Conn. Crim. Jury Instr. 6.5

In State v. Salamon, 287 Conn. 509 (2008), the Supreme Court announced a

reinterpretation of the statute defining second degree kidnapping, General Statutes § 53a-94.

The Court’s new view of the meaning of “abduct,” embodied in that statute, eliminates from the

scope of kidnapping restraints that are incidental to the commission of other crimes.

Distinguishing the statutory definitions of “abduct” and “restrain” by the inclusion in the former

of an “intent to prevent a person’s liberation,” the Court concluded that in order to establish an

abduction in conjunction with another crime, the state must prove that a defendant intended “to

prevent the victim’s liberation for a longer period of time or to a greater degree than that which is

necessary to commit the other crime.” Id., 542.

The Court emphasized that this holding did not alter the basic underpinnings of its prior

kidnapping jurisprudence. “First, in order to establish a kidnapping, the state is not required to

establish any minimum period of confinement or degree of movement. When that confinement

or movement is merely incidental to the commission of another crime, however, the confinement

or movement must have exceeded that which was necessary to commit the other crime.” Id.,

546. “Second, we do not retreat from the general principle that an accused may be charged with

and convicted of more than one crime arising out of the same act or acts, as long as all of the

elements of each crime are proven. Indeed, because the confinement or movement of a victim

that occurs simultaneously with or incidental to the commission of another crime ordinarily will

constitute a substantial interference with that victim’s liberty, such restraints still may be

prosecuted under the unlawful restraint statutes.” Id., 548.

See also State v. Sanseverino, 287 Conn. 608 (2008), and State v. DeJesus, 288 Conn.

418 (2008).