Conn. R. Prof'l Conduct 8.4

History

(P.B. 1978-1997, Rule 8.4.) (Amended June 26, 2006, to take effect Jan. 1, 2007; amended June 11, 2021, to take effect Jan. 1, 2022.) COMMENTARY: Lawyers are subject to discipline when they violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so through the acts of another, as when they request or instruct an agent to do so on the lawyer’s behalf. Subdivision (1), however, does not prohibit a lawyer from advising a client concerning action the client is legally entitled to take. Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law, such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of wilful failure to file an income tax return. However, some kinds of offenses carry no such implication. Traditionally, the distinction was drawn in terms of offenses involving “moral turpitude.’’ That concept can be construed to include offenses concerning some matters of personal morality, such as adul- tery and comparable offenses, which have no specific connec- tion to fitness for the practice of law. Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, breach of trust, or serious interference with the administration of justice are in that category. A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation. Counseling or assisting a client with regard to conduct expressly permitted under Connecticut law is not conduct that reflects adversely on a lawyer’s fitness notwithstanding any conflict with federal or other law. Nothing in this commentary shall be construed to provide a defense to a presentment filed pursuant to Practice Book Section 2-41. Discrimination and harassment in the practice of law under- mine confidence in the legal profession and the legal system. Discrimination includes harmful verbal or physical conduct directed at an individual or individuals that manifests bias or prejudice on the basis of one or more of the protected catego- ries. Not all conduct that involves consideration of these char- acteristics manifests bias or prejudice: there may be a legitimate nondiscriminatory basis for the conduct. Harassment includes severe or pervasive derogatory or demeaning verbal or physical conduct. Harassment on the basis of sex includes unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature. The substantive law of antidiscrimination and antiharass- ment statutes and case law should guide application of para - graph (7), where applicable. Where the conduct in question is subject to federal or state antidiscrimination or antiharassment law, a lawyer’s conduct does not violate paragraph (7) when the conduct does not violate such law. Moreover, an adminis- trative or judicial finding of a violation of state or federal antidis- crimination or antiharassment law does not alone establish a violation of paragraph (7). A lawyer’s conduct does not violate paragraph (7) when the conduct in question is protected under the first amendment to the United States constitution or article first, § 4 of the Connecticut constitution. Conduct related to the practice of law includes representing clients; interacting with witnesses, coworkers, court personnel, lawyers and others while engaged in the practice of law; operating or managing a law firm or law practice; and partici- pating in bar association, business or professional activities or events in connection with the practice of law. Lawyers may engage in conduct undertaken to promote diversity, equity and inclusion without violating this Rule by, for example, imple- menting initiatives aimed at recruiting, hiring, retaining and advancing diverse employees or sponsoring diverse law stu- dent organizations. A trial judge’s finding that peremptory challenges were exer- cised on a discriminatory basis does not alone establish a violation of paragraph (7). Moreover, no disciplinary violation may be found where a lawyer exercises a peremptory chal- lenge on a basis that is permitted under substantive law. A lawyer does not violate paragraph (7) by limiting the scope or subject matter of the lawyer’s practice or by limiting the law- yer’s practice to members of a particular segment of the popu- lation in accordance with these rules and other law. A lawyer may charge and collect reasonable fees and expenses for a representation. Rule 1.5 (a). Lawyers also should be mindful of their professional obligations under Rule 6.1 to provide legal services to those who are unable to pay, and their obligation under Rule 6.2 not to avoid appointments from a tribunal except for good cause. See Rule 6.2 (1), (2) and (3). A lawyer’s representation of a client does not constitute an endorsement by the lawyer of the client’s views or activities. See Rule 1.2 (b). The provisions of Rule 1.2 (d) concerning a good faith challenge to the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law apply to challenges of legal regulation of the practice of law. Lawyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens. A lawyer’s abuse of public office can suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of a lawyer. The same is true of abuse of positions of private trust, such as trustee, executor, administrator, guard - ian, agent and officer, director or manager of a corporation or other organization.