Conn. Crim. Jury Instr. 6.5-2

The defendant is charged [in count__] with kidnapping in the first degree. The statute defining

this offense reads as follows:

a person is guilty of kidnapping in the first degree when (he/she) abducts another

person and restrains the person abducted with intent to <insert appropriate

subsection:>

• § 53a-92 (a) (2) (A): inflict physical injury upon (him/her) or violate or abuse (him/her)

sexually.

• § 53a-92 (a) (2) (B): accomplish or advance the commission of a felony.

• § 53a-92 (a) (2) (C): terrorize (him/her) or a third person.

• § 53a-92 (a) (2) (D): interfere with the performance of a government function.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this charge, the state must prove the following elements

beyond a reasonable doubt:

Element 1 - Abducted another person

The first element is that the defendant abducted another person. “Abduct” means to restrain a

person with the intent to prevent (his/her) liberation by <insert as appropriate:>

• secreting or holding (him/her) in a place where (he/she) is not likely to be found. There

need be no evidence of the use or threatened use of force. The defendant need only have

effectively hidden <insert name of person> or left (him/her) in a place where (he/she)

was not likely to be found.

• using or threatening to use physical force or intimidation. The defendant does not need to

actually use force. (He/She) need only threaten to use force in such a manner that <insert

name of other person> reasonably believed that force would be used if (he/she) tried to

escape.

“Restrain” means to restrict a person’s movements intentionally and unlawfully in such a manner

as to interfere substantially with (his/her) liberty by moving (him/her) from one place to another,

or by confining (him/her) either in the place where the restriction commences or in a place to

which (he/she) has been moved, without consent. There is no requirement that the movement be

of any specific distance or that the confinement last any specific period of time. There need not

be any movement at all -- the person could be confined by preventing (him/her) from leaving a

place where (he/she) was.

Any apparent consent on the part of <insert name of other person> to the movement or

confinement must have been actual and not simply acquiescence brought about by force, fear,

shock, or deception. <Insert as appropriate:>

• <If consent is at issue:> The act of consent must have been truly voluntary. Consent

may be express or you may find that it is implied from the circumstances that you find

existed. Whether there was consent is a question of fact for you to determine. The

defendant has no burden to prove consent. The state must prove the lack of consent.

• <If person abducted is less than sixteen or an incompetent person:> Without consent in

this case means by any means whatever1, including acquiescence of the person, if

(he/she) is (a child less than sixteen years old / an incompetent person) and (the parent or

guardian / person or institution having lawful control or custody of (him/her)) has not

acquiesced in the movement or confinement.

In abducting <insert name of person>, the defendant must have specifically intended to prevent

(his/her) liberation. A person acts “intentionally” with respect to a result when (his/her)

conscious objective is to cause such result. <See Intent: Specific, Instruction 2.3-1.>

Element 2 - Intent to do further harm

The second element is that the defendant abducted <insert name of person> with the specific

intent to <insert as appropriate:>

• § 53a-92 (a) (2) (A): inflict physical injury on the person. “Physical injury” is defined as

impairment of physical condition or pain. It is a reduced ability to act as one would

otherwise have acted. The law does not require that the injury be serious. It may be

minor.

• § 53a-92 (a) (2) (A): violate or abuse the person sexually. “To violate or abuse the

person sexually” has no technical meaning, and you are to attach to these terms their

ordinary common meaning.

• § 53a-92 (a) (2) (B): accomplish or advance the commission of a felony. A felony is an

offense for which a person may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of one

year.

• § 53a-92 (a) (2) (C): terrorize the person or a third person. To terrorize means to cause

intense fear or apprehension.

• § 53a-92 (a) (2) (D): interfere with the performance of a government function.

It is not necessary that actual (physical injury / sexual violation or abuse / commission of a

felony / terror of another person / interference with the performance of a government function)

be proved, as long as you determine that the defendant intended to <insert the allegations>, and

abducted <insert name of person> with that intent.

A person acts “intentionally” with respect to a result when (his/her) conscious objective is to

cause such result. <See Intent: Specific, Instruction 2.3-1.>

To clarify the intent aspects of this count. Under the first element, the abduction, the defendant

must have intended to prevent the liberation of <insert name of person>, and that prevention of

liberation must have been accomplished. Under the second element, the defendant must have

prevented the liberation of <insert name of person> with the intent to commit <insert allegation

of other intended criminal conduct>. The defendant must have had both intentions at the time of

the abduction.

You must consider these two intentions in a further light.

3 It is alleged that the restraint used

against <insert name of person> was for the purpose of <insert allegations>. It is not necessary

to restrain a person to <insert allegations>. Nevertheless, some interference with the person’s

liberty may be necessary or incidental to <insert allegations>.

To establish the defendant’s intent to prevent the liberation of <insert name of person>

independent from the intent to <insert allegations>, the state must prove that the defendant

intended to prevent the complainant’s liberation for a longer time or to a greater degree than that

which would be necessary to <insert allegations>. In this regard, the defendant’s intent to

prevent the complainant’s liberation may be manifested by confinement or movement that is

more than merely incidental to the other intended acts. In other words, if the confinement or

movement is so much a part of the other conduct that it could not be accomplished without such

restraint, then the requisite intent to prevent the complainant’s liberation has not been

established. There is, however, no minimal period of confinement or degree of movement

necessary to establish kidnapping.

Whether the movement or confinement of the complainant is merely incidental to other conduct

is a question of fact for you to determine. In determining this, you may consider all the relevant

facts and circumstances of the case, including, but not limited to, the following factors:

• the nature and duration of the complainant’s movement or confinement by the defendant,

• whether that movement or confinement occurred during the commission of other conduct,

• whether the restraint was inherent in the nature of the other conduct,

• whether the restraint prevented the complainant from summoning assistance,

• whether the restraint reduced the defendant’s risk of detection, and

• whether the restraint created a significant danger or increased the complainant’s risk of

harm independent of that posed by the other conduct.]

As I said before, it doesn’t matter whether the defendant committed another criminal act or not.

What matters is what (his/her) intent was at the time of the alleged abduction.

[<Include if the defendant is also charged with the attempt or completion of the offense:>

5 So

determining the defendant’s intent for purposes of the second element is completely separate

from your deliberations on count __.]

Consider all of the evidence when deciding on what the defendant intended to do. <Insert

Evidence of Intent, Instruction 2.3-2.>

Conclusion

In summary, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant abducted <insert

the name of the other person>, and that (he/she) intended to <insert specific allegations of

intent>.

If you unanimously find that the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements

of the crime of kidnapping in the first degree, then you shall find the defendant guilty. On the

other hand, if you unanimously find that the state has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

any of the elements, you shall then find the defendant not guilty.

1 The “any means whatever” language was intended “to protect young children and incompetent

persons from being kidnapped when the victim agrees to go with the kidnapper because of

promises of favors or gifts. A competent adult’s actual consent to the restraint would negate lack

of consent if not induced by deception, force, fear or shock; in other words, with no compulsion

or deception. . . . The ‘any means whatever’ language should not be given in an instruction when

. . . the victim is a competent adult.” State v. Benjamin, 86 Conn. App. 344, 355 (2004).

2 See State v. Dyson, 238 Conn. 784, 798-99 (1996) (“[w]hile it seems likely that every

kidnapping would induce some degree of fear on the part of the abductee, not every perpetrator

possesses the specific intent to terrorize his victim”); State v. Crudup, 81 Conn. App. 248, 261,

cert. denied, 268 Conn. 913 (2004).

3 State v. Salamon, 287 Conn. 509 (2008), State v. Sanseverino, 287 Conn. 608 (2008), and State

v. DeJesus, 288 Conn. 418 (2008), made a significant change to the law of kidnapping. The trial

court should carefully review those cases before using this instruction.

4 State v. Salamon, supra, 287 Conn. 548. These factors are the more commonly occurring

factual scenarios that might support a finding of intent to restrain beyond that necessary to

commit the underlying crime, but they are only illustrative. Factors should only be included if

relevant, and the trial judge may include other factors that appear in the case. The instruction

must be tailored to the evidence presented by the state.

5 Include only if there is another charge arising out of the same conduct that would support an

inference of intent for purposes of the second element. Of the possible other criminal conduct

intended, only committing a felony is likely to map exactly to another crime charged in the

information. While a criminal charge may result from the other conduct, it is irrelevant to the

defendant’s intent for purposes of this instruction. The same evidence, for example, that

supports an inference that the defendant intended to sexually violate or abuse the person may

also support a charge of sexual assault, but it may not. In addition, the defendant may not have

made enough significant steps towards the other intended crime to support a charge of an

attempted crime.