Conn. Crim. Jury Instr. 5.1

Intent

Murder and intentional manslaughter are specific intent crimes. State v. Prioleau, 235

Conn. 274, 322 (1995) (“defendant must have had the conscious objective to cause the death of

the victim”); State v. Harris, 49 Conn. App. 121, 128 (1998) (the intent required for intentional

manslaughter is the intent to cause serious physical injury). The statutory definition of intent in

General Statutes § 53a-3 (11) is applicable to murder and intentional manslaughter only so far as

it refers to intent to cause a result, NOT intent to engage in proscribed conduct. State v. Austin,

244 Conn. 226, 235-36 (1998); State v. Maia, 48 Conn. App. 677, 685-88, cert. denied, 245

Conn. 918 (1998).

Reckless indifference manslaughter, manslaughter in the second degree, and criminally

negligent homicide are general intent crimes. State v. Edwards, 214 Conn. 57, 67 (1990)

(reckless indifference manslaughter); State v. Hallowell, 61 Conn. App. 463, 467 (2001)

(reckless indifference manslaughter); State v. Sotomayor, 61 Conn. App. 364, 380 (manslaughter

in the first degree and manslaughter in the second degree are distinguished by the level of

recklessness), appeal dismissed, 260 Conn. 179, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 922, 123 S. Ct. 313, 154

L. Ed. 2d 212 (2002).

Intoxication

Intoxication is relevant to the defendant’s capacity to form a specific intent. State v.

Rivera, 223 Conn. 41, 50 (1992). It does not apply to general intent crimes. State v. Austin, 244

Conn. 226, 239 (1998). If the jury is instructed on lesser included offenses of general intent and

on intoxication, this distinction must be made clear.

See Intoxication, Instruction 2.7-1, and its commentary.

Simultaneous intent

A defendant may simultaneously intend to cause death and intend to cause serious

physical injury, justifying convictions of both attempted murder and intentional assault for the

same act against the same victim. State v. Murray, 254 Conn. 472, 479-83 (2000); State v.

Williams, 237 Conn. 748, 754-57 (1996).

Transferred intent

“[T]he principle of ‘transferred intent’ was created to apply to the situation of an accused

who intended to kill a certain person and by mistake killed another. His intent is transposed from

the person to whom it was directed to the person actually killed.” State v. Hinton, 227 Conn.

301, 306 n.8 (1993). When multiple victims die as the result of the defendant’s actions, the fact

that the defendant only intended to kill one of them does not prevent that intent from being

“transferred” to all of the victims; i.e., the unintended deaths are not reduced to manslaughter as

long as the defendant had the intent to kill someone. Id., 306-11. The doctrine of transferred

intent does not logically apply to attempted murder. Id., 317.

Lesser Included Offenses

“Lesser included offense instructions are frequently appropriate in cases when the

defendant is charged with murder.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Smith, 262

Conn. 453, 470 (2003). “[T]he critical element distinguishing murder from its lesser included

offenses is intent, often the most significant and, at the same time, the most elusive element of

the crime charged.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. “If the evidence suggests at least a

possibility that the defendant acted with a lesser intent than that of the specific intent to kill,” the

defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense instruction. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id.

“[I]nherent in a trial court’s decision to charge on lesser included offenses is a finding

that the defendant’s state of mind may fall within one of many requisite mental states.

Therefore, the trial court’s charge on lesser included offenses, which occurs prior to the jury’s

deliberations, merely informs the consciousness of the jurors that the defendant’s particular state

of mind at the time he committed the crime may fall within one of many requisite mental states

and that each requisite mental state serves as an element for a distinct crime.” State v. Tomlin,

266 Conn. 608, 639 (2003) (finding error in court’s refusal to instruct on manslaughter in the

second degree and criminally negligent homicide).

“Permitting the jury to find the defendant guilty of a lesser charge of homicide than that

charged, where the evidence supports such a finding, does not violate the defendant’s sixth

amendment right to notice. By the charge on the greater offense of murder, the defendant is put

on notice that he will be put on trial for his action in causing the death of another person. Thus,

having been given notice of the most serious degree of culpable intent by the murder indictment,

he is implicitly given notice of those lesser included homicides that require a less serious degree

of culpable intent.” State v. Rodriguez, 180 Conn. 382, 405 (1980).

With a firearm

Manslaughter in the first degree or second degree with a firearm is a lesser included

offense of murder only when the allegations in the charging documents include the use of a

firearm. State v. Falcon, 26 Conn. App. 259, 266 (1991), cert. denied, 221 Conn. 911 (1992).

Applicability of self-defense to lesser included offenses

Self-defense is applicable to the lesser included offenses of manslaughter in the first

degree, manslaughter in the second degree, and criminally negligent homicide. State v.

Harrison, 32 Conn. App. 687, 695, cert. denied, 227 Conn. 932 (1993). Self-defense is not

incompatible with a charge of manslaughter in the second degree. “Conduct may be a ‘gross

deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation’;

General Statutes § 53a-3 (13); but, at the same time, may be wholly justified if the defendant’s

beliefs are reasonable from the perspective of that defendant.” State v. Hall, 213 Conn. 579, 586

(1990).

Defenses

Extreme emotional disturbance

General Statutes § 53a-54a (a) provides in pertinent part that “it shall be an affirmative

defense that the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme

emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the

reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant’s

situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be, provided nothing

contained in this subsection shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude conviction

of, manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime.” See Affirmative Defense of Extreme

Emotional Disturbance, Instruction 5.2-1.

Self-defense

See Self-Defense and Defense of Others, Instruction 2.8-1.

Intoxication

“Intoxication is not a defense to murder, but is relevant to the capacity to form specific

intent.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rivera, supra, 223 Conn. 50.

Attempt

“Manslaughter committed without an intent to cause the death of another . . . is analogous

to . . . involuntary manslaughter.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Almeda, 189 Conn. 303, 308

(1983). There is no logic to attempting to commit involuntary manslaughter, hence attempted

manslaughter is not a cognizable crime. Id., 309.

Accessorial liability

Accessory to manslaughter is a cognizable crime. State v. Harris, supra, 49 Conn. App.

128-29.