Conn. Crim. Jury Instr. 2.6-1

The state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant proximately caused the (death

of / injuries to) <insert name of decedent / person injured>. Proximate cause does not

necessarily mean the last act or cause, or the act in point of time nearest to the (death / injuries).

The concept of proximate cause incorporates the principle that an accused may be charged with a

criminal offense even though (his/her) acts were not the immediate cause of the (death / injuries).

An act or omission to act is a proximate cause of the (death / injuries) when it substantially and

materially contributes, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient,

intervening cause, to the (death / injuries). It is a cause without which the (death / injuries)

would not have occurred. It is a predominating cause, a substantial factor from which the (death

/ injuries) follow[s] as a natural, direct and immediate consequence.

[<Include if appropriate:> It does not matter whether the particular kind of harm that results

from the defendant’s act be intended by the defendant.]2 When the result is a foreseeable and

natural result of the defendant’s conduct, the law considers the chain of legal causation unbroken

and holds the defendant criminally responsible.

[<If defendant claims an intervening cause:>

The defendant claims that (his/her) conduct was not the proximate cause of <insert name of

decedent or complainant>’s (death / injuries) because there was an intervening cause that was

the cause of the (death / injuries). The doctrine of intervening cause applies in a situation in

which the defendant’s conduct is a cause and factor of the (death / injuries), that is, <insert name

of decedent or complainant> would not have (died / been injured) but for the defendant’s

conduct, but nonetheless something else subsequently occurs -- which may be an act of the

(decedent / person injured), the act of some other person, or some nonhuman force -- that does

more than supply a concurring or contributing cause of the injury. An intervening cause is

unforeseeable and sufficiently powerful in its effect that it serves to relieve the defendant of

criminal responsibility for (his/her) conduct. In such a case, the defendant’s conduct is not the

proximate cause of <insert name of decedent or complainant>’s (death / injuries).

The doctrine of intervening cause serves as a dividing line between two closely related factual

situations: 1) when two or more acts or forces, one of which was set in motion by the

defendant, combine to cause a person’s (death / injuries), the doctrine of intervening cause will

not relieve the defendant of criminal responsibility, and 2) when an unforeseeable act and force

intervenes in such a powerful way as to become the proximate cause of the (death / injuries), the

doctrine of intervening cause will relieve a defendant from criminal responsibility, even though

his or her conduct contributed, in fact, to the (death / injuries).

In other words, when more than one factor contributes, in a chain of events, to cause (death /

injuries), in order to be the proximate cause of that (death / injury), the defendant’s conduct must

have been a cause that necessarily set in operation the factors that accomplished the (death /

injury). When the other circumstance constitutes a concurring or contributing cause of the (death

/ injuries), the defendant will be held responsible. When the other circumstance constitutes an

intervening cause of the (death / injuries), the defendant will not be held responsible.

This is a question of fact for you, as jurors, to determine. Keep in mind, however, that the

defendant does not have any burden to prove an intervening cause. The burden rests on the state

to prove that the defendant’s conduct was the proximate cause of <insert name of decedent or

complainant>’s (death / injuries).]

[<If decedent had a pre-existing medical condition:>

The defendant’s criminal liability is not lessened because of a pre-existing medical condition of

<insert name of decedent>. It is sufficient that the defendant’s conduct set in motion a chain of

events that ultimately produced the death. If the defendant’s conduct inflicted upon <insert

name of decedent> physical or emotional injury or stress or trauma that was in this sense the

proximate cause of (his/her) death, then the defendant’s conduct, under the circumstances,

caused the death, even though <insert name of decedent> had already been enfeebled by poor

physical condition and the physical or emotional stress or trauma were not the only cause of

(his/her) death. This is so even though it is probable that a person in sound physical condition

would not have died from the effects of the defendant’s conduct. It does not matter that the

defendant’s conduct may have only hastened the death, or that <insert name of decedent> would

have died soon thereafter from another cause or causes. As long as (his/her) admittedly and

recognizable predisposition of <describe pre-existing condition> was not the only substantial

factor in bringing on (his/her) death, that condition does not operate to prevent the defendant’s

responsibility for (his/her) conduct having caused <insert name of decedent>’s death. If the

defendant’s unlawful conduct set in motion factors that led to <insert name of decedent>’s death,

such conduct establishes the defendant’s guilt even though (his/her) conduct or the factors

(he/she) set in motion were not the only cause of <insert name of decedent>’s death.]

1 State v. Griffin, 251 Conn. 671, 712-13 n.17 (1999).

2 Use only when the defendant may have intended one type of harm but caused another. For

example, when an accused, “with the intent to cause death by shooting, shoots the victim, who,

as a result, falls from a rooftop and is killed by the fall rather than the bullet. That would be a

particular kind of harm not intended by the accused. It nevertheless would sustain a charge of

murder if the accused intended to cause death and the fall was the direct result of the action taken

to effectuate that intent.” State v. Boles, 223 Conn. 535, 542 n.5 (1992).

3 See State v. Munoz, 233 Conn. 106, 124 (1995), and State v. Hannon, 56 Conn. App. 581, 586-

87 (2000), cert. denied, 274 Conn. 911 (2005).

4 Use if the defendant is claiming that a pre-existing medical condition of the decedent was an

intervening cause. See State v. Spates, 176 Conn. 227, 235 n.5 (1978) (defendant’s actions

during a robbery precipitated the victim’s heart attack which led to his death); State v. Dorans,

261 Conn. 730, 736-44 (2002) (victim had a pre-existing nervous system disorder). Do not use

the language that “[a] defendant takes a victim as he finds him.” Id., 261 Conn. 744 n.16.