Colo. RPC 3.1

History

Source: Entire Appendix repealed and readopted April 12, 2007, effective January 1, 2008; Comment [3] amended, effective April 6, 2016. COMMENT [1] The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client’s cause, but also a duty not to abuse legal proce- dure. The law, both procedural and substantive, establishes the limits within which an advocate may proceed. However, the law is not always clear and never is static. Accordingly, in deter- mining the proper scope of advocacy, account must be taken of the law’s ambiguities and potential for change. [2] The filing of an action or defense or similar action taken for a client is not frivolous merely because the facts have not first been fully substantiated or because the lawyer ex- pects to develop vital evidence only by discov- ery. What is required of lawyers, however, is that they inform themselves about the facts of their clients’ cases and the applicable law and determine that they can make good faith argu- ments in support of their clients’ positions. Such action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the client’s position ulti- mately will not prevail. The action is frivolous, however, if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modifica- tion or reversal of existing law. [3] The lawyer’s obligations under this Rule are subordinate to federal or state consti- tutional law that entitles a defendant in a crimi- nal matter to the assistance of counsel in pre- senting a claim or contention that otherwise would be prohibited by this Rule. See A.L.L. v. People ex rel. C.Z. , 226 P.3d 1054, 1060 (Colo. 2010) (addressing obligations of court-approved counsel for a respondent parent in a termination of parental rights appeal). ANNOTATION Law reviews. For article, ‘‘Out of Bounds: Boundary Issues in the Practice of Law’’, see 43 Colo. Law. 57 (Dec. 2014). Annotator’s note. Rule 3.1 is similar to Rule 3.1 as it existed prior to the 2007 repeal and readoption of the Colorado rules of professional conduct. Relevant cases construing that provi- sion have been included in the annotations to this rule. The constitutional right to petition the government for a redress of grievances pro- tects appeals from court decisions unless the sham exemption applies. Therefore, an attor- ney may not be disciplined unless the filing of an appeal is objectively without merit and the attorney subjectively intended an ulterior mo- tive. In re Foster, 253 P.3d 1244 (Colo. 2011). Public censure was appropriate where the attorney failed to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation, made frivolous motions, and made a statement with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge. People v. Thomas, 925 P.2d 1081 (Colo. 1996). A violation of this rule must be proved by clear and convincing evidence in a disciplin- ary proceeding. Therefore, the fact that a dis- trict court had found by a preponderance of the evidence that an attorney had made a frivolous motion did not preclude the hearing board from determining that the attorney had not violated this rule. In re Egbune, 971 P.2d 1065 (Colo. 1999). Nine-month suspension stayed upon the requirement to pay restitution to clients is justified when violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules, particularly given the substantial and continuous incompetence, advancement of meritless claims, and signifi- cant financial harm conduct caused clients in this case. People v. Bontrager, 407 P.3d 1235 (Colo. O.P .D.J. 2017). Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify public censure. Matter of Olsen, 2014 CO 42, 326 P.3d 1004. Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify suspension. People v. Robinson, 853 P.2d 1145 (Colo. 1993); People v. Maynard, 238 P.3d 672 (Colo. O.P .D.J. 2009); People v. Layton, 494 P.3d 693 (Colo. O.P .D.J. 2021); People v. Fry, 501 P.3d 846 (Colo. O.P .D.J. 2021). Cases Decided Under Former DR 1-102. I. General Consideration. II. Disciplinary Actions. A. Public Censure. B. Suspension. C. Disbarment. I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION. Law reviews. For article, ‘‘Incriminating Evidence: What to do With a Hot Potato’’, see 11 Colo. Law. 880 (1982). For article, ‘‘The Ethical Obligation to Disclose Attorney Negli- gence’’, see 13 Colo. Law. 232 (1984). For article, ‘‘Indemnification or Contribution Among Counsel in Legal Malpractice Actions’’, see 14 Colo. Law. 563 (1985). For article, ‘‘The Lawyer’s Duty to Report Ethical Violations’’, see 18 Colo. Law. 1915 (1989). For article, ‘‘Update on Ethics and Malpractice Avoidance in Family Law — Part I’’, see 19 Colo. Law. 465 (1990). For article, ‘‘Update on Ethics and Malpractice Avoidance in Family Law — Part II’’, see 19 Colo. Law. 647 (1990). For formal opinion of the Colorado Bar Association Ethics Committee on Use of Subpoenas in Civil Pro- ceedings, see 19 Colo. Law. 1556 (1990). For article, ‘‘Punishing Ethical Violations: Aggra- vating and Mitigating Factors’’, see 20 Colo. Law. 243 (1991). For article, ‘‘Sex, Lawyers and Vilification’’, see 21 Colo. Law. 469 (1992). Constitutionality upheld. This rule is not unconstitutionally vague on its face or as ap- plied. People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986). Standards used in determining a constitu- tional challenge to a statute are used in de- termining a constitutional challenge to this rule. People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986). Presumption of constitutionality attaches to such enactment, and the burden is on the party challenging an enactment to demonstrate its un- constitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986). Since a disciplinary rule is promulgated for the purpose of guiding lawyers in their profes- sional conduct, and is not directed to the public at large, the central consideration in resolving a vagueness challenge should be whether the na- ture of the proscribed conduct encompassed by the rule is readily understandable to a licensed lawyer. People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986). Attorney’s psychological problems consid- ered as aggravating and mitigating circum- stances in arriving at a recommendation for discipline. The presence of psychological prob- lems, however, does not automatically prevent the attorney from assisting in his own defense where evidence is shown to the contrary. People v. Belina, 765 P.2d 121 (Colo. 1988). Attorney’s conduct was so careless or reckless as to constitute sufficient showing of knowledge for violation of subsection (A)(4) of this disciplinary rule. People v. Rader, 822 P.2d 950 (Colo. 1992). In order to find that attorney engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation in violation of this disci- plinary rule, it must be shown that attorney had culpable mental state greater than simple negli- gence. People v. Rader, 822 P.2d 950 (Colo. 1992). Failure to respond to inquiries from refer- ral service, to pay consultation charges and forwarding fees to service, and to return case status reports to service constitutes a violation of sections (A)(1), (A)(4), and (A)(6). People v. Taylor, 799 P.2d 930 (Colo. 1990). Attorney’s conduct violated section (A)(4), (A)(5), (A)(6), and DR 2-106(A), where the attorney’s multiple billing practice resulted in the charging or collection of a clearly excessive fee because the compensation claimed bore no rational relationship to the work performed and exceeded the compensation authorized by law. People v. Walker, 832 P.2d 935 (Colo. 1992). Attorney’s conduct violated sections (A)(4) and (A)(5) where the attorney failed to file applications for approval of fees in a bank- ruptcy case, did not seek court approval of com- pensation after the bankruptcy petition was filed, and left the state while the case was pend- ing without providing his client means of con- tacting him. These actions, aggravated by a pre- vious public censure, warranted a 60-day suspension. People v. Mills, 923 P.2d 116 (Colo. 1996). Hearing board should not have found vio- lations of sections (A)(4) and (A)(5) where board absolved attorney of the charges the complaint advised him to defend. By failing to find a violation for the failure to disclose certain payments until ordered to do so, the board should not have proceeded with finding that attorney committed misconduct in not de- tailing the sources of the disputed income. In re Quiat, 979 P.2d 1029 (Colo. 1999). Board erred in concluding that attorney’s representation of individual client with whom he had a business relationship consti- tuted conduct adversely reflecting on attor- ney’s fitness to practice law. Neither com- plainant’s expert nor hearing board paid sufficient attention to the specific and unusual facts of the general and limited partnerships’ actual or potential liabilities. The record does not support the board’s findings that an actual conflict existed among the general and limited partners, including the attorney, or that potential for conflict was likely. In re Quiat, 979 P.2d 1029 (Colo. 1999). An attorney’s appearance as counsel of record in numerous court proceedings fol- lowing an order of suspension constituted a violation of DR 1-102(A)(4). People v. Kargol, 854 P.2d 1267 (Colo. 1993). Attorney’s effort to cause suppression of relevant evidence at driver license revocation proceeding in a manner not authorized by stat- ute or other law constitutes conduct prejudicial to administration of justice and contrary to DR 1-102 (A)(5). People v. Attorney A., 861 P.2d 705 (Colo. 1993). Attorney’s effort to condition settlement of a malpractice claim upon client’s agreement not to file a grievance against him constituted conduct prejudicial to the administration of jus- tice in violation of paragraph (A)(5). People v. Moffitt, 801 P.2d 1197 (Colo. 1990). Adopting a conscious scheme to take own- ership of homes, collect rents from tenants, make virtually no efforts to sell the homes, and permit foreclosures to occur on which the department of housing and urban devel- opment (HUD) would absorb the losses con- stituted equity skimming in violation of § 18- 5-802 and constitutes a violation of sections (A)(4) and (A)(6) for which suspension for one year is appropriate. People v. Phelps, 837 P.2d 755 (Colo. 1992). As officers of the court, lawyers are charged with obedience to the laws of this state and to the laws of the United States, and intentional violation by them of these laws sub- jects them to the severest discipline. People v. Wilson, 176 Colo. 389, 490 P.2d 954 (1971). The crime with which an attorney is charged is one of serious consequences denot- ing moral turpitude and he is found guilty of such a crime, he cannot, in good conscience, be permitted to practice law in this state. People v. Wilson, 176 Colo. 389, 490 P.2d 954 (1971). It is unprofessional conduct and dishonor- able to deal other than candidly with the facts in drawing affidavits and other docu- ments. People v. Radinsky, 176 Colo. 357, 490 P.2d 951 (1971). By filing false documents, an attorney per- petrates a fraud upon the court. People v. Radinsky, 176 Colo. 357, 490 P.2d 951 (1971). Where an attorney receives as a fee from one of his clients stolen property, then even though he does ask the client whether the item was stolen and receives a negative answer from him, he should make further inquiry as to the actual source of the item, and failure to do so constitutes a breach of his obligations as a member of the bar. People v. Zelinger, 179 Colo. 379, 504 P.2d 668 (1972). License to practice law assures public that the lawyer who holds the license will perform basic legal tasks honestly and without undue delay, in accordance with the highest standards of professional conduct. People v. Witt, 200 Colo. 522, 616 P.2d 139 (1980); People v. Dixon, 621 P.2d 322 (Colo. 1981); People v. Kendrick, 646 P.2d 337 (Colo. 1982). An attorney must adhere with dedication to the highest standards of honesty and in- tegrity in order that members of the public are assured that they may deal with attorneys with the knowledge that their matters will be handled with absolute propriety. People v. Golden, 654 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1982). Client has right to expect competency and integrity from lawyer. A client has every right to expect that conduct taken on its behalf will be carried out with that competence and integ- rity ideally shared by every lawyer who is li- censed to practice law in the jurisdiction. Wil- liams v. Burns, 463 F. Supp. 1278 (D. Colo. 1979); People v. Pooley, 774 P.2d 239 (Colo. 1989). Public expects appropriate discipline for misconduct. The public has a right to expect that one who engages in professional miscon- duct will be disciplined appropriately. People v. Witt 200 Colo. 522, 616 P.2d 139 (1980); People v. Dixon, 621 P.2d 322 (Colo. 1981). Most severe punishment is required when a lawyer disregards his professional obligations and converts his clients’ funds to his own use. People v. Kluver, 199 Colo. 511, 611 P.2d 971 (1980); People v. Kendrick, 646 P.2d 337 (Colo. 1982); People v. Bealmear, 655 P.2d 402 (Colo. 1982). Conversion of client funds is conduct war- ranting disbarment because it destroys the trust essential to the attorney-client relationship, se- verely damages the public’s perception of attor- neys, and erodes public confidence in our legal system. People v. Radosevich, 783 P.2d 841 (Colo. 1989). Where attorney, as trustee, withdrew $13,100 from the trust without the client-settlor’s knowl- edge and refused to repay the money when given the opportunity by the client-settlor, attor- ney’s conduct was sufficient to warrant disbar- ment. People v. Whitcomb, 819 P.2d 493 (Colo. 1991). Conversion of client funds cannot be toler- ated regardless of the apparent fact that the attorney did not use such funds for personal gain but to pay the costs and expenses incident to handling a large practice that included many non-paying clients. People v. Franco, 698 P.2d 230 (Colo. 1985). Fitness to practice law adversely reflected upon by attorney’s business judgment and vio- lations of the code of professional responsibility although his legal competence was not ques- tioned. People v. Franco, 698 P.2d 230 (Colo. 1985). Failure to represent a client also adversely reflects upon an attorney’s fitness to practice law. People v. Coca, 732 P.2d 640 (Colo. 1987). Attorney should never obstruct justice or judicial process. An attorney has a high duty as an officer of the court to never participate in any scheme to obstruct the administration of justice or the judicial process. People v. Kenelly, 648 P.2d 1065 (Colo. 1982); People v. Haase, 781 P.2d 80 (Colo. 1989). Submission of false transcript to obtain admission to law school and to qualify for admission as a member of the bar is a violation of this rule and requires that respondent’s ad- mission to the bar be voided. People v. Culpepper, 645 P.2d 5 (Colo. 1982). Failure to disclose a misdemeanor convic- tion in another state when applying for the bar and subsequent disbarment from the other state constitutes conduct involving fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation prejudicial to the administration of justice. People v. Mattox, 639 P.2d 397 (Colo. 1982). Lawyer owes obligation to client to act with diligence in handling his client’s legal work and in his representation of his client in court. People v. Bugg, 200 Colo. 512, 616 P.2d 133 (1980). Failure to take any action on behalf of his client after he was retained and entrusted with work and in making representations to his client which were false, an attorney violates the code of professional responsibility and C.R.C.P. 241.6. People v. Southern, 638 P.2d 787 (Colo. 1982). Fact that attorney informed client that workers’ compensation hearing was can- celled due to attorney’s illness when attorney was actually abandoning practice constituted conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation in violation of this rule. People v. Felker, 770 P.2d 402 (Colo. 1989). Fabricating documents to justify conduct breaches attorney’s ethical obligations to his client and to the bar. People v. Y ost, 729 P.2d 348 (Colo. 1986). Falsification of an adoption decree with the original intent to use it for a fraudulent purpose is forgery in violation of § 18-5-103 and is a violation of DR 1-102 and DR 7-102 whether of not the attorney who falsified the decree actually used or attempted to use the decree. People v. Marmon, 903 P.2d 651 (Colo. 1995). Absence of contempt finding by trial court concerning attorney’s willful failure to pay child support is a non-dispositive factor to be considered when imposing discipline. People v. Kolenc, 887 P.2d 1024 (Colo. 1994). Trial court’s finding in child support hear- ing that attorney willfully violated child sup- port order should be accorded collateral es- toppel effect before the hearing board as long as court makes finding by clear and convincing evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Kolenc, 887 P.2d 1024 (Colo. 1994). Attorney violated this rule and C.R.P.C. 1.1 when he prepared and filed child support worksheets that failed to properly reflect the new stipulation concerning custody. People v. Davies, 926 P.2d 572 (Colo. 1996). Lawyer may not secretly record any con- versation he has with another lawyer or person. People v. Selby, 198 Colo. 386, 606 P.2d 45 (1979). Telephone conversation, which attorney initi- ated and recorded without the permission of other party to conversation established unethi- cal conduct on attorney’s part. People v. Wallin, 621 P.2d 330 (Colo. 1981). Inherent in the undisclosed use of a recording device is an element of deception, artifice, and trickery which does not comport with the high standards of candor and fairness by which all attorneys are bound. People v. Selby, 198 Colo. 386, 606 P.2d 45 (1979); People v. Smith, 778 P.2d 685 (Colo. 1989). Suspension from practice in tax court is a determination of misconduct in another juris- diction constituting grounds for discipline under these rules. People v. Hartman, 744 P.2d 482 (Colo. 1987). Unfounded assertion of attorney’s lien vio- lates professional code. The assertion of an attorney’s lien in circumstances where the attor- ney has no statutory or legal foundation for a lien and, in fact, has only an uncertain claim to the fee on which the purported lien is founded violates the code of professional responsibility. People v. Razatos, 636 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1981), appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 930, 102 S. Ct. 1415, 71 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1982). Willful and knowing failure to make a fed- eral income tax return is an offense involving moral turpitude. People v. Emeson, 638 P.2d 293 (Colo. 1981). Both the charges and the well pleaded complaint are deemed admitted by the entry of a default judgment. People v. Richards, 748 P.2d 341 (Colo. 1987). Continued representation of clients with conflicting interests violates this rule and war- rants discipline. People v. Awenius, 653 P.2d 740 (Colo. 1982). Attorney’s representation of two estates where the beneficiaries of the estates had con- flicting interests and the attorney fails to obtain waivers from the beneficiaries is a violation of this rule. People v. Gebauer, 821 P.2d 782 (Colo. 1991). Attorney violated this rule by lying to grievance committee counsel regarding the re- turn of client’s files. People v. Felker, 770 P.2d 402 (Colo. 1989). Conduct found to violate disciplinary rules. People v. Bugg, 635 P.2d 881 (Colo. 1981); People v. Sachs, 732 P.2d 633 (Colo. 1987); People v. Ross, 810 P.2d 659 (Colo. 1991). Conduct held to violate this rule. People v. Goss, 646 P.2d 334 (Colo. 1982). Applied in People v. Spiegel, 193 Colo. 161, 567 P.2d 353 (1977); People v. Schermerhorn, 193 Colo. 364, 567 P.2d 799 (1977); People v. Pittam, 194 Colo. 104, 572 P.2d 135 (1977); People v. Good, 195 Colo. 177, 576 P.2d 1020 (1978); People v. McMichael, 196 Colo. 128, 586 P.2d 1 (1978); People v. Susman, 196 Colo. 458, 587 P.2d 782 (1978); People v. Harthun, 197 Colo. 1, 593 P.2d 324 (1979); People v. Cameron, 197 Colo. 330, 595 P.2d 677 (1979); People ex rel. Aisenberg v. Y oung, 198 Colo. 26, 599 P.2d 257 (1979); People v. Pacheco, 198 Colo. 455, 608 P.2d 333 (1979); People ex rel. Gallagher v. Hertz, 198 Colo. 522, 608 P.2d 335 (1979); People ex rel. Silverman v. Ander- son, 200 Colo. 76, 612 P.2d 94 (1980); People v. Hilgers, 200 Colo. 211, 612 P.2d 1134 (1980); People v. Lanza, 200 Colo. 241, 613 P.2d 337 (1980); People v. Meldahl, 200 Colo. 332, 615 P.2d 29 (1980); People v. Hurst, 200 Colo. 537, 618 P.2d 1113 (1980); People v. Kendrick, 619 P.2d 65 (Colo. 1980); People v. Gottsegen, 623 P.2d 878 (Colo. 1981); People v. Luxford, 626 P.2d 675 (Colo. 1981); People v. Rotenberg, 635 P.2d 220 (Colo. 1981); People v. Wright, 638 P.2d 251 (Colo. 1981); People v. Kane, 638 P.2d 253 (Colo. 1981); People v. Archuleta, 638 P.2d 255 (Colo. 1981); Law Of- fices of Bernard D. Morley, P .C. v. MacFarlane, 647 P.2d 1215 (Colo. 1982); People v. Whitcomb, 676 P.2d 11 (Colo. 1983); People v. Tucker, 676 P.2d 680 (Colo. 1983); People v. Bollinger, 681 P.2d 950 (Colo. 1984); People v. Underhill, 683 P.2d 349 (Colo. 1984); People v. Simon, 698 P.2d 228 (Colo. 1985); People v. McDowell, 718 P.2d 541 (Colo. 1986); People v. Smith, 778 P.2d 685 (Colo. 1989). II. DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS. A. Public Censure. Violation of election laws sufficient to jus- tify public censure. People v. Casias, 646 P.2d 391 (Colo. 1982). Bigamy, an offense of moral turpitude, warrants public censure. People v. Tucker, 755 P.2d 452 (Colo. 1988). An attorney’s inaction in response to the grievance committee’s request concerning in- formal complaint filed, considered with other circumstances, justified public censure. People v. Moore, 681 P.2d 480 (Colo. 1984). Where an attorney repeatedly issued checks from his law office account knowing that they would not be paid by the bank, such conduct, considered with other circumstances, justified public censure. People v. Moore, 681 P.2d 480 (Colo. 1984). Public censure warranted where attorney kept the first lump sum check obtained in settlement as a lump sum payment of his contingency fee and reimbursement of costs even though he knew the settlement might later be reduced by the social security disability award and the client’s union award. People v. Maceau, 910 P.2d 692 (Colo. 1996). Adjudicating, as a judge, the criminal case of a person who is his client in a divorce proceeding warrants public censure because it is the duty of an attorney-judge to promptly disclose conflicts of interest and to disqualify himself without suggestion from anyone. People v. Perrott, 769 P.2d 1075 (Colo. 1989). Conduct was prejudicial to the adminis- tration of justice and warranted public cen- sure where, during the course of criminal pro- ceedings, attorney made an offer to the deputy district attorney to dismiss a related civil action if the criminal charges against his client were dismissed. People v. Silvola, 888 P.2d 244 (Colo. 1995). Use of racial epithet by prosecutor in dis- cussing case with defense counsel for two Hispanic defendants constituted a violation of this section warranting public censure. People v. Sharpe, 781 P.2d 659 (Colo. 1989). Neglect of a legal matter ordinarily war- ranting a letter of admonition by way of rep- rimand requires imposition of public censure when such conduct is repeated after three letters of admonition. People v. Goodwin, 782 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1989). Public censure was appropriate where an already suspended attorney was the subject of prior discipline for misdemeanor convictions of assault and driving while impaired and where an additional period of suspension would have little, if any, practical effect and would not have afforded a meaningful measure of protection for the public. People v. Flores, 871 P.2d 1182 (Colo. 1994). Evidence sufficient to justify public cen- sure. People v. Hertz, 638 P.2d 794 (Colo. 1982). Public censure was appropriate where lawyer’s actions involving criminal activity did not seriously affect the lawyer’s fitness to practice law and mitigating factors were pres- ent in the absence of any aggravating factors. People v. Fahselt, 807 P.2d 586 (Colo. 1991). Public censure was appropriate where multiple representations and neglect caused no actual harm and attorney was cooperative during disciplinary proceedings, had no prior discipline, and was relatively inexperienced at the time the misconduct occurred. People v. Ramseur, 897 P.2d 1391 (Colo. 1995). Threatening to invoke disciplinary pro- ceedings against judge in anticipation of ad- verse ruling warrants public censure. People v. Tatum, 814 P.2d 388 (Colo. 1991). Failure to timely file a paternity action constitutes neglect of a legal matter that war- rants public censure. People v. Good, 790 P.2d 331 (Colo. 1990). Public censure was warranted where attor- ney made false statements in the course of discovery in cases where the attorney was the plaintiff. Evidence showed that the attorney was suffering from a psychiatric condition at the time, and the assistant disciplinary counsel could not prove that the attorney’s false state- ments were knowing, but only that they were negligent. People v. Dillings, 880 P.2d 1220 (Colo. 1994). Public censure was appropriate where at- torney failed to provide a critical document to opposing counsel after agreeing to do so and failed to reveal relevant information at the time of trial. People v. Wilder, 860 P.2d 523 (Colo. 1993). Failure to inform arbitrators of errors in expert witness’ testimony constituted violation of DR 7-102 warranting public censure because attorney did not disclose that expert had in- formed attorney of mistakes in writing, and attorney made closing arguments based on un- corrected expert conclusions. People v. Bertagnolli, 861 P.2d 717 (Colo. 1993) (decided under DR 7-102). Public censure was appropriate where at- torney’s failure to appear at three hearings vio- lated subsection (A)(5) and, in aggravation, there was a pattern of misconduct. People v. Cabral, 888 P.2d 245 (Colo. 1995). Public censure warranted where attorney engaged in sexual relations with client attor- ney represented in dissolution of marriage ac- tion even though client suffered no actual harm. People v. Zeilinger, 814 P.2d 808 (Colo. 1991). Discharging firearm in direction of spouse while intoxicated, although not a crime in- volving dishonesty, goes beyond mere negli- gence and public censure is appropriate. Miti- gating factors, although present, were insufficient to warrant making censure private. People v. Senn, 824 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1992). Public censure is appropriate for attor- ney’s negligence in closing estates in an un- timely manner and for representing two estates where the beneficiaries of the estates have con- flicting interests and the attorney fails to obtain waivers from the beneficiaries. People v. Gebauer, 821 P.2d 782 (Colo. 1991). Attorney’s unlawful assertion of charging lien against client’s share of estate proceeds following client’s demand for return of property is subject to public censure. People v. Mills, 861 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1993) (decided under DR 1-102 (A)(5)). Public censure is appropriate where law- yer’s predominant mental state was one of negligence and there was an absence of ac- tual harm to the client. People v. Hickox, 889 P.2d 47 (Colo. 1995). Public censure is appropriate if attorney’s course of behavior exhibits a serious error in judgment going beyond simple negligence. People v. Blundell, 901 P.2d 1268 (Colo. 1995). Public censure was appropriate where the attorney failed to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation, made frivolous motions, and made a statement with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge. People v. Thomas, 925 P.2d 1081 (Colo. 1996). Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify public censure. People v. Ashley, 796 P.2d 962 (Colo. 1990); People v. Mulvihill, 814 P.2d 805 (Colo. 1991); People v. Smith, 819 P.2d 497 (Colo. 1991); People v. Richardson, 820 P.2d 1120 (Colo. 1991); People v. Dalton, 840 P.2d 351 (Colo. 1992); People v. Vsetecka, 893 P.2d 1309 (Colo. 1995); People v. Wollrab, 909 P.2d 1093 (Colo. 1996); People v. Fitzgibbons, 909 P.2d 1098 (Colo. 1996); People v. Cohan, 913 P.2d 523 (Colo. 1996). Conduct violating this rule sufficient to justify public censure. People v. Bollinger, 648 P.2d 620 (Colo. 1982); People v. Driscoll, 716 P.2d 1086 (Colo. 1986); People v. Mayer, 716 P.2d 1094 (Colo. 1986); People v. Carpenter, 731 P.2d 726 (Colo. 1987); People v. Schaiberger, 731 P.2d 728 (Colo. 1987); People v. Horn, 738 P.2d 1186 (Colo. 1987); People v. Stauffer, 745 P.2d 240 (Colo. 1987); People v. Barr, 748 P.2d 1302 (Colo. 1988); People v. Dowhan, 759 P.2d 4 (Colo. 1988); People v. Fieman, 778 P.2d 830 (Colo. 1990); People v. Stayton, 798 P.2d 903 (Colo. 1990); People v. Brinn, 801 P.2d 1195 (Colo. 1990); People v. Moffitt, 801 P.2d 1197 (Colo. 1990); People v. Barr, 805 P.2d 440 (Colo. 1991); People v. Shunneson, 814 P.2d 800 (Colo. 1991); People v. Reichman, 819 P.2d 1035 (Colo. 1991); People v. Gebauer, 821 P.2d 782 (Colo. 1991); People v. Dillings, 880 P.2d 1220 (Colo. 1994); People v. Wollrab, 909 P.2d 1093 (Colo. 1996). B. Suspension. Preparing false carbon copies of corre- spondence to a client and testifying falsely to grievance committee of the supreme court con- cerning these letters warrants suspension from practice of law for period of at least three years, but not disbarment. People v. Klein, 179 Colo. 408, 500 P.2d 1181 (1972). Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows that false statements or documents are being submitted to the court, or that material information is improperly being withheld, takes no remedial action, and causes injury or potential injury to a party to the legal proceeding, or causes an adverse or potentially adverse effect on the legal proceeding, or when a lawyer knows that he is violating a court order or rule and there is injury or potential injury to a client or a party, or interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding. People v. Walker, 832 P.2d 935 (Colo. 1992). One-year suspension warranted where at- torney failed to promptly respond to discovery requests, failed to inform client of case progress after custody hearing, failed to withdraw upon client’s request, failed to advise client of child support modification hearing, misrepresented to the court that he was unable to contact client, and had been previously suspended for similar misconduct. People v. Regan, 871 P.2d 1184 (Colo. 1994). Fraud, jury tampering, and excessive fees are basis for indefinite suspension. People v. Radinsky, 176 Colo. 357, 490 P.2d 951 (1971). Attorney suspended for three years for re- peated neglect and delay in handling legal mat- ters, failure to comply with the directions con- tained in a letter of admonition, failure to answer letter of complaint from the grievance committee, and conviction of a misdemeanor. People v. Hebenstreit, 764 P.2d 51 (Colo. 1988). By commingling trust funds with his own, failing to maintain complete records of his cli- ent’s funds, and failure to render appropriate accounts to his client, the attorney’s conduct adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law, justifying suspension from practice. People v. Wright, 698 P.2d 1317 (Colo. 1985). For commingling of funds in trust account warranting suspension from practice, see People v. Calvert, 721 P.2d 1189 (Colo. 1986). Recommendation of prosecution without legitimate interest warrants suspension. Where an attorney took advantage of his posi- tion of respect and status in a district attorney’s office by repeatedly urging criminal prosecution in matters where his only legitimate profes- sional interest could be in related civil matters, such actions are prejudicial to the administra- tion of justice in violation of paragraph (A) (5). People ex rel. Gallagher v. Hertz, 198 Colo. 522, 608 P.2d 335 (1979). Actions taken by attorney contrary to court order violate this rule and justify suspen- sion. People v. Awenius, 653 P.2d 740 (Colo. 1982). Suspension is appropriate discipline given number and severity of instances of miscon- duct, including pattern of neglect over clients’ affairs over lengthy period and in variety of circumstances and misrepresentation in dissolu- tion case to client who wished to remarry con- cerning the filing of a dissolution petition. Con- sidering proper mitigating factors such as attorney’s lack of experience, absence of prior discipline, attorney’s willingness to undergo psychiatric evaluation and accept transfer to disability inactive status, suspension without credit for time on disability inactive status is appropriate. People v. Griffin, 764 P.2d 1166 (Colo. 1988). Suspension is appropriate for a lawyer ad- dicted to alcohol and cocaine and who ne- glected a client’s case resulting in the entry of default judgment, but who entered into an uncompelled restitution agreement and success- fully completed substance abuse treatment. People v. Richtsmeier, 802 P.2d 471 (Colo. 1990). Attorney misconduct of neglecting a guard- ianship matter and engaging in conduct prejudi- cial to the administration of justice warrant 90- day suspension when aggravated by history of five prior instances of disciplinary offenses for neglect, pattern of misconduct, refusal to ac- knowledge wrongful nature of conduct, vulner- ability of victim, and substantial experience in the practice of law. People v. Dolan, 813 P.2d 733 (Colo. 1991). Conduct manifesting gross carelessness in representation of clients is sufficient to justify suspension. People v. Roehl, 655 P.2d 1381 (Colo. 1983); People v. Fahrney, 782 P.2d 743 (Colo. 1989). Attorney’s neglect of dissolution case and misrepresentation to client concerning the filing of dissolution petition was especially egregious in view of client’s desire to remarry. Such con- duct in addition to number and severity of other instances of misconduct, taking into account mitigating factors, is sufficient for suspension. People v. Griffin, 764 P.2d 1166 (Colo. 1988). Felony theft held sufficient grounds for suspension. People v. Petrie, 642 P.2d 519 (Colo. 1982). Photocopying another attorney’s securities opinion letter and presenting it as one’s own, refusing to comply with discovery rules and court orders in litigation to which one is a party, and continuously failing to answer grievance complaint without good cause warrants suspen- sion. People v. Spangler, 676 P.2d 674 (Colo. 1983). An attorney’s conduct in borrowing money from his former clients and in failing to record deeds of trust on their behalf to be used as security constitutes professional misconduct and justifies his suspension. People v. Brackett, 667 P.2d 1357 (Colo. 1983). Where attorney engaged in a pattern of neglect, obvious conflict, and caused injury to his clients, suspension is warranted. People v. Belina, 765 P.2d 121 (Colo. 1988). Evidence sufficient to justify suspension from the practice of law. People v. Belfor, 197 Colo. 223, 591 P.2d 585 (1979); People v. Stineman, 716 P.2d 1079 (Colo. 1986). Both the charges and the well pleaded complaint are deemed admitted by the entry of a default judgment. People v. Richards, 748 P.2d 341 (Colo. 1987); People v. McMahill, 782 P.2d 336 (Colo. 1988). Suspended attorney must demonstrate re- habilitation for readmittance to bar. Actions of a suspended attorney who took part in a complex real estate transaction and engaged in the practice of law by representing, counseling, advising, and assisting a former client war- ranted suspension until he demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that (1) he has been rehabilitated; (2) he has complied with and will continue to comply with all applicable dis- ciplinary orders and rules; and (3) he is compe- tent and fit to practice law. People v. Belfor, 200 Colo. 44, 611 P.2d 979 (1980). Where a practicing attorney breached fidu- ciary duties to his client in misrepresenting his dealings and in handling of funds given to him in trust, his conduct warranted disbarment, and before he may seek readmittance to the state bar association, he must first demonstrate to the grievance committee that rehabilitation has oc- curred and that he is entitled to a new start. People ex rel. Buckley v. Beck, 199 Colo. 482, 610 P.2d 1069 (Colo. 1980). Attorney’s payment to inmates for refer- rals to attorney for the provision of legal ser- vices justifies 60-day suspension. People v. Shipp, 793 P.2d 574 (Colo. 1990); People v. Whitaker, 814 P.2d 812 (Colo. 1991). Three-month suspension appropriate where attorney intentionally misrepresented that he possessed automobile insurance coverage to automobile accident victim, police officer, and grievance committee investigator, and where at- torney was previously publicly censured for en- gaging in lengthy delay tactics. People v. Dowhan, 814 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1991). Reckless disregard for the propriety of submitting multiple and duplicative billing in court-appointed cases constitutes knowing conduct warranting a 90-day suspension. People v. Walker, 832 P.2d 935 (Colo. 1992). Repeated drawings of checks upon insuffi- cient funds and misuse of trust account moneys constituted grounds for suspension. People v. Lamberson, 802 P.2d 1098 (Colo. 1990). Attorney’s failure to file personal state and federal income tax returns and to pay with- holding taxes for federal income taxes and FICA, and use of cocaine and marijuana consti- tute conduct warranting suspension for one year and one day. People v. Holt, 832 P.2d 948 (Colo. 1992). Suspension for one year and one day war- ranted where attorney misrepresented to client that a trial had been scheduled, that continu- ances and new trial settings had been made, that a settlement had been reached, and where the attorney’s previous, similar discipline, was a significant aggravating factor. People v. Smith, 888 P.2d 248 (Colo. 1995). Suspension for one year and one day war- ranted for attorney who ‘‘represented’’ client for a period of 19 months without that per- son’s knowledge or consent, even asserting a counterclaim on his behalf without talking to him; who did not communicate with him in any manner for an extended period of time and then did not withdraw within a reasonable time after being unable to contact him; and who failed to answer discovery requests, resulting in the en- tries of default and then a default judgment against him. People v. Silvola, 915 P.2d 1281 (Colo. 1996). Suspension for one year and one day is warranted for commingling and misuse of client funds. The hearing board found that the respondent acted recklessly, rather than know- ingly, in misappropriating client funds. People v. Zimmermann, 922 P.2d 325 (Colo. 1996). Suspension of one year and one day neces- sary where lawyer engaged in sexual rela- tionship with client, had been previously disci- plined, and submitted false evidence to the hearing board concerning the sexual relation- ship. People v. Good, 893 P.2d 101 (Colo. 1995). Suspension of one year and one day war- ranted in light of the seriousness of attorney’s misconduct in conjunction with his noncoopera- tion in the disciplinary proceedings and his sub- stantial experience in the practice of law. People v. Clark, 900 P.2d 129 (Colo. 1995). Suspension for one year and one day war- ranted where attorney billed for time that was not actually devoted to work contemplated by contract and for time not actually performed. People v. Shields, 905 P.2d 608 (Colo. 1995). Suspension for one year and one day was warranted for attorney who violated this rule and C.R.P.C. 1.1 by preparing and filing child support worksheets that failed to properly re- flect the new stipulation concerning custody and where aggravating factors included a previous disciplinary history and failure to appear in the grievance proceedings. People v. Davies, 926 P.2d 572 (Colo. 1996). Mental disability that caused misconduct is a mitigating factor which, when considered in conjunction with other factors, justifies sus- pension of attorney for conversion of funds that would otherwise warrant disbarment. People v. Lujan, 890 P.2d 109 (Colo. 1995). District attorney’s failure to prosecute per- sonal friend for possession of marijuana vio- lates paragraphs (A)(1), (A)(5), and (A)(6) of this rule and warrants three-year suspension. People v. Larsen, 808 P.2d 1265 (Colo. 1991). Suspension of lawyer for three years, which is the longest possible period for suspen- sion, is appropriate where there was extensive pattern of client neglect and intentional decep- tion in client matters over a period of years. Anything less would be too lenient. People v. Hellewell, 811 P.2d 386 (Colo. 1991). Suspension justified where respondent vio- lated federal and state laws by failing to file personal income tax returns, failing to pay with- holding taxes, using cocaine, and using mari- huana. People v. Holt, 832 P.2d 948 (Colo. 1992). The fact that no specific client of the re- spondent was actually harmed by the respon- dent’s misconduct misses the point in pro- ceeding for suspension of an attorney. While the primary purpose of attorney discipline is the protection of the public and not to mete punish- ment to the offending lawyer, lawyers are, nonetheless, charged with obedience to the law, and intentional violation of those laws subjects an attorney to the severest discipline. People v. Holt, 832 P.2d 948 (Colo. 1992). Felony convictions warrant suspension for attorney convicted of violating California Tax Code where numerous mitigating factors were found to exist. People v. Mandell, 813 P.2d 732 (Colo. 1991). Three-year suspension appropriate where at- torney was convicted for felony distribution of cocaine, but had no record of prior discipline, there was no selfish or dishonest motive associ- ated with crime, and the attorney successfully participated in interim rehabilitation programs. People v. Rhodes, 829 P.2d 850 (Colo. 1992). Failure to communicate with clients, court, and opposing counsel, misrepresentation of the status of the proceedings to client, and failure to investigate clients’ case justifies three-year sus- pension. People v. Wilson, 814 P.2d 791 (Colo. 1991). Abusive, insulting, and unprofessional conduct towards deponent and opposing counsel during deposition and repeated in- stances of using health as an excuse for con- tinuances when respondent was ill-prepared for trial warrants six-month suspension. People v. Genchi, 824 P.2d 815 (Colo. 1992). Adopting a conscious scheme to take own- ership of homes, collect rents from tenants, make virtually no efforts to sell the homes, and permit foreclosures to occur on which HUD would absorb the losses constituted eq- uity skimming in violation of § 18-5-802 and constitutes a violation of sections (A)(4) and (A)(6) for which suspension for one year is appropriate. People v. Phelps, 837 P.2d 755 (Colo. 1992). Attorney who employed devices to de- fraud, made untrue statements of material fact, and engaged in acts which operated as fraud or deceit upon persons in violation of the Securities and Exchange Act violated DR 1-102 (A)(4) and DR 1-102 (A)(6) for which suspension of two years is appropriate, consid- ering mitigating factors. People v. Hanks, 967 P.2d 141 (Colo. 1998). Attorney who conveyed real property to defraud creditors suspended from the prac- tice of law. In mitigation, the attorney had fully cooperated with the board. People v. Koller, 873 P.2d 761 (Colo. 1994). Respondent’s multiple acts of violence are indicative of a dangerous volatility which might well prejudice his ability to effectively represent his client’s interests. Although re- spondent had taken major steps towards reha- bilitation the acts committed were of such grav- ity as to require a public censure and a three- month suspension. People v. Wallace, 837 P.2d 1223 (Colo. 1992). Third-degree sexual assault of wife ad- equate basis for one-year and one day suspen- sion. People v. Brailsford, 933 P.2d 592 (Colo. 1997). Suspension for 180 days is warranted based upon conviction of third degree assault charges. People v. Knight, 883 P.2d 1055 (Colo. 1994). Willful nonpayment of child support and failure to pay arrearages after ordered by court to do so are violations of sections (A)(5) and (A)(6) and constitute adequate basis for six-month suspension. People v. Tucker, 837 P.2d 1225 (Colo. 1992). Where deputy district attorney was con- victed of possession of cocaine under federal law, one-year suspension is appropriate due to seriousness of offense and fact that attorney had higher responsibility to the public by virtue of engaging in law enforcement. People v. Robin- son, 839 P.2d 4 (Colo. 1992). Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify suspension. People v. Murphy, 778 P.2d 658 (Colo. 1989); People v. Hodge, 782 P.2d 25 (Colo. 1989); People v. Masson, 782 P.2d 335 (Colo. 1989); People v. Chappell, 783 P.2d 838 (Colo. 1989); People v. Moya, 793 P.2d 1154 (Colo. 1990); People v. Creasey, 793 P.2d 1159 (Colo. 1990); People v. Schmad, 793 P.2d 1162 (Colo. 1990); People v. Wilbur, 796 P.2d 976 (Colo. 1990); People v. Baptie, 796 P.2d 978 (Colo. 1990); People v. Schubert, 799 P.2d 388 (Colo. 1990); People v. Taylor, 799 P.2d 930 (Colo. 1990); People v. Barber, 799 P.2d 936 (Colo. 1990); People v. Garrett, 802 P.2d 1082 (Colo. 1990); People v. Sullivan, 802 P.2d 1091 (Colo. 1990); People v. Rhodes, 803 P.2d 514 (Colo. 1991); People v. Flores, 804 P.2d 192 (Colo. 1991); People v. Crimaldi, 804 P.2d 863 (Colo. 1991); People v. Dunsmoor, 807 P.2d 561 (Colo. 1991); People v. Bennett, 810 P.2d 661 (Colo. 1991); People v. Hall, 810 P.2d 1069 (Colo. 1991); People v. Koeberle, 810 P.2d 1072 (Colo. 1991); People v. Gaimara, 810 P.2d 1076 (Colo. 1991); People v. Dash, 811 P.2d 36 (Colo. 1991); People v. Honaker, 814 P.2d 785 (Colo. 1991); People v. Anderson, 817 P.2d 1035 (Colo. 1991); People v. Redman, 819 P.2d 495 (Colo. 1991); People v. Rader, 822 P.2d 950 (Colo. 1992); People v. Hyland, 830 P.2d 1000 (Colo. 1992); People v. Smith, 830 P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1992); People v. Driscoll, 830 P.2d 1019 (Colo. 1992); People v. Raubolt, 831 P.2d 462 (Colo. 1992); People v. Regan, 831 P.2d 893 (Colo. 1992); People v. Southern, 832 P.2d 946 (Colo. 1992); People v. Denton, 839 P.2d 6 (Colo. 1992); People v. Hindorff, 860 P.2d 526 (Colo. 1993); People v. Brown, 863 P.2d 288 (Colo. 1993); People v. Cole, 880 P.2d 158 (Colo. 1994); People v. Smith, 880 P.2d 763 (Colo. 1994); People v. Swan, 893 P.2d 769 (Colo. 1995); People v. Davis, 893 P.2d 775 (Colo. 1995); People v. Miller, 913 P.2d 23 (Colo. 1996); People v. Calvert, 915 P.2d 1310 (Colo. 1996); People v. Sigley, 917 P.2d 1253 (Colo. 1996); People v. Boyer, 934 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1997). Conduct violating this rule sufficient to justify suspension. People v. Y aklich, 646 P.2d 938 (Colo. 1982); People v. Craig, 653 P.2d 1115 (Colo. 1982); People v. Kane, 655 P.2d 390 (Colo. 1982); People v. V ernon, 660 P.2d 879 (Colo. 1982); People v. Pilgrim, 698 P.2d 1322 (Colo. 1985); People v. Convery, 704 P.2d 296 (Colo. 1985); People v. Doolittle, 713 P.2d 834 (Colo. 1985); People v. Foster, 716 P.2d 1069 (Colo. 1986); People v. Coca, 716 P.2d 1073 (Colo. 1986); People v. Barnett, 716 P.2d 1076 (Colo. 1986); People v. Fleming, 716 P.2d 1090 (Colo. 1986); People v. Larson, 716 P.2d 1093 (Colo. 1986); People v. McPhee, 728 P.2d 1292 (Colo. 1986); People v. Y ost, 729 P.2d 348 (Colo. 1986); People v. Holmes, 731 P.2d 677 (Colo. 1987); People v. Proffitt, 731 P.2d 1257 (Colo. 1987); People v. May, 745 P.2d 218 (Colo. 1987); People v. Turner, 746 P.2d 49 (Colo. 1987); People v. Susman, 747 P.2d 667 (Colo. 1987); People v. Richards, 748 P.2d 341 (Colo. 1987); People v. Geller, 753 P.2d 235 (Colo. 1988); People v. Convery, 758 P.2d 1338 (Colo. 1988); People v. Lustig, 758 P.2d 1342 (Colo. 1988); People v. Preblud, 764 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1988); People v. Goldberg, 770 P.2d 408 (Colo. 1989); People v. Goens, 770 P.2d 1218 (Colo. 1989); People v. Kaemingk, 770 P.2d 1247, (Colo. 1989); People v. Fahrney, 782 P.2d 743 (Colo. 1989); People v. Bottinelli, 782 P.2d 746 (Colo. 1989); People v. Barnthouse, 775 P.2d 545 (Colo. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1026, 110 S. Ct. 734, 107 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1990); People v. Gregory, 788 P.2d 823 (Colo. 1990); People v. Macy, 789 P.2d 188 (Colo. 1990); People v. Lopez, 796 P.2d 957 (Colo. 1990); People v. Abelman, 804 P.2d 859 (Colo. 1991); People v. Heilbrunn, 814 P.2d 819 (Colo. 1991); People v. Barr, 818 P.2d 761 (Colo. 1991); People v. Nulan, 820 P.2d 111 (Colo. 1991); People v. Dieters, 825 P.2d 478 (Colo. 1992); People v. Larson, 828 P.2d 793 (Colo. 1992); People v. Tisdel, 828 P.2d 795 (Colo. 1992); People v. Rhodes, 829 P.2d 850 (Colo. 1992); People v. Walker, 832 P.2d 935 (Colo. 1992); People v. Koller, 873 P.2d 761 (Colo. 1994); People v. Dickinson, 903 P.2d 1132 (Colo. 1995); People v. Kolbjornsen, 917 P.2d 277 (Colo. 1996); People v. Pierson, 917 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1996). C. Disbarment. Disbarment is discipline for lawyer guilty of crimes of moral turpitude. People v. Wil- son, 176 Colo. 389, 490 P.2d 954 (1971). Attorney disbarred for continued pattern of conduct involving neglect and misrepre- sentation and for failure to cooperate in inves- tigation by grievance committee. People v. Y oung, 673 P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1984); People v. Coca, 732 P.2d 640 (Colo. 1987); People v. Johnston, 759 P.2d 10 (Colo. 1988). Continuing pattern of neglect, including failure to timely file tax returns on behalf of personal representative of estate, failure to file timely notice of alibi, failure to notify opposing counsel, and failure to be adequately prepared for argument, coupled with similar behavior re- sulting in previous suspension, warrants disbar- ment. People v. Stewart, 752 P.2d 528 (Colo. 1987). Misappropriation of funds, failure to ac- count, and deceit and fraud in handling the affairs of a client necessitate that an attorney be disbarred. People v. Bealmear, 655 P.2d 402 (Colo. 1982). A lawyer’s knowing misappropriation of funds, whether belonging to a client or third party, warrants disbarment except in the pres- ence of extraordinary factors of mitigation. People v. Lavenhar, 934 P.2d 1355 (Colo. 1997). Lawyer’s encouragement of a client to en- ter into a business transaction with said law- yer in which the two had differing interests and lawyer’s failure to disclose relevant facts war- rant disbarment. People v. Martinez, 739 P.2d 838 (Colo. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1054, 108 S. Ct. 1003, 98 L. Ed. 2d 970 (1988). Convictions for crimes of theft, theft-re- ceiving, and conspiracy to commit theft are serious, involve moral turpitude, and are grounds for disbarment as opposed to an indefi- nite suspension. People v. Silvola, 195 Colo. 74, 575 P.2d 413 (1978). Conviction of two counts of sexual assault on a child warrants no less a sanction than disbarment. People v. Grenemyer, 745 P.2d 1027 (Colo. 1987). Disbarment warranted by attorney’s con- viction of conspiracy to deliver counterfeited federal reserve notes, serious neglect of several legal matters, unjustified retention of clients’ property, failure to respond to the grievance committee, and previous disciplinary record. People v. Mayer, 752 P.2d 537 (Colo. 1988). False testimony and counselling of such conduct warrant disbarment. When a lawyer counsels his client to testify falsely at a hearing on a bankruptcy petition and the client does so, and the lawyer gives a false answer to a ques- tion asked of him by the bankruptcy judge, his misconduct warrants disbarment. People v. McMichael, 199 Colo. 433, 609 P.2d 633 (1980). Misrepresenting the status of a dissolution of marriage action with knowledge of im- pending remarriage and then forging the purported decree of dissolution is conduct in- volving moral turpitude deserving of disbar- ment. People v. Belina, 782 P.2d 26 (Colo. 1989). Where an attorney demonstrates an ex- treme indifference to the welfare of his cli- ents and the status of their cases and an ex- treme insensitivity to his professional duties in the face of adverse judgments due to neglect, client complaints, and repeated disciplinary pro- ceedings, disbarment is the appropriate sanc- tion. People v. Wyman, 782 P.2d 339 (Colo. 1989). Abandoning clients sufficient to justify dis- barment. People v. Sanders, 713 P.2d 837 (Colo. 1985). Abandoning clients without notice, causing them financial losses, and failing to cooperate with grievance committee justified disbarment despite lack of any prior professional miscon- duct. People v. Lovett, 753 P.2d 205 (Colo. 1988). Abandoning law practice, engaging in multiple acts of misconduct involving dishon- esty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation grounds for disbarment. People v. Greene, 773 P.2d 528 (Colo. 1989). Converting estate or trust funds for one’s personal use, overcharging for services ren- dered, neglecting to return inquiries relating to client matters, failing to make candid disclo- sures to grievance committee, and attempting to conceal wrongdoing during disciplinary pro- ceedings warrants the severe sanction of disbar- ment. People v. Gerdes, 782 P.2d 2 (Colo. 1989). Use of license to practice law for the pur- pose of bringing into being an illegal prosti- tution enterprise renders disbarment the only possible form of discipline. People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986). Theft of client’s money, misrepresenta- tions, representation of multiple clients with adverse interests, and failure to respond to informal complaints warrants disbarment. People v. Quick, 716 P.2d 1082 (Colo. 1986). Felony theft held sufficient grounds for disbarment in Colorado where respondent was convicted of crime and disbarred in another jurisdiction. Unless the disciplinary proceedings conducted in the foreign jurisdiction involved a denial of due process or other infirmity, or the imposition of the same discipline would result in a grave injustice, or the attorney’s conduct warrants a substantially different discipline, the court is required to impose the same discipline. People v. Bradbury, 772 P.2d 46 (Colo. 1989). Altering authentic dissolution decrees coupled with past attorney misconduct suffi- cient to warrant disbarment. People v. Blanck, 713 P.2d 832 (Colo. 1985). Continuing to practice while suspended is conduct justifying disbarment. People v. James, 731 P.2d 698 (Colo. 1987). Disbarment in another state warrants dis- barment. People v. Montano, 744 P.2d 480 (Colo. 1987); People v. Brunn, 764 P.2d 1165 (Colo. 1988). Attorney’s failure to disclose felony convic- tion and subsequent disbarment in another state is sufficient for disbarment. People v. Brunn, 764 P.2d 1165 (Colo. 1988). Facts sufficient to justify disbarment of at- torney for failure to comply with registration requirements of C.R.C.P. 227, misappropriation of funds, and improper withdrawal from em- ployment. People v. Scudder, 197 Colo. 99, 590 P.2d 493 (1979). A lawyer who enters into a conspiracy to violate the law by importing narcotic drugs for distribution should be disbarred. People v. Unruh, 621 P.2d 948 (Colo. 1980), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1171, 106 S. Ct. 2894, 90 L. Ed. 2d 981 (1986). Where a lawyer’s conduct not only consti- tutes a violation of the code of professional responsibility, but also involves felonious con- duct, clearly and convincingly proven by testi- mony of sheriff’s officers, the grievance com- mittee is justified in requiring disbarment. People v. Harfmann, 638 P.2d 745 (Colo. 1981). Total disregard of obligation to protect a client’s rights and interests over an extended period of time in conjunction with the violation of a number of disciplinary rules and an ex- tended prior record of discipline requires most severe sanction of disbarment. People v. O’Leary, 783 P.2d 843 (Colo. 1989). Attorney’s continued practice of law while under an order of suspension, with no efforts to wind up the legal practice, and the failure to take action to protect the legal interests of the attorney’s clients, warrants disbarment. People v. Wilson, 832 P.2d 943 (Colo. 1992). Convictions for conspiring to commit fraud against the United States and impeding an officer of a United States court warrant disbarment. People v. Pilgrim, 802 P.2d 1084 (Colo. 1990). Disbarment was the proper remedy where the attorney was afforded multiple opportunities including two suspensions and court ordered rehabilitation and where attorney’s conduct demonstrated (a) neglect of legal matters en- trusted to him; (b) misrepresentation to the cli- ent and the grievance committee; and (c) a pattern of neglect followed by the respondent that had the potential of causing serious injury to his clients. People v. Susman, 787 P.2d 1119 (Colo. 1990). A lawyer’s continued practice of law while under an order of suspension, with no efforts to wind up the legal practice, and failure to take action to protect the legal interests of the law- yer’s clients, warrants disbarment. People v. Wilson, 832 P.2d 943 (Colo. 1992). Likewise, disbarment was appropriate where attorney removed $5,000 from a client’s trust account, refused to return money upon several requests by the client which ultimately resulted in a suit against the attorney, and the attorney lied about the transaction to the attorney with whom he shared office space. Factors in aggra- vation included a history of prior discipline, including suspension for conversion of client funds, the dishonest motive of the attorney in removing and not returning the client’s funds, the attorney’s refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct, the vulnerabil- ity of the client, and the attorney’s legal expe- rience. Mitigating factors were insufficient for disciplinary action short of disbarment. People v. McGrath, 833 P.2d 731 (Colo. 1992). Disbarment is essentially automatic when a lawyer converts funds or property and there are no significant factors in mitigation. People v. Lujan, 890 P.2d 109 (Colo. 1995). Entering guilty pleas to multiple counts of bank fraud evidences serious criminal con- duct warranting disbarment. People v. Vidakovich, 810 P.2d 1071 (Colo. 1991). Payment of restitution required prior to petition for readmission. Where, in proceed- ings to enforce a debt, attorney fails to pay debt, appear for deposition, produce documents re- quested by subpoena duces tecum or appear at an examination pursuant to C.R.C.P. 69 and on separate occasions writes insufficient funds checks and fails to comply with requests for investigation, restitution is a proper condition of readmission and is to be made prior to petition for readmission. People v. Koransky, 830 P.2d 490 (Colo. 1992). Where money was accepted for investment plans which were false, fictitious, and fraudulent and the presence of aggravating fac- tors, including substantial experience by attor- ney, prior disciplinary offenses, dishonest or selfish motive, presence of multiple offenses, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of conduct, and an indifference to making restitu- tion, disbarment of attorney for violation of legal ethics was proper. People v. Kramer, 819 P.2d 77 (Colo. 1991). Disbarment appropriate where attorney ac- cepted fees from a number of clients prior to terminating her legal practice, failed to inform her clients of such termination, failed to refund clients’ retainer fees, failed to place clients’ funds in separate account, and gave clients’ files to other lawyers without clients’ consent. People v. Tucker, 904 P.2d 1321 (Colo. 1995). Disbarment warranted where attorney was convicted of two separate sexual assaults on a client and a former client and attorney’s previous dishonest conduct was an aggravating factor as well as findings of the attorney’s self- ish motive in engaging in the sexual miscon- duct, the two clients’ vulnerability, the attor- ney’s more than 20 years practicing law, and the attorney’s failure to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct. People v. Bertagnolli, 922 P.2d 935 (Colo. 1996). Notwithstanding the entry of attorney’s ‘‘Alford’’ plea in sexual assault proceedings, for purpose of disciplinary proceeding, the at- torney was held to have actually committed the acts necessary to accomplish third degree sexual assault and therefore the attorney know- ingly had sexual contact with a former client and with a current client without either wom- an’s consent. People v. Bertagnolli, 922 P.2d 935 (Colo. 1996). Disbarment appropriate when attorney engages in conduct prejudicial to client and the administration of justice and neglects nu- merous legal matters. People v. Theodore, 926 P.2d 1237 (Colo. 1996). Notwithstanding financial stress and seri- ous and costly medical problems, intentional conversion of law firm funds required dis- barment. People v. Guyerson, 898 P.2d 1062 (Colo. 1995). Propounding interrogatories to harass parties to a case and falsely accusing judicial officers and others of conspiracy warranted disbarment where respondent had been previ- ously suspended for similar conduct. People v. Bottinelli, 926 P.2d 553 (Colo. 1996). Failure to respond to discovery and mo- tions, failure to attend case management hear- ing, and failure to inform client of progress of a civil case is grounds for disbarment. People v. Hebenstreit, 823 P.2d 125 (Colo. 1992). Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify disbarment. People v. Lyons, 762 P.2d 143 (Colo. 1988); People v. Costello, 781 P.2d 85 (Colo. 1989); People v. Nichols, 976 P.2d 966 (Colo. 1990); People v. Bergmann, 807 P.2d 568 (Colo. 1991); People v. Rhodes, 814 P.2d 787 (Colo. 1991); People v. V ermillion, 814 P.2d 795 (Colo. 1991); People v. Bannister, 814 P.2d 801 (Colo. 1991); People v. Grossenbach, 814 P.2d 810 (Colo. 1991); People v. Ashley, 817 P.2d 965 (Colo. 1991); People v. Rouse, 817 P.2d 967 (Colo. 1991); People v. Calt, 817 P.2d 969 (Colo. 1991); People v. Mulligan, 817 P.2d 1028 (Colo. 1991); People v. Margolin, 820 P.2d 347 (Colo. 1991); People v. Koransky, 824 P.2d 819 (Colo. 1992); People v. Bradley, 825 P.2d 475 (Colo. 1992); People v. Mullison, 829 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1992); People v. Tanquary, 831 P.2d 889 (Colo. 1992); People v. Southern, 832 P.2d 946 (Colo. 1992); People v. McGrath, 833 P.2d 731 (Colo. 1992); People v. Brown, 840 P.2d 348 (Colo. 1992); People v. Walsh, 880 P.2d 766 (Colo. 1994); People v. Tyler, 884 P.2d 694 (Colo. 1994); People v. Kolenc, 887 P.2d 1024 (Colo. 1994); People v. Fritsche, 897 P.2d 805 (Colo. 1995); People v. Sims, 913 P.2d 526 (Colo. 1996); People v. Allbrandt, 913 P.2d 532 (Colo. 1996); People v. McDowell, 942 P.2d 486 (Colo. 1997); People v. Singer, 955 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1998). Conduct violating this rule sufficient to justify disbarment. People v. Kendrick, 646 P.2d 337 (Colo. 1982); People v. Dwyer, 652 P.2d 1074 (Colo. 1982); People v. Golden, 654 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1982); People v. Buckles, 673 P.2d 1008 (Colo. 1984); People v. Loseke, 698 P.2d 809 (Colo. 1985); People v. Fitzke, 716 P.2d 1065 (Colo. 1986); People v. Rice, 728 P.2d 714 (Colo. 1986); People v. Y oung, 732 P.2d 1208 (Colo. 1987); People v. Foster, 733 P.2d 687 (Colo. 1987); People v. Franco, 738 P.2d 1174 (Colo. 1987); People v. Quintana, 752 P.2d 1059 (Colo. 1988); People v. Brooks, 753 P.2d 208 (Colo. 1988); People v. Cantor, 753 P.2d 238 (Colo. 1988); People v. Turner, 758 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1988); People v. Danker, 759 P.2d 14 (Colo. 1988); People v. Score, 760 P.2d 1111 (Colo. 1988); People v. Hanneman, 768 P.2d 709 (Colo. 1989); People v. Kengle, 772 P.2d 605 (Colo. 1989); People v. V ernon, 782 P.2d 745 (Colo. 1989); People v. Frank, 782 P.2d 769 (Colo. 1989); People v. Johnston, 782 P.2d 1195 (Colo. 1989); People v. Hedicke, 785 P.2d 918 (Colo. 1990); People v. Dulaney, 785 P.2d 1302 (Colo. 1990); People v. Franks, 791 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1990); People v. Gregory, 797 P.2d 42 (Colo. 1990); People v. Broadhurst, 803 P.2d 478 (Colo. 1990); People v. Goens, 803 P.2d 480 (Colo. 1990); People v. Hansen, 814 P.2d 816 (Colo. 1991); People v. Schwartz, 814 P.2d 793 (Colo. 1991); People v. Whitcomb, 819 P.2d 493 (Colo. 1991); People v. Kinkade, 831 P.2d 892 (Colo. 1992); People v. Marmon, 903 P.2d 651 (Colo. 1995); People v. Gilbert, 921 P.2d 48 (Colo. 1996).