Conn. Crim. Jury Instr. 6.4

Simple robbery is defined in § 53a-133 as a larceny committed with the use or threatened

use of physical force. An instruction defining robbery that fails to include the definition of

larceny is technically incomplete. State v. Flowers, 69 Conn. App. 57, 70, cert. denied, 260

Conn. 929 (2002). Simple robbery is robbery in the third degree pursuant to § 53a-136. First

and second degree robbery are simple robbery with additional elements.

Intent to commit larceny

The intent of robbery is the intent to commit larceny; physical force is the means by

which larceny is committed. State v. Leggett, 94 Conn. App. 392, 402-403 n.14, cert. denied,

278 Conn. 911 (2006). The aggravating factors in robbery have no separate intent requirement.

State v. Rice, 25 Conn. App. 646, 648-49 (1991).

In the course of

“It is well established that, under General Statutes § 53-133, if the use of force occurs

during the continuous sequence of events surrounding the taking or attempted taking, even

though some time immediately before or after, it is considered to be ‘in the course of’ the

robbery or the attempted robbery within the meaning of the statute.” State v. Ghere, 201 Conn.

289, 297 (1986) (assault occurred subsequent to the demand for money); State v. Wallace, 56

Conn. App. 730, 740-42 (discussing when subsequent use of force occurs after the completion of

the larceny), cert. denied, 253 Conn. 901 (2000); State v. Channer, 28 Conn. App. 161, 169-73

(in the course of the commission of the crime would occur after the defendant or a coparticipant

has taken some step in fulfillment of the intent to commit the crime”), cert. denied, 223 Conn.

921 (1992).

Uses or threatens the use of physical force

The threat of physical force need not be explicitly uttered. It may be implied. State v.

Littles, 31 Conn. App. 47, 54 (“threat” has its ordinary meaning which does not require that a

threat be explicitly uttered), cert. denied, 227 Conn. 902 (1993). “An implied threat is as

effective as a stated threat, especially when the apparent ability to carry out the threat is

overwhelming.” Id.

“Both subdivisions (1) and (2) of General Statutes § 53a-133 refer to the defendant’s

purpose in using or threatening force. . . . These two states of mind are hardly conceptually

distinct from each other. . . . Both states of mind [involve] an intent to force or intimidate the

victims to yield their property so as to permit its taking or retention by the defendant.” (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Torres, 82 Conn. App. 823, 834, cert. denied, 270 Conn. 909

(2004); State v. Brown, 60 Conn. App. 487, 493 (2000); State v. Reyes, 19 Conn. App. 695, 705,

cert. denied, 213 Conn. 803 (1989).

Multiple victims

“[W]hen a robbery involves multiple victims, the state properly may charge a defendant

with a separate count of robbery for each of the victims, or with a single count of robbery for all

the victims.” State v. Flores, 301 Conn. 77, 99 (2011). If the state elects to charge a single count

of robbery, it only has to prove that one person was robbed. Id.

Lesser included offenses

Simple robbery, as defined in § 53a-133 and applied in § 53a-136 (third degree), must be

proved before robbery in the first or second degree is established. See State v. Ghere, 201 Conn.

289, 297 (1986). “[A] defendant cannot be convicted of robbery in the first degree without first

committing a robbery.” State v. Latorre, 51 Conn. App. 541, 546 (1999).

“It is clear that the essential difference between §§ 53a-134 (a) (4) [robbery in the first

degree] and 53a-135 (a) (2) [robbery in the second degree] is the type of weapon used. The

former is limited to firearms; the latter includes firearms but is not limited to them.” State v.

Gebeau, 55 Conn. App. 795, 799 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 922 (2000). Therefore, “[f]or

the defendant to have been entitled to a charge on the proposed lesser included offense of

robbery in the second degree, there must have been some dispute as to the essential

differentiating element, use of a firearm, so that he could have been acquitted of the greater

offense and convicted of the lesser.” Id. See State v. Harris, 189 Conn. 268, 274-75 (1983)

(proof of the operability of the gun was sufficiently in dispute); see also State v. Preston, 248

Conn. 472, 478-79 (1999) (defendant not entitled to a lesser included offense instruction of

larceny in the sixth degree, because his use of force for a purpose defined in § 53a-133 was not

sufficiently in dispute); State v. Tinsley, 181 Conn. 388, 399-400 (1980) (defendant not entitled

to instruction on robbery because it was not sufficiently in dispute whether he was armed or not),

cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1086, 101 S. Ct. 874, 66 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1981), overruled on other grounds

by State v. Pinnock, 220 Conn. 765, 788 (1992).

Simple robbery and larceny from the person are separate crimes. State v. Wright, 246

Conn. 132, 142 (1998). In Wright, the Court rejected the defendant’s claim under substantive

due process that larceny from the person (a C felony) is a less serious crime than simple robbery

(a D felony), because even though both crimes are aggravated forms of larceny, “the trespass to

the person of the victim . . . that inheres in larceny from the person potentially is a source of

greater harm than the force or threat of force that characterizes a simple robbery.” Id., 145-46.

Sentence enhancer: Carjacking

General Statutes § 53a-136a provides an enhanced penalty for a robbery involving an

occupied motor vehicle. “Carjacking” is not a separate crime. See State v. Edwards, 100 Conn.

App. 565, 596, cert. denied, 282 Conn. 928, and cert. denied, 282 Conn. 929 (2007). The statute

provides an enhanced penalty for “any person who commits robbery by taking a motor vehicle

from the person of another knowing that such motor vehicle is occupied by such other person.”

“Taking” is not defined in the Penal Code, so courts have applied its ordinary meaning.

“A criminal taking is ‘[t]he act of seizing an article, with or without removing it, but with an

implicit transfer of possession or control.’ Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999). Thus, to

prove that the defendant took the victim’s vehicle, the state needed to establish that the defendant

seized the vehicle from the victim’s power and control.” State v. Toro, 62 Conn. App. 635, 642,

cert. denied, 256 Conn. 923 (2001).

That a motor vehicle was taken from another person under the conditions of this statute is

a factual finding for the jury to make. This is best accomplished by way of an interrogatory. See

Sentence Enhancers, Instruction 2.11-4.