MA · jury_instructions
Instruction 6.340, Criminal Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District Court
Assault and battery with a dangerous weapon on a child under 14 (G.L. c. 265, s. 15A [c][iv])
ASSAULT AND BATTERY WITH A DANGEROUS WEAPON
ON A CHILD UNDER 14
The defendant is charged with having committed (an intentional) (or)
(a reckless) assault and battery with a dangerous weapon upon
[the alleged victim] at the time when [the alleged victim] was a child under the age
of 14 years.
G.L. c. 265, § 15A(c)(iv).
If the Commonwealth relies solely upon a theory of intentional assault and battery, continue with “I”
below. If the Commonwealth relies on both theories, continue with both “I” and “II.A” below. If the
Commonwealth relies solely upon a theory of reckless assault and battery, skip to “II.B.” below.
I. INTENTIONAL ASSAULT AND BATTERY WITH A DANGEROUS WEAPON
ON A CHILD UNDER 14
In order to prove an intentional assault and battery by means of a
dangerous weapon on a child under age 14, the Commonwealth must prove
four things beyond a reasonable doubt:
First: That the defendant touched the person of [the alleged victim] ,
however slightly, without having any right or excuse for doing so;
Second: That the defendant intended to touch [the alleged victim] ;
Third: That the touching was done with a dangerous weapon; and
Fourth: That [the alleged victim] was a child under the age of 14 years.
Here the jury must be instructed on the definition of dangerous weapon from Instruction 6.300
(Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon).
If additional language on intent is appropriate. The Commonwealth
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
intended to touch [the alleged victim] with the dangerous weapon,
in the sense that the defendant consciously and deliberately
intended the touching to occur, and that the touching was not
merely accidental or negligent. The Commonwealth is not
required to prove that the defendant specifically intended to
cause injury to [the alleged victim] .
If no injury was sustained. It is not necessary for the Commonwealth to prove that the defendant actually caused injury to [the
alleged victim] with a dangerous weapon. Any slight touching is
sufficient, if it was done with a dangerous weapon.
II. RECKLESS ASSAULT AND BATTERY WITH A DANGEROUS WEAPON ON A CHILD UNDER 14
A. Continue here if the jury is charged on both intentional and reckless conduct. There is a
second way in which a person may commit an assault and battery by
means of a dangerous weapon on a child under 14. Instead of intentional
conduct, it requires that there be reckless conduct by the defendant
causing injury.
B. Begin here if jury is charged solely on reckless conduct. This defendant is (also)
charged with having recklessly committed an assault and battery by means
of a dangerous weapon upon [the alleged victim] when [the alleged victim] was
under 14 years of age.
In order to prove the defendant guilty of having committed this
offense, the Commonwealth must prove four things beyond a reasonable
doubt:
First: That the defendant acted recklessly;
Second: That the defendant’s reckless conduct included an
intentional act which resulted in bodily injury to [the alleged victim] ;
Third: That the injury was inflicted by a dangerous weapon; and
Fourth: That the [the alleged victim] was under 14 years of age at the
time.
It is not enough for the Commonwealth to prove that the defendant
acted negligently — that is, in a manner that a reasonably careful person
would not. It must be shown that the defendant’s actions went beyond
mere negligence and amounted to recklessness. The defendant acted
recklessly if (he) (she) knew, or should have known, that such actions were
very likely to cause substantial harm to someone, but (he) (she) ran that
risk and went ahead anyway.
The defendant must have intended (his) (her) acts which resulted in
the touching, in the sense that those acts did not happen accidentally. But
it is not necessary that (he) (she) intended to injure or strike the alleged
victim, or that (he) (she) foresaw the harm that resulted. If the defendant
actually realized in advance that (his) (her) conduct was very likely to cause
substantial harm and decided to run that risk, such conduct would of
course be reckless. But even if (he) (she) was not conscious of the serious
danger that was inherent in such conduct, it is still reckless conduct if a
reasonable person, under the circumstances as they were known to the
defendant, would have recognized that such actions were so dangerous
that it was very likely that they would result in substantial injury.
G.L. c. 265, § 15A(b). Ford, 424 Mass. at 711, 677 N.E.2d at 1151 (the recklessness branch of
assault and battery with a dangerous weapon requires proof of an “intentional commission of a
wanton or reckless act (something more than gross negligence) causing physical or bodily injury to
another” by means of a dangerous weapon)
The injury must be sufficiently serious to interfere with the alleged
victim’s health or comfort. It need not be permanent, but it must be more
than trifling. For example, an act that only shakes up a person or causes
only momentary discomfort would not be sufficient.
Here, if not previously done, the jury must be instructed on the definition of dangerous weapon from
Instruction 6.300 (Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon).
SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTION
Victim injured while escaping. As I mentioned earlier, the
defendant’s touching must have directly caused the [alleged victim’s]
injury or must have directly and substantially set in motion a
chain of events that produced the injury in a natural and
continuous sequence. Here you have heard some evidence
suggesting that [alleged victim] was injured while escaping from [place].
To establish that element of the offense — that the defendant
caused the injury which occurred as a result of the escape, the
Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that
[the alleged victim] was a child under the age of 14; (2) that the
defendant, armed with a dangerous weapon, caused
[the alleged victim] reasonably to fear an immediate attack from the
defendant; (3) that this fear led [the alleged victim] to try to (escape)
(or) defend (himself) (herself) from the defendant; and (4) that
[the alleged victim] received more than a trifling bodily injury from
that dangerous weapon from or during that attempt to (escape)
(or) (defend).
Commonwealth v. Parker, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 727, 522 N.E.2d 2 (1988).
Here the jury must be instructed on “Accident” (Instruction 9.100) if the issue of
accident is rasied by the evidence.
See Instruction 6.300 (Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon) for
additional notes.
History
Instruction 6.340, Criminal Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District Court (2009 Edition). Published by the Administrative Office of the District Court, District Court Department of the Trial Court, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, on www.mass.gov. © 1988-2009 Administrative Office of the District Court; reproduced under its title-page permission ("You may freely reproduce or copy this work if you identify its source and any changes made to the original work"). Source: https://www.mass.gov/doc/6340-assault-and-battery-with-a-dangerous-weapon-on-a-child-under-14-gl-c-265-s-15a-civ/download. Changes made: the text is extracted from the published PDF (verified by three extraction engines); the running headers, page numbers and line layout are removed, and a closing NOTES section, where printed, is carried as the note.
Provenance
- Source
- mass.gov
- Retrieved
- 2026-09-25
- Edition
- 2026-09-25
- Content hash
56e502dc0d0b52842d7613bfaee63cff91ae1dd0eb60834e4d9b3704db066f15
The link goes to the issuing authority’s own document — the one we read to produce this record. Where a source publishes whole titles rather than sections, your browser may need a moment to jump to the provision.
Unofficial copy of government-published law, reproduced from official sources with full provenance. Not an official publication; verify against official sources before relying on it in a filing. Records in the 'guidance' corpus, and only that corpus, are sub-regulatory (interpretive guidelines, survey procedures) and are not binding law. Validity bounds follow each jurisdiction's declared temporalBasis.