Del. P.J.I. Civ. § 21.3

SUPERSEDING CAUSE

In this case, [defendant’s name] alleges that [third party’s name]’s negligence

was the only direct cause of [plaintiff’s name]’s injuries. Just because [defendant’s

name] was negligent and that negligence set in motion a chain of events that caused

[plaintiff’s name]’s injuries, it does not mean that [defendant’s name] is liable to

[plaintiff’s name].

One cause of injury may come after an earlier cause of injury. The second is

called an intervening cause. The fact that an intervening cause occurs does not

automatically break the chain of causation arising from the original cause. In order

to break the original chain of causation, the intervening cause must also be a

superseding cause. That is, the intervening act or event itself must not have been

anticipated or reasonably foreseeable by the person causing the original injury.

However, the precise intervening act or event need not be anticipated or foreseeable,

but the risk of harm created by the first act must be. An intervening act of negligence

will relieve the person who originally committed negligence from liability:

(1) if at the time of the original negligence, the person who committed it

would not reasonably have foreseen that another’s negligence might cause harm; or,

(2) if a reasonable person would consider the occurrence of the intervening

act as highly extraordinary; or

(3) if the intervening act was extraordinarily negligent.

If [third party’s name]’s negligence, coming after [defendant’s name]’s

negligence, was a distinct and unrelated cause of the injuries, and if that negligence

could not have been reasonably anticipated or if that subsequent conduct was

extraordinarily negligent, then you may find [third party’s name]’s negligence to be

the sole proximate cause of the injuries. If you so find, you must return a verdict in

favor of [defendant’s name].