Ill. Pattern Jury Instr. (Civil) 30.23

If [a

defendant] [defendants] negligently cause[s] [injury to] [a condition of] the plaintiff,

then the defendant[s] [is] [are] liable not only for the plaintiff's damages resulting from that

[injury] [or] [condition], but [is] [are] also liable for any damages sustained by the plaintiff

arising from the efforts of health care providers to treat the [injury] [or] [condition] caused by the

defendant[s] [even if (that) (those) health care provider(s) (was) (were) negligent.]

Notes

on Use

Perm

ission to publish granted in 2003.

This i

nstruction is intended to be used when there is evidence that a subsequent health

care provider caused or aggravated the injury. The last bracketed material should be used when

there is a claim that the subsequent health care provider was negligent. See Kolakowski v. Voris,

94 Ill.App.3d 404, 418 N.E.2d 1003, 50 Ill.Dec. 9 (1st Dist.1981).

Comme

nts

If the

issue of the subsequent medical provider having caused or aggravated an injury is

injected into the case, there is a likelihood the jury may be confused as to the applicable law. The

jury might perceive the subsequent provider as the wrongdoer and “acquit the defendants on that

basis.” Kolakowski v. Voris, supra. This proposition is not necessarily obvious and should be told

to the jury. See Daly v. Carmean, 210 Ill.App.3d 19, 30; 568 N.E.2d 955, 154 Ill.Dec. 734 (4th

Dist.1991) citing Gertz v. Campbell, 55 Ill.2d 84, 302 N.E.2d 40 (1973). No other instruction

tells the jury that the defendant, if culpable, is liable for damages caused by the subsequent

health care provider's conduct.

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