MA · jury_instructions
Instruction 6.380, Criminal Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District Court
Assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon on a pregnant woman (G.L. c. 265, s. 15A [c][ii])
ASSAULT AND BATTERY BY MEANS OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON
ON A PREGNANT WOMAN
The defendant is charged with having committed (an intentional) (or)
(a reckless) assault and battery with a dangerous weapon upon
[the alleged victim] when [the alleged victim] was pregnant and the defendant
knew, or had reason to know, that she was pregnant.
G.L. c. 265, § 15A(c)(ii).
If the Commonwealth relies solely upon a theory of intentional assault and battery, continue with “I”
below. If the Commonwealth relies on both theories, continue with both “I” and “II.A” below. If the
Commonwealth relies solely upon a theory of reckless assault and battery, skip to “II.B.” below.
I. INTENTIONAL ASSAULT AND BATTERY WITH A DANGEROUS WEAPON
ON A PREGNANT WOMAN
In order to prove the defendant guilty of an intentional assault and
battery by means of a dangerous weapon on a pregnant woman, the
Commonwealth must prove five things beyond a reasonable doubt:
First: That the defendant touched the person of [the alleged victim] ,
however slightly, without having any right or excuse for doing so;
Second: That the defendant intended to touch [the alleged victim] ;
Third: That the touching was done with a dangerous weapon;
Fourth: That [the alleged victim] was pregnant at the time of the alleged
assault and battery; and
Fifth: That the defendant knew, or had reason to know, that
[the alleged victim] was pregnant.
You should consider all the circumstances and any reasonable
inferences which you draw from the evidence to determine whether the
Commonwealth has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
knew or had reason to know that [the alleged victim] was pregnant.
Here the jury must be instructed on the definition of dangerous weapon from Instruction 6.300
(Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon).
If additional language on intent is appropriate. As I just mentioned, to
prove an intentional assault and battery, the Commonwealth
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
intended to touch [the alleged victim] , in the sense that the
defendant consciously and deliberately intended the touching to
occur, and that the touching was not merely accidental or
negligent. The Commonwealth is not required to prove that the
defendant specifically intended to cause injury to [the alleged victim] .
II. RECKLESS ASSAULT AND BATTERY WITH A DANGEROUS WEAPON
ON A PREGNANT WOMAN
A. Continue here if the jury is charged on both intentional and reckless conduct. There is a
second way in which a person may commit the crime of assault and battery
with a dangerous weapon on a pregnant woman. Instead of intentional
conduct, it involves a reckless touching that results in bodily injury.
B. Begin here if the jury is charged solely on reckless conduct. The defendant is (also)
charged with having committed an assault and battery with a dangerous
weapon upon a pregnant woman, [the alleged victim] , by reckless conduct,
thereby causing bodily injury.
In order to prove the defendant guilty of having committed this
offense, the Commonwealth must prove five things beyond a reasonable
doubt:
First: That the defendant acted recklessly;
Second: That the defendant’s reckless conduct included an
intentional act which resulted in bodily injury to [the alleged victim] ;
Third: That the injury was inflicted by a dangerous weapon;
Fourth: That [the alleged victim] was pregnant at the time of the alleged
assault and battery; and
Fifth: That the defendant knew, or had reason to know, that she was
pregnant.
It is not enough for the Commonwealth to prove that the defendant
acted negligently — that is, acted in a way that a reasonably careful person
would not. It must be shown that the defendant’s actions went beyond
mere negligence and amounted to recklessness. The defendant acted
recklessly if (he) (she) knew, or should have known, that such actions were
very likely to cause substantial harm to someone, but (he) (she) ran that
risk and went ahead anyway.
The defendant must have intended (his) (her) acts which resulted in
the touching, in the sense that those acts did not happen accidentally. But
it is not necessary that (he) (she) intended to injure or strike the alleged
victim, or that (he) (she) foresaw the harm that resulted. If the defendant
actually realized in advance that (his) (her) conduct was very likely to cause
substantial injury and decided to run that risk, such conduct would of
course be reckless. But even if (he) (she) was not conscious of the serious
danger that was inherent in such conduct, it is still reckless conduct if a
reasonable person, under the circumstances as they were known to the
defendant, would have recognized that such actions were so dangerous
that it was very likely that they would result in substantial injury.
Here the jury must be instructed on “Accident” (Instruction 9.100) if the issue of accident is raised by
the evidence.
The Commonwealth must prove the injury was sufficiently serious to
interfere with the alleged victim’s health or comfort. It need not be
permanent, but it must be more than trifling. For example, an act that only
shakes up a person or causes only momentary discomfort would not be
sufficient.
Here, if not previously done, the jury must be instructed on the definition of dangerous weapon from
Instruction 6.300 (Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon).
SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTION
Victim injured while escaping. As I mentioned earlier, the
defendant’s touching must have directly caused [alleged victim’s]
injury or must have directly and substantially set in motion a
chain of events that produced the injury in a natural and
continuous sequence. You have heard some evidence
suggesting that [alleged victim] was injured while escaping from
[place] . To establish that element of the offense — that the
defendant caused the injury which occurred as a result of the
escape — the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt: (1) that [the alleged victim] was pregnant at the time; (2) that
the defendant knew, or had reason to know, that [the alleged victim]
was pregnant; (3) that the defendant caused [the alleged victim]
reasonably to fear an immediate attack from the defendant;
(4) that this fear led her to try to (escape) (or) (defend herself)
from the defendant; and (5) that a dangerous weapon caused
more than a trifling bodily injury to [the alleged victim] from or
during that attempt to (escape) (or) (defend).
Commonwealth v. Parker, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 727, 522 N.E.2d 2 (1988).
Here the jury must be instructed on “Accident” (Instruction 9.100) if the issue of
accident is supported by the evidence.
See Instruction 6.300 (Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon) for additional notes.
History
Instruction 6.380, Criminal Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District Court (2009 Edition). Published by the Administrative Office of the District Court, District Court Department of the Trial Court, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, on www.mass.gov. © 1988-2009 Administrative Office of the District Court; reproduced under its title-page permission ("You may freely reproduce or copy this work if you identify its source and any changes made to the original work"). Source: https://www.mass.gov/doc/6380-assault-and-battery-by-means-of-a-dangerous-weapon-on-a-pregnant-woman-gl-c-265-s-15a-cii/download. Changes made: the text is extracted from the published PDF (verified by three extraction engines); the running headers, page numbers and line layout are removed, and a closing NOTES section, where printed, is carried as the note.
Provenance
- Source
- mass.gov
- Retrieved
- 2026-09-25
- Edition
- 2026-09-25
- Content hash
2125b0ea4b4c400c4958a660b97057624611f5ecdaecc60c568a98566684cb72
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