Miss. R. Crim. P. 15.3

History

Comment: Rule 15.3(a) and (b) are largely derived from former Rules 8.03 and 8.04 of the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court. They adopt the requirement that, in all felony cases, the court shall address an individual defendant personally, in open court, and in the presence of counsel (unless counsel has been waived pursuant to Rule 7.1(c)). See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465-66, 89 S. Ct. 1166, 1170, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1969). The Rule allows an organizational defendant to plead guilty through counsel who is present in court, as in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(b)(1). Section (c) comes directly from former Rule 8.04(A.)(3.) of the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court. Under section (c), the court must determine that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge; that is, that the defendant understands “what the plea connotes and. . . its consequence[,]” as required by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1712, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969). The court must also satisfy itself that there is a factual basis for the plea before entering judgment. The normal consequence of a determination that there is not a factual basis for the plea would be for the court to set aside the plea and enter a plea of not guilty. The record should affirmatively reflect the questions asked and the defendant’s responses, thereby providing an adequate basis for review. Section (d) is largely derived from former Rule 8.04(A.)(4.) of the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court. The Rule extends to pleas involving misdemeanors with the possibility of incarceration. See, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. §§ 63-11-30(2)(a) (first offense DUI), 97-3-7(1)(a) (simple assault). Section (d) prescribes the advice that the court must give to the defendant as a prerequisite to the acceptance of a guilty plea and requires the court to determine that the defendant understands the sentencing implications of that plea. Section (d) also identifies the constitutional rights that the defendant waives by the plea, which is designed to satisfy the requirements of understanding waiver set forth in Boykin. Generally speaking, it is within the court’s discretion as to whether and to what extent to advise the defendant of “collateral consequences” of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. See Magyar v. State, 18 So. 3d 807, 811-12 (Miss. 2009) (“there is no requirement that a defendant be informed of the collateral consequences” of a guilty plea; duty to register as a sex offender deemed a “collateral consequence” of a guilty plea). But immigration consequences stand as an exception; under Rule 15.3(d)(4), disclosure of certain potential immigration consequences is mandatory. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010) (deficient performance under the ineffective assistance of counsel standard in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), when counsel failed to advise defendant that his guilty plea made him subject to automatic deportation); Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(O).