Conn. Civ. Jury Instr. 3.14-1

The plaintiff has alleged that the defendant violated Connecticut General Statutes § 46a-60 when

it (discharged (him/her) from employment/took adverse action against (him/her)) on the basis of

(his/her) race.

1 Connecticut General Statutes § 46a-60 provides: “(a) It shall be a discriminatory

practice in violation of this section: (1) For an employer, by the employer or the employer’s

agent, except in the case of a bona fide occupational qualification or need, to refuse to hire or

employ or to bar or to discharge from employment any individual or to discriminate against such

individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the

individual’s race . . . .”

In order to prevail on (his/her) claim under § 46a-60, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance

of the evidence that ((his/her) discharge/the adverse employment action) was due to intentional

discrimination based on (his/her) race. Intentional race discrimination is proved in this case if

the plaintiff demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that (his/her) race was a

motivating factor for ((his/her) discharge/the adverse employment action) even though other

factors also motivated the defendant’s decision to (discharge/take adverse action) against

(him/her). A “motivating factor” is a factor that made a difference in the defendant’s decision.

The plaintiff does not have to prove that race was the sole or even the principal reason for the

decision, as long as (he/she) proves that (his/her) race was a determinative influence in the

decision. (He/She) may prove intentional discrimination directly by proving that a

discriminatory reason more likely motivated the defendant’s action in (discharging

(him/her)/taking the adverse employment action) or indirectly by proving that the reason[s] given

by the defendant for the discharge (was/were) unworthy of belief. If you find that the

defendant’s stated reason[s] are not credible, then considering all the circumstances, you may

infer, although you are not required to infer, that race was a motivating factor in the defendant’s

decision, even if it may not have been the only motivating factor.

It is not your role to second-guess the defendant’s business judgment. As long as race was not a

motivating factor that made a difference in its decisions, the fact that an employer’s decision was

incorrect, unfair, unwise or capricious, or even based on personal favoritism or animosity is

irrelevant.

1 Section 46a-60 also prohibits discriminatory practices due to “color, religious creed, age, sex,

marital status, national origin, ancestry, present or past history of mental disability, mental

retardation, learning disability or physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness . . .

.” Those words should be substituted for race in the instruction if applicable.