Ill. Pattern Jury Instr. (Civil) 160.15

If you decide for the plaintiff on the question of liability, you must then fix the amount of

money which will reasonably and fairly compensate [name(s) of survivors entitled to claim] for

the pecuniary loss proved by the evidence to have resulted to [name(s) of survivors entitled to

claim] from the death of the decedent. “Pecuniary loss” may include loss of money, benefits,

goods, services.

In determining pecuniary loss, you may consider what the evidence shows concerning the

following:

[1. What (money,) (benefits,) (goods,) (and) (services) the decedent customarily

contributed in the past;]

[2. What (money,) (benefits,) (goods,) (and) (services) the decedent was likely to have

contributed in the future;]

[3. The decedent's personal expenses (and other deductions);]

[4. What instruction, moral training, and superintendence of education the decedent might

reasonably have been expected to give his child(ren) had he lived;]

[5. His age;]

[6. His sex;]

[7. His health;]

[8. His habits of (industry,) (sobriety,) (and) (thrift);]

[9. His occupational abilities].

The contributions and benefits which you may consider must be only those contributions

and benefits upon which a money value can be placed. You are not permitted to award any

amount for the grief or loss of society and companionship caused any survivor by the death of

[decedent's name].

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omment

The FELA has consistently been interpreted as providing recovery only for pecuniary

loss. In Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 33 S.Ct. 192, 57 L.Ed. 417 (1913),

the United States Supreme Court explained that the language of the FELA wrongful death

provision is essentially identical to that of Lord Campbell's Act, 9 & 10 Vict. ch. 93 (1846), the

first wrongful death statute. Although Lord Campbell's Act did not explicitly limit the

“damages” to be recovered, that Act and many state statutes that followed it were consistently

interpreted as providing only for pecuniary loss. Vreeland, 227 U.S. at 69-71, 33 S.Ct. at 195-

96. The Supreme Court accordingly so construed the death provision of FELA. Id.

The limited measure of damages available under the FELA was reaffirmed in Miles v.

Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 111 S.Ct. 317, 112 L.Ed.2d 275 (1990), where the Supreme

Court construed the federal statute providing for damages in an admiralty wrongful death action

(Jones Act). Recognizing that Congress incorporated the FELA unaltered into the Jones Act, the

Court stated that “Congress must have intended to incorporate the pecuniary limitation on

damages as well.” 498 U.S. at _, 111 S.Ct. at 325. The Court thus held that there is no recovery

for loss of society in a Jones Act wrongful death action. Id.

By contrast, damages recoverable under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act are not limited

solely to tangible economic loss; they may also include recovery for loss of consortium or for

loss of society. See IPI 160.14.

Damages recoverable by the deceased's children are restricted to the benefits they might

have expected to receive during minority, unless proof is made of unusual facts showing that a

child might reasonably expect support after reaching majority. Hines v. Walker, 225 S.W. 837

(Tex.Civ.App.1920), error refused.

C

ases recognizing that the care, attention, instruction, training, advice and guidance

which the evidence showed the decedent reasonably might have been expected to give his

children during their minority have pecuniary value are: Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Holbrook, 235

U.S. 625, 629, 35 S.Ct. 143, 144, 59 L.Ed. 392 (1915); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Duke, 192 Fed.

306, 309-10 (8th Cir. 1911); Duke v. St. Louis & S.F.R. Co., 172 Fed. 684, 688-89

(C.C.W.D.Ark.1909); Cain v. S. R. Co., 199 Fed. 211, 213 (C.C.E.D.Tenn.1911); Giles v. Chi.

Great W. R. Co., 72 F.Supp. 493 (D.Minn. 1947); Liepelt v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 62 Ill.App.3d

653, 378 N.E.2d 1232, 19 Ill.Dec. 357 (1st Dist.1978), rev'd on other grounds, 444 U.S. 490, 100

S.Ct. 755, 62 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980).

In St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Duke, 192 Fed. 306 (8th Cir. 1911), the court approved an

instruction that “neither sympathy nor bereavement, nor affection, nor love, nor devotion which

might have existed between the husband and wife and children can be rightly considered as an

element of damage in a case of this kind. The law permits compensation for the pecuniary loss

sustained, but not for sorrow, loss of companionship, or society.” See also Mich. Cent. R. Co.

v. V reeland, 227 U.S. 59, 33 S.Ct. 192, 57 L.Ed. 417 (1913); Allendorf v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co.,

8 Ill.2d 164, 179-80, 133 N.E.2d 288, 295-96 (1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833, 77 S.Ct. 49, 1

L.Ed.2d 53 (1956). Evidence of the anticipated future income tax liability that the decedent

would have incurred had he lived is admissible to assist the jury in determining the survivor's net

loss. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 100 S.Ct. 755, 62 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980).

Loss of future earnings may be based on the decedent's full life expectancy and need not

be limited to an arbitrary retirement age as a wage earner. Allendorf v. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co., 8

Ill.2d 164, 181, 133 N.E.2d 288, 296 (1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833, 77 S.Ct. 49, 1 L.Ed.2d

53 (1956); Avance v. Thompson, 387 Ill. 77, 84, 55 N.E.2d 57, 60 (1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S.

753, 65 S.Ct. 82, 89 L.Ed. 603 (1944).