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IL · jury_instructions

Ill. Pattern Jury Instr. (Civil) 125.00

LIABILITY FOR FALLS ON SNOW AND ICE

activein force · 2026-09-10 – presentas-observed

PERMISSION TO PUBLISH GRANTED IN 2004.

INTRODUCTION

As a general rule, property owners have no duty to remove natural accumulations of

snow, ice or melt water from their premises. Riccitelli v. Sternfeld, 1 Ill.2d 133, 115 N.E.2d 288

(1953); see also Selby v. Danville Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 169 Ill.App.3d 427, 435, 523 N.E.2d

697, 119 Ill.Dec. 941 (4th Dist.1988); Smalling v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 104 Ill.App.3d 894, 899,

433 N.E.2d 713, 60 Ill.Dec. 671 (4th Dist.1982); Hankla v. Burger Chef Sys., Inc., 93 Ill.App.3d

909, 418 N.E.2d 35, 49 Ill.Dec. 391 (1st Dist.1981). There is no liability for clearing off snow

under which there is a natural accumulation of ice. McCann v. Bethesda Hosp., 80 Ill.App.3d

544, 549, 400 N.E.2d 16, 35 Ill.Dec. 879 (1st Dist.1979).

Recovery for falls on icy sidewalks or parking lots can be based on negligent design or

maintenance of the underlying pavement. Sep esy v. Archer Daniels Co., 59 Ill.App.3d 56, 375

N.E.2d 180, 16 Ill.Dec. 549 (4th Dist.1978) (sloping surface created unnatural accumulations);

McCann v. Bethesda Hosp., 80 Ill.App.3d 544, 549, 400 N.E.2d 16, 35 Ill.Dec. 879 (1st

Dist.1970) (architect testified to improper design of entry way which resulted in unnatural

accumulations); Webb v. Morgan, 176 Ill.App.3d 378, 531 N.E.2d 36, 125 Ill.Dec. 857 (5th

Dist.1988) (slope of parking lot altered natural run- off); Wolter v. Chi. Melrose Park Assocs., 68

Ill.App.3d 1011, 1019, 386 N.E.2d 495, 25 Ill.Dec. 224 (1st Dist.1979) (negligent maintenance

of parking lot surface could cause unnatural accumulation of ice). Other cases have recognized a

cause of action for negligent removal of ice and snow because an “unnatural accumulation”

resulted. Fitz Simons v. Nat'l Tea Co., 29 Ill.App.2d 306, 173 N.E.2d 534 (1961); Foster v.

George J. Cyrus & Co., 2 Ill.App.3d 274, 276 N.E.2d 38 (1st Dist.1971); McCarthy v. Hidden

Lake Village Condo. Ass'n, 186 Ill.App.3d 752, 542 N.E.2d 868, 134 Ill.Dec. 522 (1st

Dist.1989).

Illinois courts have applied the “unnatural accumulation” requirement in a number of

specific contexts. There is no duty to warn customers or invitees of the danger of natural

accumulations. McCann v. Bethesda Hosp., 80 Ill.App.3d 544, 549, 400 N.E.2d 16, 35 Ill.Dec.

879 (1st Dist.1979). Property owners have no duty to clean up ice, snow or water which is

tracked in by customers. Demario v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 6 Ill.App.3d 46, 284 N.E.2d 330 (1st

Dist.1972), or to provide mats or rugs for customers to wipe their feet. Lohan v. Walgreens Co.,

140 Ill.App.3d 171, 488 N.E.2d 679, 94 Ill.Dec. 680 (1st Dist.1986). A mat, which becomes

saturated in a store's entryway due to tracked -in water, does not transform the water into an

unnatural accumulation, nor does it aggravate the water's natural accumulation. Wilson v.

Gorski's Food Fair, 196 Ill.App.3d 612, 554 N.E.2d 412, 143 Ill.Dec. 477 (1st Dist.1990). Where

there is no evidence to show that moisture originated from an unnatural accumulation, property

owners are under no duty to remove water from interior floors near mats. Roberson v. J.C.

Penney Co., 251 Ill.App.3d 523, 623 N.E.2d 364, 191 Ill.Dec. 119 (3d Dist.1993); see Richter v.

Burton Inv. Props., Inc., 240 Ill.App.3d 998, 1004, 181 Ill.Dec. 780, 608 N.E.2d 1254 (2d

Dist.1993) (holding that the placement of mats on a ceramic tile floor did not create a duty to

cure an excessively slippery floor). But see Fanning v. Lemay, 78 Ill.App.2d 166, 222 N.E.2d

815 (5th Dist.1966), rev'd on other grounds , 38 Ill.2d 209, 230 N.E.2d 182 (1967) (liability

predicated on negligent use of floor tile which became slippery when wet). Normal usage of the

property by vehicles or pedestrians which leaves ruts or ridges or ice in natural accumulations or

which causes ice to form as a result of thawing and refreezing on an otherwise properly

maintained surface has been held to be a natural accumulation. Selby v. Danville Pepsi -Cola

Bottling Co., 169 Ill.App.3d 427, 435, 523 N.E.2d 697, 119 Ill.Dec. 941 (4th Dist.1988); Harkins

v. Sys. Parking Inc., 186 Ill.App.3d 869, 872- 73, 542 N.E.2d 921, 134 Ill.Dec. 575 (1st

Dist.1989).

Given that a property owner is not liable for injuries caused by natural accumulations of

ice and snow, a property owner cannot be held liable for a failure to provide adequate safeguards

to prevent others from falling as a result of those natural accumulations. Branson v. R & L Inv.,

Inc., 196 Ill.App.3d 1088, 1094, 143 Ill.Dec. 689, 554 N.E.2d 624 (1st Dist.1992).

The existence of a municipal nuisance ordinance does not imply a duty to remove natural

accumulations where the common law creates no such duty. Thompson v. Tormike, Inc., 127

Ill.App.3d 674, 469 N.E.2d 453, 82 Ill.Dec. 919 (1st Dist.1984). A municipal ordinance

requiring abutting property owners to remove snow and ice from public sidewalks within 24

hours of snowfall of two inches or more is an ordinance for the benefit of the municipality. Such

an ordinance does not create a duty for the landowners. Klikas v. Hanover Square Condo. Ass'n,

240 Ill.App.3d 715, 608 N.E.2d 541, 181 Ill.Dec. 468 (1st Dist.1992).

A contract or a lease agreement that requires snow removal can create a duty to remove

natural accumulations. Schoondyke v. Heil, Heil, Smart & Golee, Inc., 89 Ill.App.3d 640, 411

N.E.2d 1168, 44 Ill.Dec. 802 (1st Dist.1980). The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the

defendant knew or should have known of the dangerous condition and failed to take proper steps

to guard against it. The lease may create a duty of snow removal but does not establish a strict

liability standard. Tressler v. Winfield Vill. Coop., Inc., 134 Ill.App.3d 578, 481 N.E.2d 75, 89

Ill.Dec. 723 (4th Dist.1985). A visitor on the property is not necessarily a third- party beneficiary

of a contract of the property owner with a snow removal service. Wells v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea

Co., 171 Ill.App.3d 1012, 525 N.E.2d 1127, 121 Ill.Dec. 820 (1st Dist.1988). However, Eichler

v. Plitt Theatres, Inc., 167 Ill.App.3d 685, 521 N.E.2d 1196, 118 Ill.Dec. 503 (2d Dist.1988),

held that a lease requiring the removal of “all” snow and ice would be construed as requiring

removal of all that was reasonably practical and that such a lease could create a duty of ordinary

care toward a business patron who fell (applying the Restatement (Second) of Torts §324A).

The General Assembly adopted the Snow and Ice Removal Act (745 ILCS 75/1-75/2),

effective September 14, 1979. Section 2 provides:

§2. Any owner, lessor, occupant or other person in char ge of any residential

property, or any agent of or other person engaged by any such party, who removes or

attempts to remove snow or ice from sidewalks abutting the property shall not be liable

for any personal injuries allegedly caused by the snowy or icy condition of the sidewalk

resulting from his or her acts or omissions unless the alleged misconduct was willful or

wanton.

In 1996, the Second District considered this statute in the context of removal of snow and ice

from “sidewalks abutting” residentia l property. Yu v. Kobayashi, 281 Ill.App.3d 489, 667

N.E.2d 106, 217 Ill.Dec. 313 (2d Dist.1996). In Yu, the court found that the defendant was not

liable for any negligence in removing or attempting to remove snow from a paved area between

the stoop of an apartment and a parking lot where plaintiff slipped and fell. The court noted that

the paved area, part of the continuous walkway, was sufficiently similar to a traditional sidewalk

and to classify it otherwise would be unreasonable. Other cases have considered snow and ice

removal from “sidewalks abutting” property without referring to the statute. See Klikas, 240

Ill.App.3d 715, 608 N.E.2d 541, 181 Ill.Dec. 468 (1st Dist.1992) discussed above.

Provenance

Source
illinoiscourts.gov
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2026-09-10
Edition
2026-09-10
Content hash
8eba765d0d870706466eda0b65968964949f15056931ac1a4c54f8fd16883007
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