Conn. Crim. Jury Instr. 8.3-1

The defendant is charged [in count__] with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence

of (intoxicating liquor / any drug / or both).1 The statute defining this offense reads in pertinent

part as follows:

no person shall operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of (intoxicating

liquor / any drug / both). A person commits the offense of operating a motor vehicle

while under the influence of (intoxicating liquor / any drug / both) if such person

operates a motor vehicle <insert appropriate subsection:>

• § 14-227a (a) (1): while under the influence of (intoxicating liquor / any drug / both).

• § 14-227a (a) (2): while such person has an elevated blood alcohol content.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this charge, the state must prove beyond a reasonable

doubt the following elements:

Element 1 – Operated a motor vehicle

The first element is that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle2 at the time and place

alleged. A person “operates” a motor vehicle within the meaning of the statute when, while in

the vehicle, such person intentionally does any act or makes use of any mechanical or electrical

agency that alone, or in sequence, will set in motion the motive power of the vehicle. A person

acts “intentionally” with respect to conduct when (his/her) conscious objective is to engage in

such conduct. <See Intent: General, Instruction 2.3-1.>3

Element 2 – Under the influence / Elevated BAC

The second element is that at the time the defendant operated the motor vehicle, (he/she) <insert

as appropriate:>

• § 14-227a (a) (1): was under the influence of (intoxicating liquor / any drug / or both). A

person is under the influence of (intoxicating liquor / any drug / or both) when as a result

of (drinking such beverage / ingesting such drug / or both) that person’s mental, physical,

or nervous processes have become so affected that (he/she) lacks to an appreciable degree

the ability to function properly in relation to the operation of (his/her) motor vehicle.4

The person’s physical or mental capabilities must have been impaired to such a degree

that (he/she) no longer has the ability to drive a vehicle with the caution characteristic of

a sober person of ordinary prudence, under the same or similar circumstances. [<If

appropriate:> If you find that the defendant was operating a vehicle under the influence

of an intoxicating liquor, it is no defense that there was some other cause that also tended

to impair the defendant’s ability to exercise the required caution.] Evidence of the

manner in which a vehicle was operated is not determinative of whether the defendant

was operating the vehicle under the influence of (an intoxicating beverage / a drug / or

both). It is, however, a factor to be considered in light of all the proven surrounding

circumstances in deciding whether the defendant was or was not under the influence.5

• § 14-227a (a) (2): had an elevated blood alcohol content. “Elevated blood alcohol

content” means a ratio of alcohol in the blood that is (eight-hundredths / four-hundredths)

of one percent or more of alcohol, by weight.6 The chemical analysis of the defendant’s

(blood / breath / urine) that was presented as evidence may be used as evidence of the

defendant’s blood alcohol content at the time of the alleged offense. This means that you

may find, but are not required to, that the defendant’s blood alcohol content at the time of

the alleged offense was the same as at the time the test was administered.7

[<If applicable:> Evidence of the defendant’s refusal to submit to a blood, breath, or urine test

has been introduced. If you find that the defendant did refuse to submit to such a test, you may

make any reasonable inference that follows from that fact.]8

[<If charges include both subsections:> In deciding on your verdict as to the count __, which

alleges the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, you

cannot consider the results of any chemical tests from the Intoxilyzer as evidence of the

defendant’s guilt. That evidence was offered for a limited purpose only and is admissible only

with respect to the allegations contained in the operating with an elevated blood alcohol content

as found in count __ of the information.]9

Conclusion

In summary, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 1) the defendant was operating

a motor vehicle at the time and place alleged, and 2) (he/she) (was under the influence of

(intoxicating liquor / any drug / or both) / had an elevated blood alcohol content).

If you unanimously find that the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements

of driving while under the influence, then you shall find the defendant guilty. On the other hand,

if you unanimously find that the state has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any of the

elements, you shall then find the defendant not guilty.

1 If the defendant is not charged with being under the influence of drugs, then that part of the

statute should be omitted from the jury instruction. State v. Tryon, 145 Conn. 304, 306-307

(1958); see also State v. Coughlin, 61 Conn. App. 90, 94-96 (2000) (court properly gave limiting

instruction to the jury that the case did not involve cocaine and that the jurors could not consider

anything about the drug when deliberating in order to negate any potentially adverse effect of a

report that was admitted and showed trace amounts of cocaine in the defendant’s blood), cert.

denied, 255 Conn. 934 (2001).

2 “Motor vehicle” includes a snowmobile and an all-terrain vehicle, as those terms are defined in

§ 14-379. General Statutes § 14-227a (a).

3 Operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor is a general intent

crime. State v. Borrelli, 94 Conn. App. 849, 859 (2006) (defendant’s involuntary intoxication

insufficient to negate general intent requirement). In addition, there is no requirement that the

defendant knew or should have known that he or she had ingested an intoxicant. Id., 860.

4 State v. Gordon, 84 Conn. App. 519, 527 (2004); State v. Sanko, 62 Conn. App. 34, 41, cert.

denied, 256 Conn. 905 (2001); State v. Andrews, 108 Conn. 209, 216 (1928).

5 If there has been evidence of the defendant’s performance on field sobriety tests, the court may

wish to tailor this part of the instruction. See State v. Kelley, 95 Conn. App. 423, cert. denied,

279 Conn. 906 (2006).

6 Effective October 1, 2009, if a person is operating a commercial motor vehicle, “elevated blood

alcohol content” means a ratio of alcohol in the blood that is four-hundredths of one percent or

more of alcohol, by weight. See the definition of commercial motor vehicle in the Glossary and

instruct on the relevant portions of it.

7 See General Statutes § 14-227a (b) (formerly (c)); State v. Gallichio, 71 Conn. App. 179, 183-

89 (2002); State v. Nokes, 44 Conn. App. 40, 44-45 (1996); State v. Korhn, 41 Conn. App. 874,

880-81, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 910 (1996). The statute provides an exception to this rule: “if

the results of the additional test indicate that the ratio of alcohol in the blood of such defendant is

twelve-hundredths of one per cent or less of alcohol, by weight, and is higher than the results of

the first test, evidence shall be presented that demonstrates that the test results and the analysis

thereof accurately indicate the blood alcohol content at the time of the alleged offense.” See also

State v. Pilotti, 99 Conn. App. 563 (discussing evidentiary requirements involving breath tests),

cert. denied, 282 Conn. 903 (2007).

8 General Statutes § 14-227a (c) requires that a jury be instructed as to any inference that may or

may not be drawn in the event there is evidence that the defendant refused to submit to a blood,

breath, or urine test and there has been compliance with § 14-227b (b). See State v. Lemanski,

201 Conn. App. 360, 372 (2020) (approving instruction that jury could “make any reasonable

inference that follows” from defendant’s alleged refusal to take blood test and disagreeing that

trial court, consistent with § 14-227a (c), needed to explain precisely what the jury may and may

not infer from such refusal), cert. denied, 336 Conn. 907 (2021); State v. Gordon, 84 Conn. App.

519, 531 (approving “any reasonable inference that follows” language and disagreeing that it

permitted jury to find guilt based on refusal alone), cert. denied, 271 Conn. 941 (2004); State v.

McCarthy, 63 Conn. App. 433, 437- 39 (instruction substantially complied with the statutory

language of General Statutes § 14-227a (f) [now subsection (c)], despite its failure to state that it

“may or may not” draw a negative inference), cert. denied, 258 Conn. 904 (2001); State v.

Corbeil, 41 Conn. App. 7, 19 (“refusing” to take a breath test may be accomplished by a failure

to cooperate, as well as by an expressed refusal), appeal dismissed, 237 Conn. 919 (1996); State

v. Barlow, 30 Conn. App. 36, 42-44 (1993) (whether the defendant refused to take the test is an

issue of fact for the jury). In State v. Weed, 118 Conn. App. 654, 664-65 (2009), the Appellate

Court concluded, as a matter of first impression, that evidence that the defendant refused to

submit to a breath test provided a sufficient basis for a consciousness of guilt instruction. See

also State v. Lemanski, supra, 201 Conn. App. 375-76.

9 General Statutes § 14-227a (c) “provides that evidence of the amount of alcohol in the

defendant’s blood as shown by a chemical analysis of the defendant’s breath is admissible with

respect to the behavioral subdivision only at the request of the defendant.” (Emphasis added.)

State v. Cooper, 38 Conn. App. 661, 673, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 908 (1995), cert. denied, 517

U.S. 1214, 116 S. Ct. 1837, 134 L. Ed. 2d 940 (1996). “Substantial defective compliance with

that statutory provision requires reversal even if no particular prejudice is shown and even if

there is overwhelming evidence of guilt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 673; see also

State v. Longo, 106 Conn. App. 701, 710 (2008) (trial court properly instructed jury regarding

the use of chemical evidence when defendant charged under both subsections and issued

appropriate limiting instruction); State v. Gracia, 51 Conn. App. 4, 14-15 (1998) (same).