Conn. Crim. Jury Instr. 8.2-6

The defendant is charged [in count__] with the alteration of a firearm identification mark. The

statute defining this offense reads in pertinent part as follows:

no person shall (remove / deface / alter / obliterate) the name of any maker or model

or any maker’s number or other mark of identification on any firearm.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this charge, the state must prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that the defendant (removed / defaced / altered / obliterated) the name of any maker or

model or any maker’s number or other mark of identification on a firearm.

A “firearm” is any sawed-off shotgun, machine gun, rifle, shotgun, pistol, revolver or other

weapon, whether loaded or unloaded, from which a shot may be discharged. For purposes of

this offense, you must find that the firearm was operable.

[<Include if appropriate:> For an instrument to meet the statutory definition of “other weapon,”

the state must have proven that the instrument is both designed for violence and capable of

inflicting death or serious bodily harm.

2]

[<Insert if applicable:>

The statute defining this offense provides that if you find that the defendant was in possession of

or owned a firearm on which the maker’s name, number, model or other identification mark has

been (removed / defaced / altered / obliterated), then you may find, but are not required to, that it

was the defendant who (removed / defaced / altered / obliterated) the identification mark,

number, model or name of the firearm. This inference is not a necessary one, but it is an

inference you may draw if you find it is reasonable and logical and in accordance with my

instructions on circumstantial evidence.

The defendant need not be the owner of the firearm to have been in possession of it.

“Possession” means either having the (substance / object) on one’s person or otherwise having

control over the (substance / object), that is, knowing where it is and being able to access it.

Possession also requires that the defendant knew that (he/she) was in possession of the firearm.

That is, that (he/she) was aware that (he/she) was in possession of it and was aware of its nature.

The state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that (he/she) was in

possession of the firearm. <See Knowledge, Instruction 2.3-3.>

<If some form of constructive possession is alleged, see Possession, Instruction 2.11-1.>]

Conclusion

In summary, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (removed /

defaced / altered / obliterated) the name of any maker or model or any maker’s number or other

mark of identification on a firearm.

If you unanimously find that the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements

of the crime of altering a firearm identification mark, then you shall find the defendant guilty.

On the other hand, if you unanimously find that the state has failed to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt any of the elements, you shall then find the defendant not guilty.

1 This statute specifically incorporates the definition of “firearm” as found in General Statutes §

53a-3 (19), which requires that the firearm be operable.

2 See State v. Lopez, 341 Conn. 793, 807 (2022) (state failed to prove that airsoft pellet gun was

“weapon” and, therefore, “firearm” within the meaning of General Statutes § 53a-3 (19) because

it produced no evidence to show that it was designed for violence or that it was capable of

causing death or serious bodily harm); see also State v. Coauette, 601 N.W.2d 443, 446-47

(Minn. App. 1999) (paintball gun not a firearm because it was “designed for use in a game and . .

. its projectiles are [liquid paint] capsules designed to burst on impact, rather than to pierce”),

review denied, Minnesota Supreme Court, Docket No. C4-98-2286 (Minn. December 14, 1999);

cf. State v. Grant, 294 Conn. 151, 156 (2009) (evidence that BB gun “was capable of discharging

shot that could cause serious bodily injury” established that it was a “weapon” and, hence,

“firearm” within meaning of § 53a-3 (19)); State v. Hardy, 278 Conn. 113, 117-18 (2006)

(operating manual stating that BB gun was “not a toy” and could “cause serious injury or death”

sufficient to establish that it was a “deadly weapon” within meaning of General Statutes § 53a-3

(6)).

3 The inference is permissive, rather than mandatory. See State v. Francis, 246 Conn. 339, 352

(1998); State v. Turner, 62 Conn. App. 376, 393 (2001).

4 Ascertain from counsel what form of possession is alleged. The definition should be narrowly

tailored to the allegations.