Conn. Crim. Jury Instr. 6.11-2

2024; November 19, 2025)

The defendant is charged [in count __] with risk of injury to a minor. The statute defining this

offense makes it illegal for any person to do any act likely to impair the (health / morals) of a

child under the age of sixteen years.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this charge, the state must prove the following elements

beyond a reasonable doubt:

Element 1 - Act

The first element is that that the defendant did an act that was likely to impair the (health /

morals) of the child.

[<If the alleged injury is to the child’s health:> To be likely to impair the health of a minor, the

statute requires that the defendant committed blatant physical abuse that endangered the child’s

physical well-being.

2]

[<If the alleged injury is to the child’s morals:> To be likely to impair the morals of a minor, the

act must be performed in a sexual and indecent manner.

3 “Sexual” means having to do with sex

and “indecent” means offensive to good taste or public morals. As used here, “morals” means

living, acting and thinking in accordance with those principles and precepts that are commonly

accepted among us as right and decent.4]

I want to stress that the state does not have to prove that the defendant actually did impair the

(health / morals) of the child. Rather, the state must show only that the defendant’s behavior

was likely to have done so. “Likely” means in all probability.

5 Thus, the state must show that it

was probable that the conduct of the defendant would (physically injure / injure the health of /

impair the morals of) the child. There is no requirement that the state prove actual harm to the

child.

[<Insert if appropriate:>6 The defendant need not have had the specific intent to impair the

(health / morals) of the child, only the general intent to do the act. <See Intent: General,

Instruction 2.3-1.>]

Element 2 - Minor under 16 years of age

The second element is that at the time of the incident, the child was under the age of sixteen

years. This means that the child had not yet had (his/her) sixteenth birthday.

Conclusion

In summary, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 1) the defendant did an act that

was likely to impair the (health / morals) of the child, and 2) the minor was under 16 years of age

at the time.

If you unanimously find that the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements

of the crime of risk of injury to a minor, then you shall find the defendant guilty. On the other

hand, if you unanimously find that the state has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any of

the elements, you shall then find the defendant not guilty.

1 If the information charges the defendant, in the conjunctive, with both alternatives (i.e.,

impairment of both health and morals) and the court instructs the jury, in the disjunctive, as to

each of those alternatives (i.e., impairment of either health or morals), the court should consider

including a specific unanimity charge, particularly regarding unanimity as to elements. <See

Specific Unanimity, Instruction 2.11-6.>

In State v. Edwin B., 231 Conn. App. 702, cert. granted on other grounds, 352 Conn. 905 (2025),

the Appellate Court addressed the need for a specific unanimity instruction in connection with a

risk of injury charge, particularly regarding unanimity as to instances of conduct. <See Specific

Unanimity, Instruction 2.11-6.> Although the long form information did not charge different

theories of liability in a single count, the state presented evidence and argument concerning two

distinct acts, either of which might have formed the basis for a conviction. The court reasoned

that the count was duplicitous because “the state presented evidence of two separate instances of

conduct—shaking the [infant] victim and delaying seeking medical attention—that constitute

violations of § 53-21 (a) (1).” Id., 720. Because “the jury reasonably could have found the

defendant guilty of violating § 53-21 (a) (1) based on either instance of conduct, or both,” the

lack of a specific unanimity charge prejudiced the defendant. Id., 720-21. See State v. Douglas

C., 345 Conn. 421, 435 (2022).

2 See State v. Kulmac, 230 Conn. 43, 64 n.15 (1994); State v. Schriver, 207 Conn. 456, 466-67

(1988).

3 State v. Kulmac, 230 Conn. 43, 64 n.15 (1994); State v. Zwirn, 210 Conn. 582, 588 (1989);

State v. Schriver, 207 Conn. 456, 466-67 (1988).

4 See State v. Payne, 240 Conn. 766, 782-83 (1997) (not improper to instruct jury to apply

community standards).

5 See State v. Romero, 269 Conn. 481, 492 (2004).

6 See State v. Pierson, 201 Conn. 211, 217 (1986) (instruction need not include principle of

general intent unless evidence suggests that the defendant’s conduct was involuntary).