Conn. Crim. Jury Instr. 4.3-5

The defendant is charged [in count__] with abuse of an oath document. The statute defining this

offense reads in pertinent as follows:

A person is guilty of abuse of an oath document, executed subsequent to an oath

taken by a judicial officer pursuant to section 1-25, when he or she disseminates said

oath document to a person by telegraph or mail, by electronically transmitting a

facsimile through connection with a telephone network, by computer network, or by

any other form of written communication, with the intent to defraud, deceive,

intimidate, injure or harass a judicial officer.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this charge, the state must prove the following elements

beyond a reasonable doubt:

Element 1 - Dissemination of an Oath Document

The first element is that the defendant disseminated an oath document to another person by

(telegraph / mail / electronically transmitting a facsimile through connection with a telephone

network / computer network / written communication).

An “oath document” is a written document which serves as evidence of the administration of the

oath required of judicial officers pursuant to statute.

[<Insert if applicable:> A “computer network” is defined as either a set of related devices

connected to a computer by communications facilities, or a complex of two or more computers,

including related devices, connected by communications facilities.]

Element 2 – Executed Pursuant to § 1-25

The second element is that the oath document disseminated by the defendant was executed by a

judicial officer subsequent to (his/her) taking of an oath pursuant to General Statutes § 1-25.

General Statutes § 1-25 mandates the specific oath required to be taken by judicial officers.

A “judicial officer” is a judge of the Probate Court, judge of the Superior Court, judge of the

Appellate Court, associate justice of the Supreme Court, or chief justice of the Supreme Court.

<Identify judicial officer> is a <identify office held>.

Element 3- Intent

The third element is that the defendant, by (his/her) dissemination of the oath document,

intended to defraud, deceive, intimidate, injure, or harass <identify judicial officer>. A person

acts “intentionally” with respect to a result when (his/her) conscious objective is to cause such

result. <See Intent: Specific, Instruction 2.3-1.>

You will recall from my prior instruction, a “judicial officer” is a judge of probate, judge of the

superior court, judge of the appellate court, associate justice of the supreme court, or chief justice

of the supreme court.

“Defraud” means to practice fraud, to cheat or trick, to deprive a person of property or any

interest or right by fraud.2

“Deceive” means to mislead or cause a person to believe what is not true.

“Intimidate” means to make afraid, or to deter with threats or violence.

“Injure” means to cause impairment of physical condition or pain.

“Harass” means to disturb persistently, bother continuously, pester or torment.

Conclusion

In summary, the state must prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1) the

defendant disseminated an oath document to another person by (telegraph / mail / electronically

transmitting a facsimile through connection with a telephone network / computer network /

written communication), 2) the oath document was executed by a judicial officer subsequent to

(his/her) taking of an oath pursuant to General Statutes § 1-25 and 3) the defendant, by (his/her)

dissemination of the oath document, intended to defraud, deceive, intimidate, injure, or harass a

judicial officer.

If you find the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of abuse of an oath

document, you shall find the defendant guilty. On the other hand, if you unanimously find that

the state has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any of the elements, you shall then find

the defendant not guilty.

1 While the term “judicial officer” is not defined by statute, probate judges are judicial officers.

Kinsella v. Jaekle, 192 Conn. 704, 724 (1984); see also General Statutes § 45a-18. Conversely,

attorneys are not judicial officers; Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 566 (1975); nor are

commissioners of the Superior Court. Yudkin v. Gates, 60 Conn. 426, 427 (1891). Federal

judges, whether Article I or Article III, while judicial officers, do not take the oath mandated by

General Statutes § 1-25.

2 State v. DeCaro, 252 Conn. 229, 242 n.12 (2000).

3 State v. Yurch, 37 Conn. App. 72, 80-81 (1995).