NJ · jury_instructions
N.J. Model Civil Jury Charge 5.40I
Proximate Cause
5.40I PROXIMATE CAUSE (Approved 2/89; Revised 11/2023)
A. In General
The last requirement for holding a defendant liable is that the defect,
whatever you find it to be, must have been a proximate cause of the accident.
Proximate cause means that the defect in the product was a substantial factor which
singly, or in combination with another cause, brought about the accident. Plaintiff
need not prove that the very accident which occurred could have been anticipated
so long as it was within the rea lm of f oreseeability that some harm could result
from the defect in question. 1 If the product in question, however, does not add to
the risk of the occurrence of the particular accident and hence was not a
contributing factor in the happening of the accident [or if there was an independent
intervening cause of the accident], then plaintiff has failed to establish that a
particular product defect was a proximate cause of the accident.2
1 In toxic tort (i.e., asbestos exposure) cases where the plaintiff has presented competent and
credible evidence that even a minimal exposure to the substance can cause the claimed injury or
disease, it may be appropriate for the court to instruct the jury that a substantial factor is an
“efficient cause” of the claimed injury or disease and not a remote or trivial cause having only an
insignificant connection with the harm, but that liability should not attach based on casual or
minimal contact with the product or imposed based on mere guesswork. See Fowler v. Akzo
Nobel Chemicals, Inc., 251 N.J. 300 (2022).
2 See Soler v. Castmaster, Div. of H.P.M. Corp., 98 N.J. 137 (1983), and Brown v. United States
Stove Co., 98 N.J . 155 (1984) , where there is an issue of misuse/abnormal use or substantial
alteration affecting proximate cause. Where there is misuse/abnormal use or substantial alteration
after leaving the control of a defendant , the critical question on the issue of pr oximate cause
(An intervening cause is the act of an independent agency which destroy s
the c ausal conn ection between the effect of the defect in the product and the
accident, the independent act being the immediate and sole cause in which case the
liability will not be established because the defect in the product is not the
proximate cause of the injury. However, the defendant would not be relieved from
liability for its defective product by the intervention of acts of third persons if those
acts were reasonably foreseeable , and hence there is a substantial causal
connection between the product defect and the accident.)3
B. Limiting Instruction Where Comparative Negligence is N ot
Applicable — Plaintiff’s Conduct May Only Be Considered on
Issue of Proximate Cause4 (Approved 4/95)
You have heard evidence about how [P laintiff] was using the [product].
When you are deciding whether the [product] was defective, you are not permitted
becomes whether the original defect in the product constitutes a proximate cause of the injury
despite a subsequent alteration or misuse /abnormal use. Misuse/abnormal us e or substantial
alteration will not relieve a de fendant’s responsibility unless the proximate cause of the injury is
the misuse/abnormal use or substantial alteration. Soler, 98 N.J. at 149.
3 Navarro v. George Koch & Sons, Inc., 211 N.J. Super. 558, 573 (App. Div. 1986), and Butler v.
PPG Industries, Inc., 201 N.J. Super. 558, 564 (App. Div. 1985), may be understood as discussions
of a burden of production rather than p ersuasion. So construed they clearly conform t o Brown,
supra, and prior law.
4 T he conduct of the plaintiff may not be the only action which renders the product’s defect an
insignificant element in the happening of the accident. See, e.g., Fabian v. Minster Machine Co.,
258 N.J. Super. 261, 276-277 (App. Div. 1992), where the c ourt notes in its discussion of the
“empty chair” defense that the conduct of the employer, a co -employee, or defendant who has
to consider the [Plaintiff’s] conduct.
If you find the [product] was defective, then you must decide whether the
defect was a pro ximate cause of t he accident. At this po int, you may consider the
[Plaintiff’s] conduct.
If you decide that the [product] defect was the only cause of the accident,
then you must find that that defect proximately caused the accident.
If you decide that the [product] defect was a partial or c ontributory cause,
then you must also find that the [product] defect was a proximate cause of the
accident, even if the [Plaintiff’s] conduct was also a partial or contributory cause.5
On the other hand, if you decide that the [Plaintiff’s] conduct was th e only
cause, then you must find that the [product] defect was not a proximate cause of
the accident.
already settled are factors which may be relied upon to show that the defect was not a proximate
cause of the accident.
5 Tobia v. Cooper Medical Center, 136 N.J. 335, 341-44 (1994); Jurado v. Western Gear Works,
131 N.J. 375, 388 (1993); Johansen v. Makita USA, Inc., 128 N.J. 86, 102-03 (1992); Brown, 98
N.J. at 171.
History
(Approved 2/89; Revised 11/2023)
Provenance
- Source
- njcourts.gov
- Retrieved
- 2026-08-20
- Edition
- 2026-08-20
- Content hash
6b05f72f59ded82f85c8a5fa6042c2c8ab84cad3540b4aa8f5162112455ba9d0
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