Conn. Code Evid. § 6-10

History

COMMENTARY (a) Prior inconsistent statements generally. Subsection (a) embraces a familiar common-law principle. State v. Avis, 209 Conn. 290, 302, 551 A.2d 26, cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1097, 109 S. Ct. 1570, 103 L. Ed. 2d 937 (1989); G & R Tire Distributors, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 177 Conn. 58, 60–61, 411 A.2d 31 (1979); Beardsley v. Wildman, 41 Conn. 515, 516 (1874). Impeachment of a witness’ in-court testimony with the wit- ness’ prior inconsistent statements is proper only if the prior statements are in fact ‘‘inconsistent’’ with the witness’ testi- mony. E.g., State v. Richardson, 214 Conn. 752, 763, 574 A.2d 182 (1990); State v. Reed, 174 Conn. 287, 302–303, 386 A.2d 243 (1978). A finding of a statement’s inconsistency ‘‘is not limited to cases in which diametrically opposed asser - tions have been made.’’ State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 749 n.4, 513 A.2d 86, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994, 107 S. Ct. 597, 93 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1986). Inconsistencies can be found in omissions, changes of position, denials of recollection or eva- sive answers. Id., 748–49 n.4. The determination whether an ‘‘inconsistency’’ exists lies within the discretion of the court. State v. Avis, supra, 209 Conn. 302. The substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent state - ments is treated elsewhere in the Code. See Section 8-5 (1). (b) Examining witness concerning prior inconsistent statement. Subsection (b) addresses the necessity of laying a founda- tion as a precondition to examining the witness about his or her prior inconsistent statement. It adopts the rule of State v. Saia, 172 Conn. 37, 46, 372 A.2d 144 (1976). See State v. Butler, 207 Conn. 619, 626, 543 A.2d 270 (1988); State v. Williams, 204 Conn. 523, 534, 529 A.2d 653 (1987). Although Connecticut favors the laying of a foundation; see State v. Saia, supra, 172 Conn. 46; it consistently has main - tained that there is ‘‘no inflexible rule regarding the necessity of calling the attention of a witness on cross-examination to [the] alleged prior inconsistent statement before. . . ques- tioning him [or her] on the subject. . . .’’ Id.; see Adams v. Herald Publishing Co. , 82 Conn. 448, 452–53, 74 A. 755 (1909). (c) Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement of witness. The first sentence is consistent with common law. See G & R Tire Distributors, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra, 177 Conn. 61; see also Barlow Bros. Co. v. Parsons, 73 Conn. 696, 702–703, 49 A. 205 (1901) (finding extrinsic proof of prior inconsistent statement unnecessary when witness admits to making statement); State v. Graham, 21 Conn. App. 688, 704, 575 A.2d 1057 (same), cert. denied, 216 Conn. 805, 577 A.2d 1063 (1990); cf. State v. Butler, supra, 207 Conn. 626 (where witness denied or stated that he or she did not recall having made prior statement, extrinsic evidence establishing making of that statement could be admitted). Notwithstanding the gen- eral rule, subsection (c) recognizes the court’s discretion to admit extrinsic evidence of a witness’ prior inconsistent state- ment even when the examiner lays a foundation and the wit- ness admits to making the statement. See G & R Tire Distributors, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra, 61. The second sentence reconciles two interrelated principles: the preference for laying a foundation when examining a wit - ness concerning prior inconsistent statements; see subsection (b); and the discretion afforded the trial court in determining the admissibility of extrinsic evidence of a witness’ prior incon- sistent statements where no foundation has been laid. State v. Saia, supra, 172 Conn. 46. Case law forbids the introduction of extrinsic evidence of a witness’ prior inconsistent statement when the witness’ state- ment involves a collateral matter, i.e., a matter not directly relevant and material to the merits of the case. E.g., State v. Diaz, 237 Conn. 518, 548, 679 A.2d 902 (1996); Johnson v. Palomba Co., 114 Conn. 108, 115–16, 157 A. 902 (1932).