Conn. Crim. Jury Instr. 6.7-2

Note: This instruction is for crimes committed on or after October 1, 2021. Public Acts

Nos. 12-114, § 12, 17-31, § 1, and 21-56, § 1, substantially revised the definition of the

offense. For crimes committed before October 1, 2012, see Instruction 6.7-2 (archived I).

For crimes committed before October 1, 2017, but on or after October 1, 2012, see

Instruction 6.7-2 (archived II). For crimes committed before October 1, 2021, but on or

after October 1, 2017, see Instruction 6.7-2 (archived III).

The defendant is charged [in count__] with stalking in the second degree. The statute defining

this offense reads in pertinent part as follows:

a person is guilty of stalking in the second degree when (he/she) knowingly engages

in a course of conduct directed at or concerning a specific person that would cause a

reasonable person to <insert as applicable:>

• fear for such specific person’s physical safety or the physical safety of a third

person.

• suffer emotional distress.

• fear injury to or the death of an animal owned by or in possession and control

of such specific person.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this charge, the state must prove the following elements

beyond a reasonable doubt:

Element 1 - Knowingly

The first element is that the defendant acted “knowingly.” A person acts “knowingly” with

respect to a circumstance described in a statute when (he/she) is aware that such circumstance

exists. <See Knowledge, Instruction 2.3-3.>

Element 2 - Course of conduct

The second element is that the defendant engaged in a course of conduct directed at or

concerning a specific person, <identify complainant>. “Course of conduct” means two or more

acts, including, but not limited to, acts in which a person directly, indirectly or through a third

party, by any action, method, device or means, including, but not limited to, electronic or social

media, <insert as appropriate based on the allegations:>

• (follows / lies in wait for / monitors / observes / surveils / threatens / harasses /

communicates about or with / sends unwanted gifts to) a person.

• interferes with a person’s property.

“Concerning” means relating to, regarding or about. The defendant may do any one of these acts

more than once or in combination with other acts. For example, follow two or more times or

follow once and send an unwanted gift once.

<Insert definitions as appropriate:>

• To “follow” means to go, proceed or come after, to move behind in the same direction.

Following implies proximity in space and time. Whether someone has deliberately

maintained sufficient visual or physical proximity with another person, uninterrupted,

over a substantial enough period of time to constitute following will depend on the facts

and circumstances of each case.

• To “lie in wait for” means to wait in a place where another person is likely to be or to

pass by.2

• To “monitor” means to watch closely for purposes of control, surveillance, to keep track

of or to check continually.

• To “surveil” means to place under surveillance, the act of carefully watching someone.

• To “observe” means to see, watch, perceive or notice.

These actions must be of a predatory nature. The statute does not encompass conduct that is

aimless, unintentional, accidental or undertaken for a lawful purpose.

• To “threaten” means to utter what a reasonable person would consider to be a serious

expression of intent to commit an unlawful act of violence. A threat can only be

punishable when it is a true threat. <See True Threats, Instruction 2.2-8.>

• To “harass” means to disturb persistently, bother continuously, pester or torment.

• To “communicate” means to express thoughts, feelings or information by writing or

speaking.

Element 3 - Caused fear or emotional distress

The third element is that the defendant caused <identify complainant> to reasonably (fear for

(his/her) physical safety or the physical safety of a third person / suffer emotional distress / fear

injury to or death of an animal owned by or in the possession and control of <identify

complainant>). Determining whether this element is satisfied requires a two step process. First,

the situation and the facts must be viewed from the viewpoint of <identify complainant>. Did

(he/she) in fact fear for (his/her) physical safety or that of a third person, and/or fear injury to or

death of an animal (he/she) owned or possessed and controlled, and/or did (he/she) suffer

emotional distress? If the answer to that question is no, you must find the defendant not guilty.

If the answer to that question is yes, you must then ask whether that fear, or emotional distress,

was reasonable. You must answer that question from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under

the circumstances at the time. You must ask yourself whether under all the circumstances then

present, was the fear, or the emotional distress, reasonable?

“Emotional distress” means significant mental or psychological suffering or distress that may or

may not require medical or other professional treatment or counseling.

Conclusion

In summary, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 1) the defendant acted

knowingly, 2) the defendant engaged in a course of conduct directed at or concerning a specific

person, <identify complainant>, and 3) the defendant’s course of conduct caused <identify

complainant> to fear for (his/her) physical safety or the physical safety of a third person,

<identify third person>, or caused <identify complainant> to suffer emotional distress, or caused

<identify complainant> to fear injury to or the death of an animal owned by or in the possession

and control of <identify complainant>.

If you unanimously find that the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements

of the crime of stalking in the second degree, then you shall find the defendant guilty. On the

other hand, if you unanimously find that the state has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

any of the elements, you shall then find the defendant not guilty.

1 State v. Marsala, 44 Conn. App. 84, 98, cert. denied, 240 Conn. 912 (1997); see also State v.

Jackson, 56 Conn. App. 264, 272, cert. denied, 242 Conn. 938 (2000).

2 For a discussion of the traditional legal definition of “lying in wait,” see State v. Culmo, 43

Conn. Supp. 46, 63-64 (1993). The committee believes that this definition, with its emphasis on

concealment and surprise, is not applicable to the behavior that the stalking statute addresses.

3 See General Statutes § 53a-181d (a) (2).