Conn. Crim. Jury Instr. 3.1-1

Note: This statute does not define a separate crime, but a separate theory of liability. It

should be included in the instruction defining the substantive offense, following the

elements of that offense. If the state presents alternative theories of vicarious liability, the

jury must be unanimous. See Introduction to Vicarious Liability.

When the defendant is charged only as an accessory, the court, in explaining the elements

of the underlying crime, should refer to the fact that the underlying crime was committed

by the principal offender rather than the defendant.

A person is criminally liable for a criminal act if (he/she) directly commits it or if (he/she) is an

accessory in the criminal act of another. The statute defining accessorial liability reads in

pertinent part as follows:

a person, acting with the mental state required for commission of an offense, who

solicits, requests, commands, importunes or intentionally aids another person to

engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable for such

conduct and may be prosecuted and punished as if (he/she) were the principal

offender.

This statute does not connect those five acts specified with the word “and” but separates them by

the word “or.” A person is an accessory if (he/she) solicits or requests or commands or

importunes or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct that constitutes an offense.

“Solicit” means to tempt or to entice someone to do wrong; “importune” means to demand or

urge; “aid” means to assist, help or support. A person acts “intentionally” with respect to a result

when (his/her) conscious objective is to cause such result. “Intentionally aid,” therefore, means

to act in any manner, the conscious objective of which is to assist, help or support. <See Intent:

Specific, Instruction 2.3-1.>

If the defendant did any of these things as specified in the statute, (he/she) is guilty of <insert

substantive crime> as though (he/she) had directly committed it or participated in its

commission. To establish the guilt of a defendant as an accessory for assisting in the criminal act

of another, the state must prove criminality of intent and community of unlawful purpose.

1 That

is, for the defendant to be guilty as an accessory, it must be established that (he/she) acted with

the mental state necessary to commit <insert substantive crime>, and that in furtherance of that

crime, (he/she) solicited, requested, commanded, importuned or intentionally aided the principal

to commit <insert substantive crime>.

Evidence of mere presence as an inactive companion, or passive acquiescence, or the doing of

innocent acts which, in fact, aid in the commission of a crime, is insufficient to find the

defendant guilty as an accessory under the statute. Nevertheless, it is not necessary to prove that

the defendant was actually present or actively participated in the actual commission of the crime

of <insert substantive crime>.

Conclusion

[<If charged only as an accessory:> The rule is that a person who solicits, requests, commands,

importunes or intentionally aids in the commission of a crime is guilty of that very crime. Thus,

for you to find the defendant guilty of this charge, you must unanimously find that the state has

proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant assisted another to commit the crime of

<insert substantive crime>. You must also unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant had the intent to commit the crime charged and did solicit, request, command,

importune or intentionally aid another in the commission of the crime of <insert charged

crime>.]

[<If charged as either an accessory or principal:> For you to find the defendant guilty of this

charge, you must unanimously find that the state has proved all the elements of <insert

substantive crime> beyond a reasonable doubt. If you conclude that the defendant is guilty as a

principal or as an accessory, you do not need to be unanimous regarding whether you believe

(he/she) was a principal or accessory as long as all (six / twelve) jurors agree that at least one

method (i.e., principal or accessory) has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.]

<If also charged under a theory of Pinkerton liability, see Vicarious Liability under Pinkerton,

Instruction 3.1-3.

1 Do not include language suggestive of theories of criminal enterprise or conspiracy because it

may mislead the jury that it could find the defendant guilty as an accessory without the requisite

intent. State v. Lopez, 280 Conn. 779, 820-23 (2007); State v. Diaz, 237 Conn. 518, 534-41

(1996).