Conn. Code Evid. § 4-8

History

COMMENTARY (a) General rule. It is well established that evidence of an offer to compromise or settle a disputed claim is inadmissible to prove the validity or invalidity of the claim or its amount. See, e.g., Jutkowitz v. Dept. of Health Services, 220 Conn. 86, 97, 596 A.2d 374 (1991); Simone Corp. v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 187 Conn. 487, 490, 446 A.2d 1071 (1982); Evans Products Co. v. Clinton Building Supply, Inc., 174 Conn. 512, 517, 391 A.2d 157 (1978); Fowles v. Allen, 64 Conn. 350, 351–52, 30 A. 144 (1894); Stranahan v. East Haddam, 11 Conn. 507, 514 (1836); cf. PSE Consulting, Inc. v. Frank Mercede & Sons, Inc. , 267 Conn. 279, 332–33, 838 A.2d 135 (2004) (email containing settlement discussion between defendant and third party admissible because Section 4-8 precludes only admission of evidence of settlement between parties to litigation, not third parties). The purpose of the rule is twofold. First, an offer to compro- mise or settle is of slight probative value on the issues of liability or the amount of the claim since a party, by attempting to settle, merely may be buying peace instead of conceding the merits of the disputed claim. Stranahan v. East Haddam, supra, 11 Conn. 514. Second, the rule supports the policy of encouraging parties to pursue settlement negotiations by assuring parties that evi- dence of settlement offers will not be introduced into evidence to prove liability or a lack thereof if a trial ultimately ensues. See Tomasso Bros., Inc. v. October Twenty-Four, Inc. , 221 Conn. 194, 198, 602 A.2d 1011 (1992); Miko v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 220 Conn. 192, 209, 596 A.2d 396 (1991). (b) Exceptions. Subdivision (1) recognizes the admissibility of evidence of settlement offers when introduced for some purpose other than to prove or disprove liability or damages. See State v. Milum, 197 Conn. 602, 613, 500 A.2d 555 (1986) (to show bias and effort to obstruct criminal prosecution). Section 4-8’s list of purposes for which such evidence may be introduced is intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. See Lynch v. Granby Holdings, Inc. , 32 Conn. App. 574, 583–84, 630 A.2d 609 (1993) (evidence of offer to compromise admissible to show that parties attempted to resolve problem concerning placement of sign when trial court instructed jury that evidence did not indicate assumption of liability), rev’d on other grounds, 230 Conn. 95, 644 A.2d 325 (1994). Subdivision (2) preserves the common-law rule permitting admissibility of statements made by a party in the course of settlement negotiations that constitute statements of fact or admissions of liability. See, e.g., Tomasso Bros., Inc. v. Octo- ber Twenty-Four, Inc. , supra, 221 Conn. 198; Hall v. Sera, 112 Conn. 291, 298, 152 A. 148 (1930); Hartford Bridge Co. v. Granger, 4 Conn. 142, 148 (1822). A statement made in the course of settlement negotiations that contains an admission of fact is admissible ‘‘where the statement was intended to state a fact.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tomasso Bros., Inc. v. October Twenty-Four, Inc., supra, 198, quoting Simone Corp. v. Connecticut Light & Power Co. , supra, 187 Conn. 490. However, if the party making the statement merely ‘‘intended to concede a fact hypothetically for the purpose of effecting a compromise’’; Tomasso Bros., Inc. v. October Twenty-Four, Inc., supra, 198, quoting Evans Products Co. v. Clinton Building Supply, Inc., supra, 174 Conn. 517; the factual admission is inadmissible as an offer to compromise. See Tomasso Bros., Inc. v. October Twenty-Four, Inc., supra, 198. If, considering the statement and surrounding circumstances, it is unclear whether the statement was intended to further a compromise or as a factual admission, the statement must be excluded. E.g., id., 199; Simone Corp. v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., supra, 490.