Conn. Code Evid. § 6-7

History

COMMENTARY (a) General rule. Subsection (a) recognizes the trial court’s discretionary authority to admit prior crimes evidence; e.g., State v. Skakel, 276 Conn. 633, 738, 888 A.2d 985, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1030, 127 S. Ct. 578, 166 L. Ed. 2d 428 (2006); Heating Acceptance Corp. v. Patterson, 152 Conn. 467, 472, 208 A.2d 341 (1965); see General Statutes § 52-145 (b); subject to consideration of the three factors set forth in the rule. State v. Nardini, 187 Conn. 513, 522, 447 A.2d 396 (1982); accord State v. Skakel, supra, 738; State v. Cooper, 227 Conn. 417, 434–35, 630 A.2d 1043 (1993). A determination of youthful offender status pursuant to chap- ter 960a of the General Statutes does not constitute a convic- tion for purposes of subsection (a). State v. Keiser, 196 Conn. 122, 127–28, 491 A.2d 382 (1985); see General Statutes § 54-76k. The trial court must balance the probative value of the con- viction evidence against its prejudicial impact. State v. Harrell, 199 Conn. 255, 262, 506 A.2d 1041 (1986); see Section 4-3; see also Label Systems Corp. v. Aghamohammadi, 270 Conn. 291, 313, 852 A.2d 703 (2004) (trial court must weigh ‘‘(1) the potential for the evidence to cause prejudice, (2) its signifi - cance to indicate untruthfulness, and (3) its remoteness in time’’). The balancing test applies whether the witness against whom the conviction evidence is being offered is the accused or someone other than the accused. See State v. Cooper, supra, 227 Conn. 435; State v. Pinnock, 220 Conn. 765, 780–81, 601 A.2d 521 (1992). The party objecting to the admis- sion of conviction evidence bears the burden of showing the prejudice likely to arise from its admission. E.g., S tate v. Har- rell, supra, 262; State v. Binet, 192 Conn. 618, 624, 473 A.2d 1200 (1984). The Supreme Court has established no absolute time limit that would bar the admissibility of certain convictions, although it has suggested a ten year limit on admissibility measured from the later of the date of conviction or the date of the witness’ release from the confinement imposed for the conviction. See, e.g., Label Systems Corp. v. Aghamohammadi, supra, 270 Conn. 309; State v. Nardini, supra, 187 Conn. 526. The court has noted, however, that those ‘‘convictions having. . . spe- cial significance upon the issue of veracity [may] surmount the standard bar of ten years. . . .’’ State v. Nardini, supra, 526; see also Label Systems Corp. v. Aghamohammadi, supra, 309 (‘‘unless a conviction [has] some special signifi - cance to untruthfulness, the fact that it was more than ten years old would most likely preclude its admission under our balancing test’’(emphasis in original)). Ultimately, the trial court retains discretion to determine whether the remoteness of a particular conviction will call for its exclusion. See Label Sys- tems Corp. v. Aghamohammadi, supra, 307; State v. Nardini, supra, 526. A conviction that qualifies under the rule may be admitted to attack credibility, whether the conviction was rendered in this state or another jurisdiction. State v. Perelli, 128 Conn. 172, 180, 21 A.2d 389 (1941); see State v. Grady, 153 Conn. 26, 30, 211 A.2d 674 (1965). When a conviction from a jurisdic- tion other than Connecticut is used, choice of law principles govern whether, for purposes of the ‘‘more than one year’’ requirement, the source of the time limitation derives from the law of the jurisdiction under which the witness was convicted or from an analogous provision in the General Statutes. See State v. Perelli, supra, 180. (b) Methods of proof. Subsection (b) restates the two common-law methods of proving a witness’ criminal conviction. E.g., State v. Denby, 198 Conn. 23, 29–30, 501 A.2d 1206 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1097, 106 S. Ct. 1497, 89 L. Ed. 2d 898 (1986); State v. English, 132 Conn. 573, 581–82, 46 A.2d 121 (1946). Although these are the traditional methods of proving a wit - ness’ criminal conviction, nothing in subsection (b) precludes other methods of proof when resort to the traditional methods prove to be unavailing. Use of the disjunctive ‘‘or’’ is not intended to preclude resort to one method of proof merely because the other method of proof already has been attempted. (c) Matters subject to proof. Subsection (c) is consistent with common law. State v. Rob- inson, 227 Conn. 711, 736, 631 A.2d 288 (1993) (name of crime and date and place of conviction); State v. Dobson, 221 Conn. 128, 138, 602 A.2d 977 (1992) (date and place of conviction); State v. Pinnock, supra, 220 Conn. 780 (name of crime and date of conviction). Inquiry into other details and circumstances surrounding the crime for which the witness was convicted is impermissible. See State v. Denby, supra, 198 Conn. 30; State v. Marino, 23 Conn. App. 392, 403, 580 A.2d 990, cert. denied, 216 Conn. 818, 580 A.2d 63 (1990). The rule preserves the court’s common-law discretion to limit the matters subject to proof. See, e.g., State v. Dobson, supra, 221 Conn. 138; State v. Pinnock, supra, 220 Conn. 780. The court’s discretion to exclude the name of the crime generally has been limited to those situations in which the prior conviction does not reflect directly on veracity. See, e.g., State v. Pinnock, supra, 780, 782. When the court orders the name of the crime excluded, the examiner may refer to the fact that the witness was convicted for the commission of an unspecified crime that was punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. See State v. Dobson, supra, 138; State v. Geyer, 194 Conn. 1, 16, 480 A.2d 489 (1984). The rule also reflects the holding in State v. Robinson, supra, 227 Conn. 736. If the witness admits the fact of conviction, the punishment or sentence imposed for that conviction is inadmissible. State v. McClain, 23 Conn. App. 83, 87–88, 579 A.2d 564 (1990). (d) Pendency of appeal. Subsection (d) restates the rule from cases such as State v. Varszegi, 36 Conn. App. 680, 685–86, 653 A.2d 201 (1995), aff’d, 236 Conn. 266, 673 A.2d 90 (1996), and State v. Schroff, 3 Conn. App. 684, 689, 492 A.2d 190 (1985).