MA · jury_instructions
Instruction 6.680, Criminal Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District Court
Stalking (G.L. c. 265, § 43)
STALKING
G.L. c. 265, § 43(a)
The defendant is charged with stalking.
To prove the defendant guilty of this offense, the
Commonwealth must prove six things beyond a reasonable doubt:
First: That the defendant committed at least three separate acts;
Second: That the defendant intended to target [the alleged victim] with
each act;
Third: That the defendant committed each act willfully and
maliciously;
Fourth: That the acts, taken as a whole, seriously alarmed the [the
alleged victim];
Fifth: That the acts, taken as a whole, would cause a reasonable
person to suffer substantial emotional distress; and
Sixth: That the defendant threatened [the alleged victim] with the
intention of placing [the alleged victim] in imminent fear of death or bodily
injury and that [the alleged victim’s] fear was reasonable.
See Commonwealth v. Lehan, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 246, 251–52 (2021) (stalking is
comprised of the five elements of criminal harassment as well as the additional element
that defendant made a threat with the intent to place the person in imminent fear of death
or bodily injury).
To prove the first element, the Commonwealth must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed at least
three separate acts. An act may be based on conduct, speech or
both. The acts must be separate, distinct and separated by at least a
brief period of time.
Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 Mass. 8, 15 (1999) (“repeatedly” in stalking statute requires
more than two incidents); Commonwealth v. Kwiatkowski, 418 Mass. 543, 548 (1994)
(same). See also Commonwealth v. Lehan, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 246, 252-253 (2021).
“Period of time” means the passage of time and does not denote a particular time interval.
“As long as the acts are separate, distinct, and separated by some interval, they occur over
a period of time within the meaning of the statute.” Commonwealth v. Valentin, 91 Mass.
App. Ct. 515, 523 (2017).
Where act is based on speech alone. If an act is based on speech, the
Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the speech was a true threat or “fighting words” and
therefore not protected by the First Amendment.
A true threat is one that either threatens imminent
physical harm to the alleged victim, or that caused and was
intended to cause the alleged victim to fear physical harm
at the time or in the future. To determine whether the
statement is a true threat, you may consider the context or
circumstances in which the statement was made.
“Fighting words” are face-to-face personal insults
that are so personally abusive that they are plainly likely to
provoke a violent reaction.
If the Commonwealth has not proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that the alleged speech meets the
definition of true threats or fighting words, the alleged
speech cannot be the basis for one (or more) of the three
required acts. You may consider, however, whether it
gives context to other acts.
O'Brien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. 415, 422-425 (2012). See also Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S.
343, 359-360 (2003); Commonwealth v. Chou, 433 Mass. 229, 236 (2001).
To prove the second element, the Commonwealth must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to target [the
alleged victim] with each act. By target, I mean that each act was directed
at [the alleged victim], and that the defendant intended that [the alleged victim]
know that each act was directed at them.
Commonwealth v. Lehan, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 246, 253-254 (2021).
To prove the third element, the Commonwealth must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted willfully and
maliciously. An act is “willful” if it is done intentionally and by
design, and not by mistake or accident. The defendant acted willfully
if the defendant intended the conduct. An act is done with “malice” if
the defendant’s conduct was intentional and without justification or
mitigation, and any reasonably prudent person would have foreseen
the actual harm that resulted to [the alleged victim].
Commonwealth v. Ecker, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 216, 221–22 (2017). See also note 5 below.
To prove the fourth element, the Commonwealth must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that [the alleged victim] was seriously alarmed
by the conduct. The Commonwealth is required to prove only that the
cumulative effect of the defendant's conduct seriously alarmed [the
alleged victim]. It is not required to prove that each individual act did so.
Commonwealth v. Walters, 472 Mass. 680, 699 (2015).
To prove the fifth element, the Commonwealth must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the acts, taken as a whole, would
cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress.
By substantial emotional distress, I mean distress that is
considerable, of importance, solid and real. The offending conduct
must be such as would produce a considerable or significant amount
of emotional distress in a reasonable person; it must be something
markedly greater than the level of uneasiness, nervousness,
unhappiness or the like which is commonly experienced in day to day
living.
The term “substantial emotional distress” is defined as “considerable in amount”, or “of real
worth and importance.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 444 Mass. 102, 107-108 (2005)
(“emotional distress that is merely trifling or passing is not enough to satisfy this element,
but must be markedly greater than that commonly experienced as part of ordinary living”).
See also Commonwealth v. Paton, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 215, 221 (2005); Commonwealth v.
Clemens, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 915, 916 (2004).
To prove the sixth element, the Commonwealth must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one of the acts included a
threat made with the intention of placing [the alleged victim] in imminent fear
of death or bodily injury and that [the alleged victim’s] fear was reasonable.
To determine whether the fear was reasonable, you may consider the
actions and words of the defendant in light of all the circumstances.
Commonwealth v. Walters, 472 Mass. 680, 692 (2015); Commonwealth v. Cullen, 79
Mass. App. Ct. 618, 621-622 (2011).
If the threat was made indirectly, give Supplemental Instruction 1, “Threats made
indirectly,” infra.
If the Commonwealth has proved all six elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, you should return a verdict of guilty. If the
Commonwealth has not proved one or more of these six elements
beyond a reasonable doubt, you must return a verdict of not guilty.
SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS
1. Threat made indirectly. In proving the sixth element, the
Commonwealth is not required to prove that the threat was
communicated directly to [the alleged victim]. This element is
satisfied if it is proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant intended the threat to be conveyed to [the alleged
victim]. It does not matter whether the threat was conveyed
directly or indirectly through another person or by some
other means as long as the defendant intended that the
threat be conveyed to [the alleged victim].
See Instruction 2.240 (Direct and Circumstantial Evidence). Commonwealth v. Walters,
472 Mass. 680, 693–94 (2015); Commonwealth v. Lehan, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 246, 254
(2021) (“The threat need not be a direct communication, but rather may be indirect or
communicated through otherwise ambiguous behavior, as long as surrounding
circumstantial evidence would allow a jury to infer that the defendant's behavior was
intended as a threat to the victim”); Commonwealth v. Maiden, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 433, 435
(2004) (“the legal definition of threat requires ‘communication’ of the threat in the sense
that it must be uttered, not idly, but to the target, to one who the defendant intends to pass
it on to the target, or to one who the defendant should know will probably pass it on to the
target”); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 280, 283 (2003); Commonwealth v.
Furst, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 283, 284-285 (2002); Commonwealth v. Meier, 56 Mass. App. Ct.
278, 282 (2002).
2. Types of communications covered by statute. The conduct, acts or
threats may be communicated by any means including, but
not limited to (mail) (telephone) (facsimile transmission) (e-
mail) (internet communications) (telecommunications device)
(electronic instant messages) (any electronic communication
device including any device that transfers [signs] [signals]
[writing] [images] [sounds] [data] or [intelligence of any nature]
transmitted in whole or in part by a [wire] [radio]
[electromagnetic system] [photo-electronic system] [photo-optical system]).
History
Instruction 6.680, Criminal Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District Court (Revised July 2024). Published by the Administrative Office of the District Court, District Court Department of the Trial Court, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, on www.mass.gov. © 1988-2009 Administrative Office of the District Court; reproduced under its title-page permission ("You may freely reproduce or copy this work if you identify its source and any changes made to the original work"). Source: https://www.mass.gov/doc/6680-stalking-gl-c-265-ss-43/download. Changes made: the text is extracted from the published PDF (verified by three extraction engines); the running headers, page numbers and line layout are removed, and a closing NOTES section, where printed, is carried as the note.
Provenance
- Source
- mass.gov
- Retrieved
- 2026-09-25
- Edition
- 2026-09-25
- Content hash
dddf3f7564c74a3009d1f21a5d41dccdf9e0c7540ed8f9727fe3668f7b288830
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