Conn. Crim. Jury Instr. 5.2-1

The defendant has offered an affirmative defense to the charge of murder. <See Affirmative

Defense, Instruction 2.9-1.> Specifically, the defendant claims that at the time of the incident

giving rise to this charge, (he/she) was acting under the influence of an extreme emotional

disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse.

The defendant bears the burden of proving extreme emotional disturbance by a preponderance of

the evidence.1 The state does not bear the burden of disproving this defense. Moreover, this

defense does not negate intent, but rather it is raised to mitigate culpability. In other words, a

person charged with murder may raise this defense to lessen the charge from murder to

manslaughter in the first degree.

To prove the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, the defendant must establish

the following two elements by a preponderance of the evidence: 1) (he/she) committed the

offense while under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance, and 2) there was a

reasonable explanation or excuse for the defendant’s extreme emotional disturbance.

To determine whether the defendant established that (he/she) did, in fact, suffer from an extreme

emotional disturbance, you should consider whether the defendant was exposed to an extremely

unusual and overwhelming stressor, meaning something more than mere annoyance or

unhappiness. You should then determine if the defendant had an extreme emotional reaction to

such stressor, and whether that resulted in the defendant losing self-control and in (his/her)

reason being overborne by extreme intense feelings, such as passion, anger, distress, grief,

excessive agitation or other similar emotions.

3 The word “extreme” in this context refers to the

greatest degree of intensity away from the normal state of the defendant.4

If you find that the defendant acted under the influence of an emotional disturbance and that it

was extreme, you must then consider whether there was a reasonable explanation or excuse for

such disturbance. You must measure the reasonableness of the defendant’s explanation or

excuse from the viewpoint of a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation, under the

circumstances as the defendant believed them to be.

While the extreme emotional disturbance need not have been triggered by a spontaneous or

sudden occurrence, and indeed, may have “simmered” in the defendant’s mind for a long period

of time,

5 the disturbance must actually have influenced (his/her) conduct at the time of the

killing.6 Furthermore, any emotional disturbance must have been so severe and intense that the

defendant, while intending to cause death, was so overwhelmed that (his/her) usual intellectual

controls failed and (his/her) normal rational thinking no longer prevailed at the time of <insert

name of decedent>’s death.

It is your responsibility as the trier of fact to decide to what extent, if any, the defendant’s

emotions governed (his/her) conduct at the time of the death of <insert name of decedent>. As a

reminder, the affirmative defense of extreme emotional distress does not negate intent, but rather

is raised to mitigate culpability.

If you find that the state has proved the elements of murder beyond a reasonable doubt, then you

shall proceed to determine whether the defendant has sustained his/her burden of proving the

defense of extreme emotional disturbance by a preponderance of the evidence.

If you find that the defendant has not sustained his/her burden of proving the defense of extreme

emotional disturbance by a preponderance of the evidence, then you shall find the defendant

guilty of murder.

If you find that the defendant has sustained his/her burden of proving the defense of extreme

emotional disturbance by a preponderance of the evidence, then you shall find the defendant not

guilty of murder and shall instead find the defendant guilty of manslaughter in the first degree.

1 In Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), the United States Supreme Court held that it

was not unconstitutional to place the burden of proving this defense on the defendant because it

“does not serve to negate intent, but rather is raised to establish circumstances that mitigate

culpability.” See State v. Elliott, 177 Conn. 1, 6 (1979).

2 State v. Henderson, 353 Conn. 433, 442-43 (2025). “The first element of the defense is

subjective; it requires inquiry into the defendant’s unique situation and belief to determine

whether he did, in fact, experience an extreme emotional disturbance to ensure that the claimed

explanation as to the cause of his action is not contrived or sham. . . . Applying the subjective

element requires an understanding of the situation as it would have been perceived, not by a

perfectly sensible individual but by the particular defendant at bar . . . . The second element of

the defense, however, is primarily objective; the fact finder evaluates the reasonableness of the

explanation or excuse for the defendant’s extreme emotional disturbance from the perspective of

a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation, under the circumstances as the defendant

believed them to be.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Henderson,

353 Conn. 433, 443-44 (2025).

In State v. Parris, 352 Conn. 652 (2025), the Supreme Court explained that Ҥ 53a-54a (a)

requires that the jury determine whether the defendant acted under the influence of extreme

emotional disturbance and whether the disturbance itself, as opposed to the criminal act, had a

reasonable explanation or excuse. In addition, neither the statute nor the relevant case law

suggests that the choice of the murder victim ‘make sense’ for the extreme emotional disturbance

defense to apply.” Id., 671-72 (disagreeing that defense was unreasonable or inapplicable where

victim “was not the main provocateur of the defendant’s distress”).

3 In State v. Aviles, 277 Conn. 281, 313-14, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 840 (2006), the Supreme Court

reiterated that “these illustrative examples are neither conclusive nor exclusive” and that the

inclusion of other “similar emotions” allows the jury to consider a wide range of emotional

responses to a given situation, specifically, that the defendant’s physical pain may have

influenced his conduct; see also State v. Person, 60 Conn. App. 820, 828 (2000), cert. denied,

255 Conn. 926 (2001) (specific reference to defendant’s mental illness not required); State v.

Kellman, 56 Conn. App. 279 (specific reference to intoxication not required), cert. denied, 252

Conn. 939 (2000).

4 State v. Elliott, supra, 177 Conn. 10; State v. Hodge, 248 Conn. 207, 262, cert. denied, 528 U.S.

969 (1999).

5 See State v. Aviles, supra, 277 Conn. 314-15; State v. Kaddah, 250 Conn. 563, 580 (1999).

6 See State v. Kaddah, supra, 250 Conn. 578 n.14 (this instruction adequately conveyed that the

emotional disturbance need not be linked to a specific event, and did not require the defendant’s

requested instruction that explicitly said that the victim need not be the cause of it).