Conn. Crim. Jury Instr. 7.7-3

The defendant is charged [in count__] with importing child sexual abuse material. The statute

defining this offense reads in pertinent part as follows:

a person is guilty of importing child sexual abuse material when, with intent to

promote child sexual abuse material, such person knowingly imports or causes to be

imported into the state three or more visual depictions of child sexual abuse material

of known content and character.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this charge, the state must prove the following elements

beyond a reasonable doubt:

Element 1 - Imported child sexual abuse material

The first element is that the defendant imported child sexual abuse material or caused child

sexual abuse material to be imported into the state. To “cause to be imported” means to engage

in conduct that results in the importation of child sexual abuse material. “Into the state” means

into the state of Connecticut.

“Child sexual abuse material” is any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, videotape,

picture or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, digital,

mechanical or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where the production of such visual

depiction involves the use of a person under sixteen years of age engaging in sexually explicit

conduct, provided whether the subject of a visual depiction was a person under sixteen years of

age at the time the visual depiction was created is a question to be decided by the trier of fact.

A “computer-generated image” is an image of a real child under the age of 16 that has been

digitally captured, stored, altered, and/or enhanced.

“Sexually explicit conduct” means actual or simulated (A) sexual intercourse, including

genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital or oral-anal physical contact, whether between persons

of the same or opposite sex, or with an artificial genital, (B) bestiality, (C) masturbation, (D)

sadistic or masochistic abuse, or (E) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any

person.

The person depicted must be under 16 years of age; that is, (he/she) must not yet have had

(his/her) sixteenth birthday when the prohibited conduct is alleged to have taken place.

Furthermore, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person depicted was or is

an actual, real person.

Element 2 - Knowingly

The second element is that (he/she) acted knowingly. A person acts “knowingly” with respect to

conduct or to a circumstance when (he/she) is aware that (his/her) conduct is of such nature or

that such circumstance exists. <See Knowledge, Instruction 2.3-3.> The state must prove that

the defendant knew (he/she) was importing or causing to be imported into Connecticut visual

depictions, and that (he/she) knew the content and character of the visual depictions, that is, that

(he/she) knew they were child sexual abuse material.

Element 3 - Number of depictions

The third element is that the defendant imported or caused to be imported into the state three or

more visual depictions of child sexual abuse material. A “visual depiction” includes

undeveloped film and videotape and information of any kind in any form, including computer

software, that is capable of conversion into a visual image and includes encrypted data. It does

not matter whether the visual depictions are different images or multiple copies of the same

image.

Element 4 - Intent

The fourth element is that (he/she) had the specific intent to promote child sexual abuse material.

A person acts “intentionally” with respect to conduct when his conscious objective is to engage

in such conduct. <See Intent: Specific, Instruction 2.3-1.> To “promote” means to (manufacture

/ issue / sell / give / provide / lend / mail / deliver / transfer / transmit / publish / distribute /

circulate / disseminate / present / exhibit / advertise / produce / direct / participate in).

Conclusion

In summary, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 1) the defendant (imported

child sexual abuse material / caused child sexual abuse material to be imported) into this state, 2)

(he/she) did so knowingly, 3) it consisted of three or more visual depictions, and 4) (he/she) did

so with the specific intent to promote child sexual abuse material.

If you unanimously find that the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements

of the crime of importing child sexual abuse material, then you shall find the defendant guilty.

On the other hand, if you unanimously find that the state has failed to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt any of the elements, you shall then find the defendant not guilty.

1 For further guidance on what constitutes “sexually explicit conduct,” see Possessing Child

Sexual Abuse Material, Instruction 7.7-4.

2 In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 240 (2002), the United States Supreme

Court held that a federal statute that prohibited possession of, inter alia, virtual child

pornography, i.e., that produced by computer without using any real children, was violative of

the first amendment. The definition of child sexual abuse material in Connecticut’s statutes; see

General Statutes § 53a-193 (13); contemplates only material created using real children and,

therefore, avoids this constitutional issue. See State v. Dore, 237 Conn. App. 594, 613-14, 614

n.21, cert. denied, 354 Conn. 923 (2026).

The Appellate Court in Dore, reiterating the Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Sorabella, 277

Conn. 155, 187-88, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 821 (2006), concluded that expert witness testimony is

not required to establish that a particular image depicts a real child. It noted that advances in

technology may one day require the use of expert testimony to aid the jury in determining if the

image depicts a real child, but until then “[j]uries are still capable of distinguishing between real

and virtual images; and admissibility remains within the province of the sound discretion of the

trial judge.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 632.

3 See State v. Sorabella, 277 Conn. 155, 204-206, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 821, 127 S. Ct. 131, 166

L. Ed. 2d 36 (2006).