Conn. Crim. Jury Instr. 8.4-2

The defendant is charged [in count__] with breach of the peace in the second degree. The statute

defining this offense reads in pertinent part as follows:

a person is guilty of breach of the peace when, with intent to cause inconvenience,

annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, such person engages in

fighting or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior in a public place.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this charge, the state must prove the following elements

beyond a reasonable doubt:

Element 1 - Intent

The first element is that the defendant

• acted with the intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm. The predominant

intent must be to cause what a reasonable person operating under contemporary

community standards would consider a disturbance to or impediment of a lawful activity,

a deep feeling of vexation or provocation, or a feeling of anxiety prompted by threatened

danger or harm. <See Intent: Specific, Instruction 2.3-1.>

• recklessly created a risk of causing inconvenience, annoyance or alarm. A person acts

“recklessly” with respect to a result or circumstances when (he/she) is aware of and

consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or

that such circumstances exist. <See Recklessness, Instruction 2.3-4.>

The words “inconvenience, annoyance or alarm” refer to what a reasonable person operating

under contemporary community standards would consider a disturbance to or impediment of a

lawful activity, a deep feeling of vexation or provocation, or a feeling of anxiety prompted by

threatened danger or harm.1

Element 2 - Conduct

The second element is that the defendant engaged in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or

threatening behavior that actually involved physical violence or portended imminent physical

violence.2 The defendant’s conduct must be more than a display of mere bad manners. It must

cause or create a risk of causing inconvenience, annoyance or alarm among members of the

public.

[<If appropriate:> The defendant’s speech, absent actual physical conduct, may constitute the

prohibited behavior when it can be identified as “fighting words.” <See Fighting Words,

Instruction 2.2-7.>]

Element 3 - Public Place

The third element is that the conduct took place in a public place. “Public place” means any area

that is used or held out for use by the public whether owned or operated by public or private

interests.3

Conclusion

In summary, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 1) (intended to

cause / recklessly created a risk of causing) inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, 2) <describe

conduct>, and 3) it was in a public place.

If you unanimously find that the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements

of the crime of breach of peace in the second degree, then you shall find the defendant guilty.

On the other hand, if you unanimously find that the state has failed to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt any of the elements, you shall then find the defendant not guilty.

1 The Supreme Court applied this interpretive gloss to the mens rea language of the disorderly

conduct statute in State v. Indrisano, 228 Conn. 795, 810-811 (1994). In State v. Wolff, 237

Conn. 633, 670 (1996), the Court applied it to the breach of peace statute. See the discussion of

intent in the Introduction to this section.

2 State v. Indrisano, supra, 228 Conn. 812, interpreted the phrase “violent, tumultuous or

threatening behavior” to require physical conduct. See also State v. LoSacco, 12 Conn. App.

481, 491 (statute limited to conduct that actually involves physical violence or portends

imminent physical violence), cert. denied, 205 Conn. 814 (1983). “Indrisano avoided first

amendment difficulties that would criminalize mere verbal speech by clarifying that a conviction

under § 53a-182 must be based on a defendant’s conduct rather than on a defendant’s

statements.” State v. McKiernan, 78 Conn. App. 182, 188, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 902 (2003).

3 Defined in § 53a-180aa (b). “[T]he plain and ordinary meaning of ‘public’ confirms that the

legislature intended for § 53a-181 (a) (1) to apply only to conduct that occurs on property that is

held out for use by all members of the public, not just select groups.” State v. Rivera, 200 Conn.

App. 401, 421 (2020) (parking area outside commercial driving school was not “public place”

for purposes of § 53a-181 (a) (1)). It is not enough that the area is merely viewable by members

of the public. Id., 422.