In a suit against an architect, jurors normally are not qualified to supply the
standard of care by which to measure th e defendant's conduct. Based upon their
common knowledge alone, without technical training, jurors usually cannot know
what conduct constitutes standard architectural practice. Therefore, ordinarily, when
an architect is charged with negligence, the standard of practice by which his/her
conduct is to be judged must be furnished by expert testimony; that is to say, by the
testimony of persons who by knowledge, training or experience are deemed qualified
to testify and to express their opinions on standard architectural practice.
As jurors, you should not speculate or guess about the standards which the
average architect should follow. In a case such as this, you as jurors must determine
what is standard architectural practice from the testimony of the expert witnesses who
have been heard in this case. After hearing such testimony and deciding what
standard architectural practice is in the circumstances of this case, you as jurors must
then determine whether the defendant has complied with or wh ether defendant has
2 If the failure of the architect’s performance is so clear that professional negligence may be found
without the aid of expert testimony, this instruction is unnecessary.
departed from that standard of care. If you find that the defendant has complied with
this standard, he/she is not liable to the pl aintiff, regardless of the result of his/her
work. On the other hand, if you find that the defendant has departed from this
standard of care, and that such departure has resulted in injury or damage, then you
should find the defendant liable for his/her negligence.
Cases:
If the failure of the architect's performance is so clear that professional
negligence may be found without the addition of expert testimony, this
instruction is necessary. As to th e necessity of expert testimony in
architectural malpractice cases, see Walker Rogge, Inc. v. Chelsea Title
and Guar. Co., 222 N.J. Super. 363 (App. Div. 1988), aff’d, 116 N.J.
517 (1989); Covil v. Robert & Co., Assoc ., 144 S.E.2d 450 (Ga. App.
1965); Pittman Construction Co. v. City of New Orleans, 178 So.2d 312
(La. App. 1965); Paxton v. Alameda Cty ., 259 P.2d 934 (Cal. App.
1953).
C. Common Knowledge May Furnish Standard of Care
Negligence is the failure to comply with the standard of care required by law to
protect a person from foreseeable risks of harm. Negligence in an architect's practice
is the architect's failure to comply with the standard of care required by law in the
performance of his/her duties. Usually it is necessary to establish the standard of care
by expert testimony, that is, by testim ony of persons who are qualified by their
training, study and experience to give their opinions on subjects not generally
understood by persons who lack such special training or experience. In the usual
case, standard architectural practice by which to judge defendant's conduct cannot be
determined by the jury without the assistance of expert testimony.
However, in some cases, such as the case at hand, the jury may determine from
its common knowledge and experience the standard of care by which to judge
defendant's conduct. In this case, plaintiff contends that defendant violated the duty
of care he/she owed to plaintiff by doing ______________/by failing to do
______________. In this case, therefore, it is for you, as jurors, to determine, based
upon common knowledge and experience, what skill and care the average architect
would have exercised in the same or similar circumstances. It is for you as jurors to
say from your common knowledge and experience whether defendant did something
which the average member of his/her pr ofession would not ha ve done or whether
defendant failed to do someth ing or failed to take some measure that the average
member of his/her profession would have done or taken in the circumstances of this
case.
NOTE TO JUDGE
Where there has been expert architectural testimony as to the standard of
care but the standard is one which can also be determined by the jury
from its common knowledge and experience, the jury should determine
the standard of care after consider ing all the evidence in the case,
including the expert architectural testimony, as well as its own common
knowledge and experience.
After determining the standard of care required in the circumstances of this
case, you should then consider the eviden ce to determine whether defendant has
complied with or departed from that standard of care. If you find that defendant has
complied with that standard, he/she is not liable to the plaintiff, regardless of the
result of his/her work. On the other hand, if you find that the defendant has departed
from that standard of care, and that such departure has resulted in an identifiable
injury or damage, then you should find defendant liable for his/her negligence.
History
(Approved 11/95)
Provenance
- Source
- njcourts.gov
- Retrieved
- 2026-08-20
- Edition
- 2026-08-20
- Content hash
b2168d949be3ffcda74e5e2045b6df0bf2d96f381c6b5eea9a1b6e4e41d21abf
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