N.J. Model Civil Jury Charge 4.10K

4.10 BILATERAL CONTRACTS

K. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL (Approved 5/98)

Plaintiff has alleged that the defendant promised [name what was

promised] and that plaintiff reasonably relied on that promise.

A promise which is made without any consideration being given by the

other party sometimes can be enforced. Thus, even if nothing of value was

promised or exchanged by the party who reasonably relied on a promise,

sometimes the promise can be enforced.

To succeed on this claim, plaintiff must prove each of the following facts:

1. That the defendant made a clear and definite promise.1

2. That the defendant expected that the promise would be relied upon.

3. That the plaintiff did reas onably rely on the promise.

1Promissory Estoppel is well established in New Jersey. E.g., Royal Assoc. v.

Concannon, 200 N.J. Super. 84 (App. Div. 1985). See Spaulding v. Hussain, 229 N.J. Super.

430, 438 (App. Div. 1988) where “the trial judge correctly charged the elements of

promissory estoppel, namely, a clear and definite promise made with the expectation that the

promisee will rely coupled with reasonable reliance therein by the promisee to his detriment.”

See also Friedman v. Tappan Development Corp., 22 N.J. 523 (1956); The Malaker Corp. v.

First Jersey National Bank, 163 N.J. Super. 463 (App. Div. 1978), certif. den. 79 N.J. 488

(1979). However, more recent decisions have tended to relax the strict requirement of a

“clear and definite” promise, particularly wh ere the plaintiff seeks damages resulting from

detrimental reliance on promises made. See, e.g., Pop’s Cones v. Resorts Intern. Hotel, 307

N.J. Super. 461, 469-70, 472 (App. Div. 1997); Peck v. Imedia, Inc., 293 N.J. Super. 151, 168

(App. Div. 1996).

4. That the plaintiff’s reliance on the promise caused the plaintiff to

suffer a definite and substantial detriment.2

If plaintiff proves all of the above conditions by a preponderance of the

evidence, then you can consider the de fendant’s promise as creating a valid

contract between the parties.

2Peck v. Imedia, Inc., 293 N.J. Super. 151 (App. Div. 1996) discusses the need for

detrimental reliance without expres sly stating that the reliance by “substantial and definite.”

293 N.J. Super. at 165. The “definite and substantial” requirement can be traced to Friedman

v. Tappan Dev. Corp. 22 N.J. 523, 538, (1956) and has been reit erated in more modern cases,

like Malaker, 163 N.J. Super. at 479, and Royal Assoc., 200 N.J. Super. at 92. However, the

Restatement (Second) expressly questions the continued viability of the “substantial and

definite” requirement. § 90, Reporter’s Note, at 247-48.