IL · jury_instructions
Ill. Pattern Jury Instr. (Civil) 125.00
LIABILITY FOR FALLS ON SNOW AND ICE
PERMISSION TO PUBLISH GRANTED IN 2004.
INTRODUCTION
As a general rule, property owners have no duty to remove natural accumulations of
snow, ice or melt water from their premises. Riccitelli v. Sternfeld, 1 Ill.2d 133, 115 N.E.2d 288
(1953); see also Selby v. Danville Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 169 Ill.App.3d 427, 435, 523 N.E.2d
697, 119 Ill.Dec. 941 (4th Dist.1988); Smalling v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 104 Ill.App.3d 894, 899,
433 N.E.2d 713, 60 Ill.Dec. 671 (4th Dist.1982); Hankla v. Burger Chef Sys., Inc., 93 Ill.App.3d
909, 418 N.E.2d 35, 49 Ill.Dec. 391 (1st Dist.1981). There is no liability for clearing off snow
under which there is a natural accumulation of ice. McCann v. Bethesda Hosp., 80 Ill.App.3d
544, 549, 400 N.E.2d 16, 35 Ill.Dec. 879 (1st Dist.1979).
Recovery for falls on icy sidewalks or parking lots can be based on negligent design or
maintenance of the underlying pavement. Sep esy v. Archer Daniels Co., 59 Ill.App.3d 56, 375
N.E.2d 180, 16 Ill.Dec. 549 (4th Dist.1978) (sloping surface created unnatural accumulations);
McCann v. Bethesda Hosp., 80 Ill.App.3d 544, 549, 400 N.E.2d 16, 35 Ill.Dec. 879 (1st
Dist.1970) (architect testified to improper design of entry way which resulted in unnatural
accumulations); Webb v. Morgan, 176 Ill.App.3d 378, 531 N.E.2d 36, 125 Ill.Dec. 857 (5th
Dist.1988) (slope of parking lot altered natural run- off); Wolter v. Chi. Melrose Park Assocs., 68
Ill.App.3d 1011, 1019, 386 N.E.2d 495, 25 Ill.Dec. 224 (1st Dist.1979) (negligent maintenance
of parking lot surface could cause unnatural accumulation of ice). Other cases have recognized a
cause of action for negligent removal of ice and snow because an “unnatural accumulation”
resulted. Fitz Simons v. Nat'l Tea Co., 29 Ill.App.2d 306, 173 N.E.2d 534 (1961); Foster v.
George J. Cyrus & Co., 2 Ill.App.3d 274, 276 N.E.2d 38 (1st Dist.1971); McCarthy v. Hidden
Lake Village Condo. Ass'n, 186 Ill.App.3d 752, 542 N.E.2d 868, 134 Ill.Dec. 522 (1st
Dist.1989).
Illinois courts have applied the “unnatural accumulation” requirement in a number of
specific contexts. There is no duty to warn customers or invitees of the danger of natural
accumulations. McCann v. Bethesda Hosp., 80 Ill.App.3d 544, 549, 400 N.E.2d 16, 35 Ill.Dec.
879 (1st Dist.1979). Property owners have no duty to clean up ice, snow or water which is
tracked in by customers. Demario v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 6 Ill.App.3d 46, 284 N.E.2d 330 (1st
Dist.1972), or to provide mats or rugs for customers to wipe their feet. Lohan v. Walgreens Co.,
140 Ill.App.3d 171, 488 N.E.2d 679, 94 Ill.Dec. 680 (1st Dist.1986). A mat, which becomes
saturated in a store's entryway due to tracked -in water, does not transform the water into an
unnatural accumulation, nor does it aggravate the water's natural accumulation. Wilson v.
Gorski's Food Fair, 196 Ill.App.3d 612, 554 N.E.2d 412, 143 Ill.Dec. 477 (1st Dist.1990). Where
there is no evidence to show that moisture originated from an unnatural accumulation, property
owners are under no duty to remove water from interior floors near mats. Roberson v. J.C.
Penney Co., 251 Ill.App.3d 523, 623 N.E.2d 364, 191 Ill.Dec. 119 (3d Dist.1993); see Richter v.
Burton Inv. Props., Inc., 240 Ill.App.3d 998, 1004, 181 Ill.Dec. 780, 608 N.E.2d 1254 (2d
Dist.1993) (holding that the placement of mats on a ceramic tile floor did not create a duty to
cure an excessively slippery floor). But see Fanning v. Lemay, 78 Ill.App.2d 166, 222 N.E.2d
815 (5th Dist.1966), rev'd on other grounds , 38 Ill.2d 209, 230 N.E.2d 182 (1967) (liability
predicated on negligent use of floor tile which became slippery when wet). Normal usage of the
property by vehicles or pedestrians which leaves ruts or ridges or ice in natural accumulations or
which causes ice to form as a result of thawing and refreezing on an otherwise properly
maintained surface has been held to be a natural accumulation. Selby v. Danville Pepsi -Cola
Bottling Co., 169 Ill.App.3d 427, 435, 523 N.E.2d 697, 119 Ill.Dec. 941 (4th Dist.1988); Harkins
v. Sys. Parking Inc., 186 Ill.App.3d 869, 872- 73, 542 N.E.2d 921, 134 Ill.Dec. 575 (1st
Dist.1989).
Given that a property owner is not liable for injuries caused by natural accumulations of
ice and snow, a property owner cannot be held liable for a failure to provide adequate safeguards
to prevent others from falling as a result of those natural accumulations. Branson v. R & L Inv.,
Inc., 196 Ill.App.3d 1088, 1094, 143 Ill.Dec. 689, 554 N.E.2d 624 (1st Dist.1992).
The existence of a municipal nuisance ordinance does not imply a duty to remove natural
accumulations where the common law creates no such duty. Thompson v. Tormike, Inc., 127
Ill.App.3d 674, 469 N.E.2d 453, 82 Ill.Dec. 919 (1st Dist.1984). A municipal ordinance
requiring abutting property owners to remove snow and ice from public sidewalks within 24
hours of snowfall of two inches or more is an ordinance for the benefit of the municipality. Such
an ordinance does not create a duty for the landowners. Klikas v. Hanover Square Condo. Ass'n,
240 Ill.App.3d 715, 608 N.E.2d 541, 181 Ill.Dec. 468 (1st Dist.1992).
A contract or a lease agreement that requires snow removal can create a duty to remove
natural accumulations. Schoondyke v. Heil, Heil, Smart & Golee, Inc., 89 Ill.App.3d 640, 411
N.E.2d 1168, 44 Ill.Dec. 802 (1st Dist.1980). The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the
defendant knew or should have known of the dangerous condition and failed to take proper steps
to guard against it. The lease may create a duty of snow removal but does not establish a strict
liability standard. Tressler v. Winfield Vill. Coop., Inc., 134 Ill.App.3d 578, 481 N.E.2d 75, 89
Ill.Dec. 723 (4th Dist.1985). A visitor on the property is not necessarily a third- party beneficiary
of a contract of the property owner with a snow removal service. Wells v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea
Co., 171 Ill.App.3d 1012, 525 N.E.2d 1127, 121 Ill.Dec. 820 (1st Dist.1988). However, Eichler
v. Plitt Theatres, Inc., 167 Ill.App.3d 685, 521 N.E.2d 1196, 118 Ill.Dec. 503 (2d Dist.1988),
held that a lease requiring the removal of “all” snow and ice would be construed as requiring
removal of all that was reasonably practical and that such a lease could create a duty of ordinary
care toward a business patron who fell (applying the Restatement (Second) of Torts §324A).
The General Assembly adopted the Snow and Ice Removal Act (745 ILCS 75/1-75/2),
effective September 14, 1979. Section 2 provides:
§2. Any owner, lessor, occupant or other person in char ge of any residential
property, or any agent of or other person engaged by any such party, who removes or
attempts to remove snow or ice from sidewalks abutting the property shall not be liable
for any personal injuries allegedly caused by the snowy or icy condition of the sidewalk
resulting from his or her acts or omissions unless the alleged misconduct was willful or
wanton.
In 1996, the Second District considered this statute in the context of removal of snow and ice
from “sidewalks abutting” residentia l property. Yu v. Kobayashi, 281 Ill.App.3d 489, 667
N.E.2d 106, 217 Ill.Dec. 313 (2d Dist.1996). In Yu, the court found that the defendant was not
liable for any negligence in removing or attempting to remove snow from a paved area between
the stoop of an apartment and a parking lot where plaintiff slipped and fell. The court noted that
the paved area, part of the continuous walkway, was sufficiently similar to a traditional sidewalk
and to classify it otherwise would be unreasonable. Other cases have considered snow and ice
removal from “sidewalks abutting” property without referring to the statute. See Klikas, 240
Ill.App.3d 715, 608 N.E.2d 541, 181 Ill.Dec. 468 (1st Dist.1992) discussed above.
Provenance
- Source
- illinoiscourts.gov
- Retrieved
- 2026-09-10
- Edition
- 2026-09-10
- Content hash
8eba765d0d870706466eda0b65968964949f15056931ac1a4c54f8fd16883007
The link goes to the issuing authority’s own document — the one we read to produce this record. Where a source publishes whole titles rather than sections, your browser may need a moment to jump to the provision.
Unofficial copy of government-published law, reproduced from official sources with full provenance. Not an official publication; verify against official sources before relying on it in a filing. Records in the 'guidance' corpus, and only that corpus, are sub-regulatory (interpretive guidelines, survey procedures) and are not binding law. Validity bounds follow each jurisdiction's declared temporalBasis.