Conn. R. Prof'l Conduct 3.3

History

(P.B. 1978-1997, Rule 3.3.) COMMENTARY: This Rule governs the conduct of a lawyer who is representing a client in the proceedings of a tribunal. See Rule 1.0 (n) for the definition of ‘‘tribunal.’’ It also applies when the lawyer is representing a client in an ancillary proceed- ing conducted pursuant to the tribunal’s adjudicative authority, such as a deposition. Thus, for example, subsection (a) (3) requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures if the lawyer comes to know that a client who is testifying in a deposition has offered evidence that is false. This Rule sets forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of the court to avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process. A lawyer acting as an advocate in an adjudicative proceeding has an obligation to present the client’s case with persuasive force. Performance of that duty while maintaining confidences of the client, however, is quali- fied by the advocate’s duty of candor to the tribunal. Conse - quently, although a lawyer in an adversary proceeding is not required to present an impartial exposition of the law or to vouch for the evidence submitted in a cause, the lawyer must not allow the tribunal to be misled by false statements of law or fact or evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. Representations by a Lawyer. An advocate is responsible for pleadings and other documents prepared for litigation, but is usually not required to have personal knowledge of matters asserted therein, for litigation documents ordinarily present assertions by the client, or by someone on the client’s behalf, and not assertions by the lawyer. Compare Rule 3.1. However, an assertion purporting to be on the lawyer’s own knowledge, as in an affidavit by the lawyer or in a statement in open court, may properly be made only when the lawyer knows the assertion is true or believes it to be true on the basis of a reasonably diligent inquiry. There are circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative misrepresentation. The obligation prescribed in Rule 1.2 (d) not to counsel a client to commit or assist the client in commit- ting a fraud applies in litigation. Regarding compliance with Rule 1.2 (d), see the Commentary to that Rule. See also the Commentary to Rule 8.4 (2). Legal Argument. Legal argument based on a knowingly false representation of law constitutes dishonesty toward the tribunal. A lawyer is not required to make a disinterested expo- sition of the law, but must recognize the existence of pertinent legal authorities. Furthermore, as stated in subsection (a) (2), an advocate has a duty to disclose directly adverse authority in the controlling jurisdiction that has not been disclosed by the opposing party. The underlying concept is that legal argu- ment is a discussion seeking to determine the legal premises properly applicable to the case. Offering Evidence. Subsection (a) (3) requires that the lawyer refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false, regardless of the client’s wishes. This duty is premised on the lawyer’s obligation as an officer of the court to prevent the trier of fact from being misled by false evidence. A lawyer does not violate this Rule if the lawyer offers the evidence for the purpose of establishing its falsity. If a lawyer knows that the client intends to testify falsely or wants the lawyer to introduce false evidence, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client that the evidence should not be offered. If the persuasion is ineffective and the lawyer contin- ues to represent the client, the lawyer must refuse to offer the false evidence. If only a portion of a witness’ testimony will be false, the lawyer may call the witness to testify but may not elicit or otherwise permit the witness to present the testi- mony that the lawyer knows is false. The duties stated in subsections (a) and (b) apply to all lawyers, including defense counsel in criminal cases. In some jurisdictions, however, courts have required counsel to present the accused as a witness or to give a narrative statement if the accused so desires, even if counsel knows that the testi- mony or statement will be false. The obligation of the advocate under the Rules of Professional Conduct is subordinate to such requirements. The prohibition against offering false evidence only applies if the lawyer knows that the evidence is false. A lawyer’s reasonable belief that evidence is false does not preclude its presentation to the trier of fact. A lawyer’s knowledge that evidence is false, however, can be inferred from the circum - stances. See Rule 1.0 (g). Thus, although a lawyer should resolve doubts about the veracity of testimony or other evi- dence in favor of the client, the lawyer cannot ignore an obvi- ous falsehood. Because of the special protections historically provided criminal defendants, however, this Rule does not permit a lawyer to refuse to offer the testimony of such a client where the lawyer reasonably believes but does not know that the testimony will be false. Unless the lawyer knows the testimony will be false, the lawyer must honor the client’s decision to testify. Remedial Measures. Having offered material evidence in the belief that it was true, a lawyer may subsequently come to know that the evidence is false. Or, a lawyer may be sur- prised when the lawyer’s client, or another witness called by the lawyer, offers testimony the lawyer knows to be false, either during the lawyer’s direct examination or in response to cross-examination by the opposing lawyer. In such situa- tions or if the lawyer knows of the falsity of testimony elicited from the client during a deposition, the lawyer must take rea - sonable remedial measures. In such situations, the advocate’s proper course is to remonstrate with the client confidentially, advise the client of the lawyer’s duty of candor to the tribunal and seek the client’s cooperation with respect to the withdrawal or correction of the false statements or evidence. If that fails, the advocate must take further remedial action. If withdrawal from the representation is not permitted or will not undo the effect of the false evidence, the advocate must make such disclosure to the tribunal as is reasonably necessary to remedy the situation, even if doing so requires the lawyer to reveal information that otherwise would be protected by Rule 1.6. It is for the tribunal then to determine what should be done. The disclosure of a client’s false testimony can result in grave consequences to the client, including not only a sense of betrayal but also loss of the case and perhaps a prosecution for perjury. But the alternative is that the lawyer cooperate in deceiving the court, thereby subverting the truth-finding process which the adversary system is designed to implement. See Rule 1.2 (d). Furthermore, unless it is clearly understood that the lawyer will act upon the duty to disclose the existence of false evidence, the client can simply reject the lawyer’s advice to reveal the false evidence and insist that the lawyer keep silent. Thus, the client could in effect coerce the lawyer into being a party to fraud on the court. Preserving Integrity of Adjudicative Process. Lawyers have a special obligation to protect a tribunal against criminal or fraudulent conduct that undermines the integrity of the adju- dicative process, such as bribing, intimidating or otherwise unlawfully communicating with a witness, juror, court official or other participant in the proceeding, unlawfully destroying or concealing documents or other evidence or failing to disclose information to the tribunal when required by law to do so. Thus, subsection (b) requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures, including disclosure if necessary, when- ever the lawyer knows that a person, including the lawyer’s client, intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in crimi- nal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding. Nothing in Rule 3.3 (e) is meant to limit a lawyer’s obligation to take appropriate action after judgment has entered. Duration of Obligation. A practical time limit on the obliga- tion to rectify false evidence or false statements of fact has to be established. The conclusion of the proceeding is a rea- sonably definite point for the termination of the obligation. In criminal and juvenile delinquency matters, the duty to correct a newly discovered and material falsehood continues until the defendant or delinquent is discharged from custody or released from judicial supervision, whichever occurs later. The lawyer shall notify the tribunal that false evidence or false statements of fact were made. Ex Parte Proceedings. Ordinarily, an advocate has the limited responsibility of presenting one side of the matters that a tribunal should consider in reaching a decision; the conflicting position is expected to be presented by the opposing party. However, in any ex parte proceeding, such as an application for a temporary restraining order, there is no balance of presen- tation by opposing advocates. The object of an ex parte pro - ceeding is nevertheless to yield a substantially just result. The judge has an affirmative responsibility to accord the absent party just consideration. The lawyer for the represented party has the correlative duty to make disclosures of material facts known to the lawyer and that the lawyer reasonably believes are necessary to an informed decision. Withdrawal. Normally, a lawyer’s compliance with the duty of candor imposed by this Rule does not require that the lawyer withdraw from the representation of a client whose interests will be or have been adversely affected by the lawyer’s disclo- sure. The lawyer may, however, be required by Rule 1.16 (a) to seek permission of the tribunal to withdraw if the lawyer’s compliance with this Rule’s duty of candor results in such an extreme deterioration of the client-lawyer relationship that the lawyer can no longer competently represent the client. Also see Rule 1.16 (b) for the circumstances in which a lawyer will be permitted to seek a tribunal’s permission to withdraw. In connection with a request for permission to withdraw that is premised on a client’s misconduct, a lawyer may reveal infor- mation relating to the representation only to the extent reason- ably necessary to comply with this Rule or as otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6.