NJ · jury_instructions
N.J. Model Civil Jury Charge 3.13
Malicious Prosecution (Prior Civil Proceeding)
3.13 MALICIOUS PROSECUTION BASED UPON A PRIOR CIVIL
PROCEEDING (Approved before 1984)
Elements of a Malicious Prosecution
An action at law for malicious prosecution based upon a prior civil judicial
proceeding consists of several elements.
First. The plaintiff must establish that the defendant instituted or caused to
be instituted a civil suit against him/her and that he/she suffered special grievance
thereby. (Here state the nature of the sp ecial grievance such as whether plaintiff
was arrested in connection with said su it or whether his/her property or business
was interfered with by the appointment of a receiver, the granting of an injunction,
by writ of replevin, by the filing of a lis pendens, etc.)
Second. The plaintiff must establish that the civil suit terminated favorably
to him/her or in a manner not adverse to him/her.
On this subject the (undisputed) facts ar e (state facts relating to the nature of
the termination, such as a termination in his/her favor, a voluntary withdrawal or
abandonment, etc.)
Third. The plaintiff must establish lack of reasonable or probable cause for
the civil suit.
On this subject there is a sharp conflict in the proofs.
The plaintiff contends that there was a lack of reasonable or probable cause
and the defendant contends that ther e was reasonable or probable cause for
instituting the civil action against the plaintiff.
In cases of civil actions reasonable or probable cause exists where there are
reasonable grounds for belief that a cause of action exists, supported by
circumstances sufficient to warrant an ordinarily prudent person in believing that it
exists.
Whether probable cause existed doe s not depend upon a consideration of
what the facts actually were, but rather upon a consideration of what the facts were
as they appeared to or were known by or were believed to be by the defendant
when he/she instituted the civil suit against the plaintiff.
It was not necessary that the defendant have actual cause to sue the plaintiff;
it was necessary only that he/she have reasonable or probable cause for so doing.
If you find that the defendant had reasonable or probable cause to believe
that plaintiff was civilly liable it is immate rial that the plaintiff was in fact not
liable. Even if you believe that plain tiff was not civilly lia ble, he/she cannot
recover if you find that the defendant had reasonable or probable cause to believe
that he/she was liable. No r can you draw an inference of lack of reasonable or
probable cause just because the civil suit ended by (here state how the suit ended).
On the other hand, if you find that the defendant did not have an honest
belief that the plaintiff was liable and the suit was thereby falsely instituted you
must conclude that there was no reasonable or probable cause.
[Here review the facts dealing with the conflicting contentions as to
reasonable or probable cause.]
Fourth. The plaintiff must establish th at the defendant was activated by a
malicious motive in instituting the civil suit against him/her.
The malice contemplated by this element is not malice in the sense that the
word is sometimes used. The kind of malice I speak of means the intentional doing
of a wrongful or unlawful act without just cause or excuse. Such malice is an
intentional act which an ordinarily cautious person would realize that under
ordinary circumstances damage would re sult to one’s person or property. The
element of malice may be inferred from a lack of reasonable of probable cause.
Fifth. The last element that must be proved is that the plaintiff suffered
damage, as I shall later define that te rm, as a proximate result of a malicious
prosecution.
[If the defense of advice of counsel is within the issues of the case the
following should be added:]
In this case the defendant has raised the defense of advice of counsel. This
is an affirmative defense and the burden of establishing it by a preponderance of
the credible evidence is upon the defendant.
If you find that the defendant truthfully communicated to his/her attorney all
of the material facts of the case and then relied upon the advice of his/her attorney
to institute the civil suit ag ainst the plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot recover even if
you find all the necessary elements to establish malicious prosecution.
On the other hand, the advice of an attorney will not protect a party who
consults an attorney unless all the material facts within his/her knowledge are fully
and truthfully stated to the attorney. If you find from the evidence that in seeking
the advice of counsel the defendant did not make a full, fair and complete
disclosure of all material facts within his/her knowledge to his/her counsel, the
advice of counsel is no defense to this action.
NOTE TO JUDGE
“Originally, no cause of action wa s recognized in the law for the
wrongful institution of a civil action irrespective of the fact that it was
brought maliciously and without pr obable cause. The recovery of
costs by the defendant was considered sufficient redress. However,
the inadequacy of this remedy asserted itself and as early as 1816 our
Supreme Court established an exception to the doctrine. In Potts v.
Imlay, 4 N.J.L. 382 (Sup. Ct. 1816), it was declared that an action for
malicious prosecution could not be maintained for prosecuting a civil
suit unless the defendant in that suit was ‘arrested without cause and
deprived of his/her liberty or made to suffer other special grievance
different from and superadded to the ordinary expense of a defense.’”
(original emphasis.) This rule has never been changed or criticized
and it still represents the law of this State. Bitz v. Meyer, 40 N.J.L. 252
(Sup. Ct. 1878); Schneider v. Mueller, 132 N.J.L. 163 (E. & A. 1944).
A special grievance may consis t of disbarment proceedings; Toft v.
Ketchum, 18 N.J. 280 (1955) of license revocation proceedings before
the Director of Milk Industry, Rainier’s Dairies v. Raritan Valley
Farms, Inc., 19 N.J . 552 (1955) and where plaintiff’s property or
business has been interfered with by appointment of receiver, granting
of injunction or restraining order or filing of lis pendens. Mayflower
Industries v. Thor Corp., 15 N.J. Super. 139 (1951), aff’d 9 N.J. 605
(1952).
Whether the special grievance pleaded is actionable, as a matter of
law, is for the court’s determination.
“The action for malicious prosecution of a civil suit is governed by
the same rules governing such an action arising out of a criminal
prosecution.”
1 Prosser on Torts, § 97, p. 885. In order to succeed, it
must appear (1) that the suit was brought without reasonable or
probable cause; (2) that it was act uated by malice, and (3) it has
terminated favorably to the plaintiff. Shoemaker v. Shoemaker ,
supra. These elements must be established in addition to the special
1Since these actions are governed essentially by the same rules, consult the notes dealing with
malicious prosecution of a criminal action for any elements not discussed herein.
grievance already mentioned.
Malice in this connection means the intentional commission of a
wrongful act without just cause or excuse. Brennan v. United
Hatters, 73 N.J.L. 729 (E. & A. 1906); Kamm v. Flink, 113 N.J.L. 583
(E. & A. 1934).
In Brennan v. United Hatters , supra, Justice Pitney, for the Court,
said:
But malice in the law mean s nothing more than the
intentional doing of a wrongful act without justification
or excuse.
And what is wrongful act w ithin the meaning of this
definition? We answer, any act which in the ordinary
course will infringe upon the rights of another to his/her
damage is wrongful, except it be done in the exercise of
an equal or superior right. In Mogul Steamship Co. v.
McGregor, 23 Q.B. Div. 598-613, at 744-745, Lord
Justice Bower said: ‘Now, intentionally to that which is
calculated in the ordinary c ourse of events to damage,
and which does in fact dama ge another in that other
person’s property or trade, is actionable if done without
just cause or excuse. Such intentional action, when done
without just cause or excuse , is what the law calls a
malicious wrong.
Reasonable or probable cause for the institution of a
civil suit is the presence of reasonable ground for belief
that the cause of action exists supported by
circumstances sufficient to warrant an ordinarily prudent
man in the belief that it exists. Mayflower v. Thor, 15
N.J. Super. 139, 151-153 (Chan. Div. 1951).
COUNTERCLAIM
If in a civil suit the defendant files a counterclaim
alleging that the main suit constitutes malicious
prosecution it may well be that under our present liberal
practice rules the filing of the counterclaim would be
allowed, but trial thereon withheld pending disposition
of the original action. See Mayflower, supra, and cases
cited therein.
History
(Approved before 1984)
Provenance
- Source
- njcourts.gov
- Retrieved
- 2026-08-20
- Edition
- 2026-08-20
- Content hash
1410bde20d9c8ecc767284051dd9b210967b7d9a05e016441f4a85925e4de71c
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