Ill. S. Ct. R. 113

History

Adopted Feb. 22, 2013, eff. May 1, 2013; amended Apr. 8, 2013, eff. May 1, 2013; amended Dec. 29, 2017, eff. Jan. 1, 2018; amended June 8, 2018, eff. July 1, 2018; amended Nov. 19, 2020, eff. Dec. 1, 2020; amended Sept. 29, 2021, eff. Oct. 1, 2021. Committee Comments (February 22, 2013) On April 11, 2011, the Illinois Supreme Court created the Special Supreme Court Committee on Mortgage Foreclosures and charged it with the following tasks: investigating the procedures used throughout the State of Illinois in mortgage foreclosure proceedings; studying relevant Illinois Supreme Court Rules and local rules that directly or indirectly affect such proceedings; analyzing the procedures adopted in other states in response to the unprecedented number of foreclosure filings nationwide; and reviewing legislative proposals pending in the Illinois General Assembly that may impact the mortgage foreclosure rules for the state. To meet this charge, the Committee established subcommittees, one of which was the Practice and Procedures Subcommittee. The Practice and Procedures Subcommittee submitted proposals for changes to the practice and procedures for mortgage foreclosure cases for discussion at a public hearing held on April 27, 2012. After consideration of comments and discussion at the public hearing, the Committee proposed this new rule governing mortgage foreclosure practice and procedure. Paragraph (b) is derived from the need to address evidentiary issues that often arise during the course of a mortgage foreclosure. The new requirement to attach a copy of the note, as it currently exists with all indorsements and allonges, supplements the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law to provide this necessary document to the defendant and the court at the outset. Including this additional document will prevent unnecessary delays caused by motion practice and discovery often used by defendants. In drafting this section of the rule, the Committee took into conside ration the positions of both the judiciary and comments provided at the public hearing regarding attaching a copy of all assignments to the complaint. The Committee members recognized that with the increase in transfers of mortgages and notes, Illinois courts have seen a dramatic increase in assertions by mortgagors that the mortgagee lacks standing to bring the foreclosure complaint. Quite often, mortgagors who ignore the judicial process until after a foreclosure or sale has occurred have raised standing issues as a defense, but have been told that their claim was forfeited by the failure to raise it in a timely manner. The Committee considered that as a matter of judicial economy, requiring that all executed assignments of the mortgage be attached at the time of filing could provide current documentation at the outset to all defendants and the circuit court demonstrating how the plaintiff has standing to file the complaint. However, due to industry changes in the documentation requirements for mortgage ass ignments over the past two decades, a requirement to attach all copies of assignments to the complaint at the time of filing proved to be impractical and overly burdensome for practitioners given the current volume of foreclosures statewide. This rule does not prohibit the attachment of such assignments should a plaintiff choose to do so. This rule also does not preclude the requirement of submission of all assignments at a later date in the litigation should the appropriate issues present themselves and pr esentation of the documents to the court and litigants becomes necessary. Paragraph (c) addresses some of the many issues that arise from document handling procedures by lenders and servicers. Illinois courts, along with courts nationwide, have faced issues relating to “robo- signing” practices at major lenders, where affidavits were not properly notarized or where the affiant did not actually review any of the pertinent loan records. In addition to questionable document handling procedures, circuit courts have dealt with prove-up affidavits that come in varied forms, many of which do not properly address the foundational requirements necessary for establishing the accuracy of computerized business records nor the correct amount due and owing under the mortg age and note. Paragraph (c)(2) identifies the minimum requirements necessary for a prove-up affidavit submitted by the mortgagee for entry of a judgment of foreclosure and Form 1 gives a form affidavit that should be used. No judgment of foreclosure will be entered without compliance with Paragraph (c). However, Form 1 establishes only the amounts due and owing on the borrower’s loan. Paragraph (c)(2) and Form 1 do not relieve the foreclosing party from establishing other evidentiary requirements, as necessary, in connection with proving the allegations contained in its complaint including, but not limited to, the party’s right to enforce the instrument of indebtedness, if applicable. Paragraph (d) addresses the desire of the Illinois courts to have adequa te assurance that the mortgagor is sufficiently notified when an order of default and a judgment of foreclosure are entered against the mortgagor. Many mortgagors ignore court notices, believing that they are in error because their lender is negotiating wi th them for a loan modification. Other mortgagors have been told by servicers that their foreclosure case is on hold, but the servicer has not told the plaintiff’s attorneys to place the file on hold. Currently, many circuit court clerks send a generic postcard that notifies any defendant, who has an appearance on file, of entry of a default order. Thus, if the mortgagor has not filed an appearance, the mortgagor may not receive notice of the default order from the clerk. The post card may not contain any helpful information that the defendant can understand. Likewise, notice of the default order is not mailed to the property address as a matter of course. While section 2-1302 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1302) requires that a plaint iff give notice of entry of a default order to be sent to all parties against whom the order applies, failure to give such notice does not affect the validity of the order. As a result, a mortgagor may not receive notice of entry of the default order from either the Clerk of the Circuit Court or the mortgagee’s counsel. Paragraph (d) addresses this deficiency in the notification process and requires the mortgagee’s counsel to prepare a specific “Notice of Entry of Default and Judgment of Foreclosure” (Form 2). Counsel for the plaintiff must prepare this notice for the property address or any other address where the defendant is most likely to receive it. A defendant may have filed an appearance or another court paper that would indicate an address that may be different from the address of service of summons and different from the property address. By preparing this notice, and having the Clerk of the Circuit Court mail the notices, any undeliverable mail will remain in the court file and defaulted mortgagors will receive a clearer notice of the order and the judgment of foreclosure than they do currently. Paragraph (f) addresses two issues relating to judicial sales that have become substantial problems throughout the state. Paragraph (f)(1) attempts to provide adequate notice to those mortgagors who are about to lose their home. Currently, the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law does not specify that a separate notice of the sale be sent to defaulted defendants, and assumes that the publication requirements ar e adequate for those that have not otherwise participated in the foreclosure proceedings. See 735 ILCS 5/15-1507(c)(3) (lacking a specific requirement that a separate notice of sale be sent to a defaulted mortgagor). However, in many residential cases, a lack of participation, for any reason, results in a lack of notice of the sale to the mortgagor living in the property being foreclosed. That lack of notice often results in the mortgagor learning about the sale on the eve of the sale and filing an emergency motion to stay the sale. In cases where the mortgagor finds out about the sale from a notice of confirmation of sale or through the sheriff’s notice of eviction, the courts then must hear motions to vacate the sale and motions to stay possession. See 735 ILCS 5/15-1508(b-5) (requiring notice of confirmation of sale be sent to a defaulted mortgagor). Many of these motions could be avoided and judicial efficiency increased if all parties, including defaulted parties, are given notice of the sale. Accordingl y, paragraph (f)(1) implements a new notice requirement to supplement section 15-1507(c)(3) by mandating a separate notice to a defaulted mortgagor presale while also complementing section 15- 1508(b-5) that requires notice postsale for confirmation. Paragraph (f)(2) addresses the selling officer. Currently, section 15- 1506(f)(3) of the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law (735 ILCS 5/15- 1506(f)(3)) allows, by special motion, an official other than the one customarily designated by a court to be appointed to c onduct judicial sales. The Committee recognized that the customarily appointed selling officer is the sheriff in many counties statewide, section 15- 1506 allows a court to appoint a private selling officer upon motion. Given the high volume of foreclosures throughout the state, many sales are being held nearly a year after the expiration of the redemption period. In some cases, this is due to the failure of the sheriff to promptly obey the court order commanding him to sell the property at auction. Accordingly, the loan accrues late fees and increased interest charges. These additional charges do not benefit any party to the foreclosure and do not help the communities if the property remains vacant during that idle period. In order to correct these deficienc ies in the process, the Committee recommended that a rule be enacted that expressly allows the use of private selling officers throughout the state. In many instances, private selling officers have lower costs with the capacity and ability to conduct a sal e in a timely manner that prevents the accrual of additional fees and facilitates the rehabilitation of properties into valuable components of neighborhoods. Paragraph (g) implements a specific notification process for informing mortgagors about the existence of surplus funds resulting from a judicial sale. Currently, many clerks of the circuit courts are holding unclaimed surplus funds from judicial sales. Due to the lack of notice, these funds remain unclaimed. Paragraph (g) implements a specific “S pecial Notice of Surplus Funds” (Form 3) that the plaintiff’s counsel must send to the mortgagors and paragraph (h) includes a specific motion (Form 4) that can be completed by the mortgagors for presentment to the court without an attorney. This paragraph is intended to facilitate the ability of mortgagors to claim those funds to which they may be entitled. Paragraph (i) addresses the issue of a deceased mortgagor and the subject matter jurisdiction issues addressed in ABN Amro Mortgage Group, Inc. v. McG ahan, 237 Ill. 2d 526 (2010), which have not been specifically addressed by remedial legislation.