Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.220

History

Committee Notes 1968 Adoption. (a)(1) This is substantially the same as section 925.05, Florida Statutes. (a)(2) This is new and allows a defendant rights which he did not have, but must be considered in light of subdivision (c). (a)(3) This is a slight enlargement upon the present practice; however, from a practical standpoint, it is not an enlargement, but merely a codification of section 925.05, Florida Statutes, with respect to the defendant’s testimony before a grand jury. (b) This is a restatement of section 925.04, Florida Statutes, except for the change of the word “may” to “shall.” (c) This is new and affords discovery to the state within the trial judge’s discretion by allowing the trial judge to make discovery under (a)(2) and (b) conditioned upon the defendant giving the state some information if the defendant has it. This affords the state some area of discovery which it did not previously have with respect to (b). A question was raised concerning the effect of (a)(2) on FBI reports and other reports which are submitted to a prosecutor as “confidential” but it was agreed that the interests of justice would be better served by allowing this rule and that, after the appropriate governmental authorities are made aware of the fact that their reports may be subject to compulsory disclosure, no harm to the state will be done. (d) and (e) This gives the defendant optional procedures. (d) is simply a codification of section 906.29, Florida Statutes, except for the addition of “addresses.” The defendant is allowed this procedure in any event. (e) affords the defendant the additional practice of obtaining all of the state’s witnesses, as distinguished from merely those on whose evidence the information, or indictment, is based, but only if the defendant is willing to give the state a list of all defense witnesses, which must be done to take advantage of this rule. The confidential informant who is to be used as a witness must be disclosed; but it was expressly viewed that this should not otherwise overrule present case law on the subject of disclosure of confidential informants, either where disclosure is required or not required. (f) This is new and is a compromise between the philosophy that the defendant should be allowed unlimited discovery depositions and the philosophy that the defendant should not be allowed any discovery depositions at all. The purpose of the rule is to afford the defendant relief from situations when witnesses refuse to “cooperate” by making pretrial disclosures to the defense. It was determined to be necessary that the written signed statement be a criterion because this is the only way witnesses can be impeached by prior contradictory statements. The word “cooperate” was intentionally left in the rule, although the word is a loose one, so that it can be given a liberal interpretation, i.e., a witness may claim to be available and yet never actually submit to an interview. Some express the view that the defendant is not being afforded adequate protection because the cooperating witness will not have been under oath, but the subcommittee felt that the only alternative would be to make unlimited discovery depositions available to the defendant which was a view not approved by a majority of the subcommittee. Each minority is expressed by the following alternative proposals: Alternative Proposal (1): When a person is charged with an offense, at any time after the filing of the indictment, information, or affidavit upon which the defendant is to be tried, such person may take the deposition of any person by deposition upon oral examination for the purpose of discovery. The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the use of subpoenas as provided by law. The deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes. The scope of examination and the manner and method of taking such deposition shall be as provided in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and the deposition may be used for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of a deponent as a witness. Alternative Proposal (2): If a defendant signs and files a written waiver of his or her privilege against self-incrimination and submits to interrogation under oath by the prosecuting attorney, then the defendant shall be entitled to compulsory process for any or all witnesses to enable the defendant to interrogate them under oath, before trial, for discovery purposes. A view was expressed that some limitation should be placed on the state’s rights under sections 27.04 and 32.20, Florida Statutes, which allow the prosecutor to take all depositions unilaterally at any time. It was agreed by all members of the subcommittee that this right should not be curtailed until some specific time after the filing of an indictment, information, or affidavit, because circumstances sometimes require the filing of the charge and a studied marshalling of evidence thereafter. Criticism of the present practice lies in the fact that any time up to and during the course of the trial the prosecutor can subpoena any person to the privacy of the prosecutor’s office without notice to the defense and there take a statement of such person under oath. The subcommittee was divided, however, on the method of altering this situation and the end result was that this subcommittee itself should not undertake to change the existing practice, but should make the Supreme Court aware of this apparent imbalance. (g) This is new and is required in order to make effective the preceding rules. (h) This is new and, although it encompasses relief for both the state and the defense, its primary purpose is to afford relief in situations when witnesses may be intimidated and a prosecuting attorney’s heavy docket might not allow compliance with discovery within the time limitations set forth in the rules. The words, “sufficient showing” were intentionally included in order to permit the trial judge to have discretion in granting the protective relief. It would be impossible to specify all possible grounds which can be the basis of a protective order. This verbiage also permits a possible abuse by a prosecution-minded trial judge, but the subcommittee felt that the appellate court would remedy any such abuse in the course of making appellate decisions. (i) This is new and, although it will entail additional expense to counties, it was determined that it was necessary in order to comply with the recent trend of federal decisions which hold that due process is violated when a person who has the money with which to resist criminal prosecution gains an advantage over the person who is not so endowed. Actually, there is serious doubt that the intent of this subdivision can be accomplished by a rule of procedure; a statute is needed. It is recognized that such a statute may be unpopular with the legislature and not enacted. But, if this subdivision has not given effect there is a likelihood that a constitutional infirmity (equal protection of the law) will be found and either the entire rule with all subdivisions will be held void or confusion in application will result. (j) This provision is necessary since the prosecutor is required to assume many responsibilities under the various subdivisions under the rule. There are no prosecuting attorneys, either elected or regularly assigned, in justice of the peace courts. County judge’s courts, as distinguished from county courts, do not have elected prosecutors. Prosecuting attorneys in such courts are employed by county commissions and may be handicapped in meeting the requirements of the rule due to the irregularity and uncertainty of such employment. This subdivision is inserted as a method of achieving as much uniformity as possible in all of the courts of Florida having jurisdictions to try criminal cases. 1972 Amendment. The committee studied the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice relating to discovery and procedure before trial. Some of the standards are incorporated in the committee’s proposal, others are not. Generally, the standards are divided into 5 parts: Part I deals with policy and philosophy and, while the committee approves the substance of Part I, it was determined that specific rules setting out this policy and philosophy should not be proposed. Part II provides for automatic disclosures (avoiding judicial labor) by the prosecutor to the defense of almost everything within the prosecutor’s knowledge, except for work product and the identity of confidential informants. The committee adopted much of Part II, but felt that the disclosure should not be automatic in every case; the disclosure should be made only after request or demand and within certain time limitations. The ABA Standards do not recommend reciprocity of discovery, but the committee deemed that a large degree of reciprocity is in order and made appropriate recommendations. Part III of the ABA Standards recommends some disclosure by the defense (not reciprocal) to which the state was not previously entitled. The committee adopted Part III and enlarged upon it. Part IV of the Standards sets forth methods of regulation of discovery by the court. Under the Standards the discovery mentioned in Parts II and III would have been automatic and without the necessity of court orders or court intervention. Part III provides for procedures of protection of the parties and was generally incorporated in the recommendations of the committee. Part V of the ABA Standards deals with omnibus hearings and pretrial conferences. The committee rejected part of the Standards dealing with omnibus hearings because it felt that it was superfluous under Florida procedure. The Florida committee determined that a trial court may, at its discretion, schedule a hearing for the purposes enumerated in the ABA Omnibus Hearing and that a rule authorizing it is not necessary. Some of the provisions of the ABA Omnibus Hearing were rejected by the Florida committee, i.e., stipulations as to issues, waivers by defendant, etc. A modified form of pretrial conference was provided in the proposals by the Florida committee. (a)(1)(i) Same as ABA Standard 2.1(a)(i) and substance of Standard 2.1(e). Formerly Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(e) authorized exchange of witness lists. When considered with proposal 3.220(a)(3), it is seen that the proposal represents no significant change. (ii) This rule is a modification of Standard 2.1(a)(ii) and is new in Florida, although some such statements might have been discoverable under rule 3.220(f). Definition of “statement” is derived from 18 U.S.C. § 3500. Requiring law enforcement officers to include irrelevant or sensitive material in their disclosures to the defense would not serve justice. Many investigations overlap and information developed as a byproduct of one investigation may form the basis and starting point for a new and entirely separate one. Also, the disclosure of any information obtained from computerized records of the Florida Crime Information Center and the National Crime Information Center should be subject to the regulations prescribing the confidentiality of such information so as to safeguard the right of the innocent to privacy. (iii) Same as Standard 2.1(a)(ii) relating to statements of accused; words “known to the prosecutor, together with the name and address of each witness to the statement” added and is new in Florida. (iv) From Standard 2.1(a)(ii). New in Florida. (v) From Standard 2.1(a)(iii) except for addition of words, “that have been recorded” which were inserted to avoid any inference that the proposed rule makes recording of grand jury testimony mandatory. This discovery was formerly available under rule 3.220(a)(3). (vi) From Standard 2.1(a)(v). Words, “books, papers, documents, photographs” were condensed to “papers or objects” without intending to change their meaning. This was previously available under rule 3.220(b). (vii) From Standard 2.1(b)(i) except word “confidential” was added to clarify meaning. This is new in this form. (viii) From Standard 2.1(b)(iii) and is new in Florida in this form. Previously this was disclosed upon motion and order. (ix) From Standard 2.3(a), but also requiring production of “documents relating thereto” such as search warrants and affidavits. Previously this was disclosed upon motion and order. (x) From Standard 2.1(a)(iv). Previously available under rule 3.220(a)(2). Defendant must reciprocate under proposed rule 3.220(b)(4). (xi) Same committee note as (b) under this subdivision. (2) From Standard 2.1(c) except omission of words “or would tend to reduce his punishment therefore” which should be included in sentencing. (3) Based upon Standard 2.2(a) and (b) except Standards required prosecutor to furnish voluntarily and without demand while this proposal requires defendant to make demand and permits prosecutor 15 days in which to respond. (4) From Standards 2.5(b) and 4.4. Substance of this proposal previously available under rule 3.220(h). (5) From Standard 2.5. New in Florida. (b)(1) From Standard 3.1(a). New in Florida. (2) From Standard 3.1(b). New in Florida. (3) Standards did not recommend that defendant furnish prosecution with reciprocal witness list; however, formerly, rule 3.220(e) did make such provision. The committee recommended continuation of reciprocity. (4) Standards did not recommend reciprocity of discovery. Previously, Florida rules required some reciprocity. The committee recommended continuation of former reciprocity and addition of exchanging witness’ statement other than defendants’. (c) From Standard 2.6. New in Florida, but generally recognized in decisions. (d) Not recommended by Standards. Previously permitted under rule 3.220(f) except for change limiting the place of taking the deposition and eliminating requirement that witness refuse to give voluntary signed statement. (e) From Standard 4.1. New in Florida. (f) Same as rule 3.220(g). (g) From Standard 4.4 and rule 3.220(h). (h) From Standard 4.4 and rule 3.220(h). (i) From Standard 4.6. Not previously covered by rule in Florida, but permitted by decisions. (j)(1) From Standard 4.7(a). New in Florida except court discretion permitted by rule 3.220(g). (2) From Standard 4.7(b). New in Florida. (k) Same as prior rule. (l) Modified Standard 5.4. New in Florida. 1977 Amendment. The proposed change only removes the comma which currently appears after (a)(1). 1980 Amendment. The intent of the rule change is to guarantee that the accused will receive those portions of police reports or report summaries which contain any written, recorded, or oral statements made by the accused. 1986 Amendment. The showing of good cause under (d)(2) of this rule may be presented ex parte or in camera to the court. 1989 Amendment. 3.220(a). The purpose of this change is to ensure reciprocity of discovery. Under the previous rule, the defendant could tailor discovery, demanding only certain items of discovery with no requirement to reciprocate items other than those demanded. A defendant could avoid reciprocal discovery by taking depositions, thereby learning of witnesses through the deposition process, and then deposing those witnesses without filing a demand for discovery. With this change, once a defendant opts to use any discovery device, the defendant is required to produce all items designated under the discovery rule, whether or not the defendant has specifically requested production of those items. Former subdivision (c) is relettered (b). Under (b)(1) the prosecutor’s obligation to furnish a witness list is conditioned upon the defendant filing a “Notice of Discovery.” Former subdivision (a)(1)(i) is renumbered (b)(1)(i) and, as amended, limits the ability of the defense to take depositions of those persons designated by the prosecutor as witnesses who should not be deposed because of their tangential relationship to the case. This does not preclude the defense attorney or a defense investigator from interviewing any witness, including a police witness, about the witness’s knowledge of the case. This change is intended to meet a primary complaint of law enforcement agencies that depositions are frequently taken of persons who have no knowledge of the events leading to the charge, but whose names are disclosed on the witness list. Examples of these persons are transport officers, evidence technicians, etc. In order to permit the defense to evaluate the potential testimony of those individuals designated by the prosecutor, their testimony must be fully set forth in some document, generally a police report. (a)(1)(ii) is renumbered (b)(1)(ii). This subdivision is amended to require full production of all police incident and investigative reports, of any kind, that are discoverable, provided there is no independent reason for restricting their disclosure. The term “statement” is intended to include summaries of statements of witnesses made by investigating officers as well as statements adopted by the witnesses themselves. The protection against disclosure of sensitive information, or information that otherwise should not be disclosed, formerly set forth in (a)(1)(i), is retained, but transferred to subdivision (b)(1)(xii). The prohibition sanction is not eliminated, but is transferred to subdivision (b)(1)(xiii). “Shall” has been changed to “may” in order to reflect the procedure for imposition of sanctions specified in Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971). The last phrase of renumbered subdivision (b)(2) is added to emphasize that constitutionally required Brady material must be produced regardless of the defendant’s election to participate in the discovery process. Former subdivision (b) is relettered (c). Former subdivisions (b)(3) and (4) are now included in new subdivision (d). An introductory phrase has been added to subdivision (d). Subdivision (d) reflects the change in nomenclature from a “Demand for Discovery” to the filing of a “Notice of Discovery.” As used in subdivision (d), the word “defendant” is intended to refer to the party rather than to the person. Any obligations incurred by the “defendant” are incurred by the defendant’s attorney if the defendant is represented by counsel and by the defendant personally if the defendant is not represented. The right of the defendant to be present and to examine witnesses, set forth in renumbered subdivision (d)(1), refers to the right of the defense, as party to the action. The term refers to the attorney for the defendant if the defendant is represented by counsel. The right of the defendant to be physically present at the deposition is controlled by new subdivision (h)(6). Renumbered subdivision (d)(2), as amended, reflects the new notice of discovery procedure. If the defendant elects to participate in discovery, the defendant is obligated to furnish full reciprocal disclosure. Subdivision (e) was previously numbered (a)(4). This subdivision has been modified to permit the remedy to be sought by either prosecution or defense. Subdivision (f) was previously numbered (a)(5) and has been modified to permit the prosecutor, as well as the defense attorney, to seek additional discovery. Former subdivision (c) is relettered (g). Former subdivision (d) is relettered (h). Renumbered subdivision (h)(1) has been amended to reflect the restrictions on deposing a witness designated by the prosecution under (b)(1)(i) (designation of a witness performing ministerial duties only or one who will not be called at trial). (h)(1)(i) is added to provide that a deposition of a witness designated by the prosecutor under (b)(1)(i) may be taken only upon good cause shown by the defendant to the court. (h)(1)(ii) is added to provide that abuses by attorneys of the provisions of (b)(1)(i) are subject to stringent sanctions. New subdivision (h)(1)(iii) abolishes depositions in misdemeanor cases except when good cause is shown. A portion of former subdivision (d)(1) is renumbered (h)(3). This subdivision now permits the administrative judge or chief judge, in addition to the trial judge, to designate the place for taking the deposition. New subdivision (h)(4) recognizes that children and some adults are especially vulnerable to intimidation tactics. Although it has been shown that such tactics are infrequent, they should not be tolerated because of the traumatic effect on the witness. The videotaping of the deposition will enable the trial judge to control such tactics. Provision is also made to protect witnesses of fragile emotional strength because of their vulnerability to intimidation tactics. New subdivision (h)(5) emphasizes the necessity for the establishment, in each jurisdiction, of an effective witness coordinating office. The Florida Legislature has authorized the establishment of such office through section 43.35, Florida Statutes. This subdivision is intended to make depositions of witnesses and law enforcement officers as convenient as possible for the witnesses and with minimal disruption of law enforcement officers’ official duties. New subdivision (h)(6) recognizes that one of the most frequent complaints from child protection workers and from rape victim counselors is that the presence of the defendant intimidates the witnesses. The trauma to the victim surpasses the benefit to the defense of having the defendant present at the deposition. Since there is no right, other than that given by the rules of procedure, for a defendant to attend a deposition, the Florida Supreme Court Commission on Criminal Discovery believes that no such right should exist in those cases. The “defense,” of course, as a party to the action, has a right to be present through counsel at the deposition. In this subdivision, the word “defendant” is meant to refer to the person of the defendant, not to the defense as a party. See comments to rules 3.220(d) and 3.220(d)(1). Although defendants have no right to be present at depositions and generally there is no legitimate reason for their presence, their presence is appropriate in certain cases. An example is a complex white collar fraud prosecution in which the defendant must explain the meaning of technical documents or terms. Cases requiring the defendant’s presence are the exception rather than the rule. Accordingly, (h)(6)(i)–(ii) preclude the presence of defendants at depositions unless agreed to by the parties or ordered by the court. These subdivisions set forth factors that a court should take into account in considering motions to allow a defendant’s presence. New subdivision (h)(7) permits the defense to obtain needed factual information from law enforcement officers by informal telephone deposition. Recognizing that the formal deposition of a law enforcement officer is often unnecessary, this procedure will permit such discovery at a significant reduction of costs. Former subdivisions (e), (f), and (g) are relettered (i), (j), and (k), respectively. Former subdivision (h) is relettered (l) and is modified to emphasize the use of protective orders to protect witnesses from harassment or intimidation and to provide for limiting the scope of the deposition as to certain matters. Former subdivision (i) is relettered (m). Former subdivision (j) is relettered (n). Renumbered (n)(2) is amended to provide that sanctions are mandatory if the court finds willful abuse of discovery. Although the amount of sanction is discretionary, some sanction must be imposed. (n)(3) is new and tracks the certification provisions of federal procedure. The very fact of signing such a certification will make counsel cognizant of the effect of that action. Subdivision (k) is relettered (o). Subdivision (l) is relettered (p). 1992 Amendment. The proposed amendments change the references to “indictment or information” in subdivisions (b)(1), (b)(2), (c)(1), and (h)(1) to “charging document.” This amendment is proposed in conjunction with amendments to rule 3.125 to provide that all individuals charged with a criminal violation would be entitled to the same discovery regardless of the nature of the charging document (i.e., indictment, information, or notice to appear). 1996 Amendment. This is a substantial rewording of the rule as it pertains to depositions and pretrial case management. The amendment was in response to allegations of discovery abuse and a call for a more cost conscious approach to discovery by the Florida Supreme Court. In felony cases, the rule requires prosecutors to list witnesses in categories A, B, and C. Category A witnesses are subject to deposition as under the former rule. Category B witnesses are subject to deposition only upon leave of court. Category B witnesses include, but are not limited to, witnesses whose only connection to the case is the fact that they are the owners of property; transporting officers; booking officers; records and evidence custodians; and experts who have filed a report and curriculum vitae and who will not offer opinions subject to the Frye test. Category C witnesses may not be deposed. The trial courts are given more responsibility to regulate discovery by pretrial conference and by determining which category B witnesses should be deposed in a given case. The rule was not amended for the purpose of prohibiting discovery. Instead, the rule recognized that many circuits now have “early resolution” or “rocket dockets” in which “open file discovery” is used to resolve a substantial percentage of cases at or before arraignment. The committee encourages that procedure. If a case cannot be resolved early, the committee believes that resolution of typical cases will occur after the depositions of the most essential witnesses (category A) are taken. Cases which do not resolve after the depositions of category A, may resolve if one or more category B witnesses are deposed. If the case is still unresolved, it is probably going to be a case that needs to be tried. In that event, judges may determine which additional depositions, if any, are necessary for pretrial preparation. A method for making that determination is provided in the rule. Additionally, trial judges may regulate the taking of depositions in a number of ways to both facilitate resolution of a case and protect a witness from unnecessary inconvenience or harassment. There is a provision for setting a discovery schedule, including a discovery cut-off date as is common in civil practice. Also, a specific method is provided for application for protective orders. One feature of the new rule relates to the deposition of law enforcement officers. Subpoenas are no longer required. The rule has standardized the time for serving papers relating to discovery at fifteen days. Discovery in misdemeanor cases has not been changed. (b)(1)(A)(i) An investigating officer is an officer who has directed the collection of evidence, interviewed material witnesses, or who was assigned as the case investigator. (h)(1) The prosecutor and defense counsel are encouraged to be present for the depositions of essential witnesses, and judges are encouraged to provide calendar time for the taking of depositions so that counsel for all parties can attend. This will 1) diminish the potential for the abuse of witnesses, 2) place the parties in a position to timely and effectively avail themselves of the remedies and sanctions established in this rule, 3) promote an expeditious and timely resolution of the cause, and 4) diminish the need to order transcripts of the deposition, thereby reducing costs. 1998 Amendment. This rule governs only the location of depositions. The procedure for procuring out-of-state witnesses for depositions is governed by statute. 2018 Amendment. The amendments to subdivision (j) are a clarification of the rule based on Scipio v. State, 928 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 2006), and Washington v. State, 151 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014). Court Commentary 1996 Amendment. The designation of a witness who will present similar fact evidence will be dependent upon the witness’s relationship to the similar crime, wrong, or act about which testimony will be given rather than the witness’s relationship to the crime with which the defendant is currently charged. 1999/2000 Amendment. This rule does not affect requests for nonexempt law enforcement records as provided in chapter 119, Florida Statutes, other than those that are nonexempt as a result of a codefendant’s participation in discovery. See Henderson v. State, 745 So. 2d 319 (Fla. Feb. 18, 1999). 2014 Amendment. The amendment to subdivision (b)(1)(A)(i)(8) is not intended to limit in any manner whatsoever the discovery obligations under the other provisions of the rule. With respect to subdivision (b)(l)(M)(iv), the Florida Innocence Commission recognized the impossibility of listing in the body of the rule every possible permutation expressing a benefit by the state to the informant witness. Although the term “anything” is not defined in the rule, the following are examples of benefits that may be considered by the trial court in determining whether the state has complied with its discovery obligations. The term “anything” includes, but is not limited to, any deal, promise, inducement, pay, leniency, immunity, personal advantage, vindication, or other benefit that the prosecution, or any person acting on behalf of the prosecution, has knowingly made or may make in the future.