CRE 201

History

(Federal Rule Identical.) COMMITTEE COMMENT This rule is identical to Rule 201 F.R.E. and generally codifies prior Colorado case law. See Nicholls v. Barrick, 27 Colo. 432, 62 P. 202 (1900) [courts take judicial notice of those mat- ters which may be designated as ‘‘common knowledge’’]; Finnerty v. Cook, 118 Colo. 310, 195 P.2d 973 (1948) [judicial notice of facts which are ‘‘universally known’’]; Israel v. Wood, 93 Colo. 500, 27 P.2d 1024 (1933) [courts take judicial notice of matters of com- mon knowledge in the community where they sit]; Bieser v. Stoddard, 73 Colo. 554, 216 P. 707 (1923) [well recognized natural and physi- cal laws are judicially known and may not be put in issue by denial of their inevitable effect]; Winterberg v. Thomas, 126 Colo. 60, 246 P.2d 1058 (1952) [appellate courts will not hesitate to take judicial notice of the unquestioned laws of mathematics]. However, the mandatory na- ture of subsection (d) is a departure from exist- ing practice. In this rule judicial notice is limited to ad- junctive facts which are those facts that can be readily determined by resort to accurate sources, such as a calendar date, Sierra Mining Company v. Lucero, 118 Colo. 180, 194 P.2d 302 (1948); term of public office, People, ex rel. Flanders v. Neary, 113 Colo. 12, 154 P.2d 48 (1944); or statistical charts, Good v. A.B. Chance Co., 39 Colo. App. 70, 565 P.2d 217 (1977). ANNOTATION Law reviews. For note, ‘‘Rule 201: The Use of Hearsay In Establishing Facts Sufficient for Judicial Notice’’, see 22 Colo. Law. 2535 (1993). For article, ‘‘The Google Knows Many Things: Judicial Notice in the Internet Era’’, see 39 Colo. Law. 19 (Nov. 2010). This rule is a codification of existing case law. Prestige Homes, Inc. v. Legouffe, 658 P.2d 850 (Colo. 1983). This rule does not broaden the scope of judicial notice. Larsen v. Archdiocese of Den- ver, 631 P.2d 1163 (Colo. App. 1981). This rule has traditionally been used cau- tiously in keeping with its purpose to bypass the usual fact-finding process only when the facts are of such common knowledge that they cannot reasonably be disputed. Prestige Homes, Inc. v. Legouffe, 658 P.2d 850 (Colo. 1983). The court may take judicial notice of facts not subject to reasonable dispute because they are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to resources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. A court may take judicial notice of the contents of court records in a related proceeding. People v. Sa’ra, 117 P.3d 51 (Colo. App. 2004). The occurrence of legal proceedings or other court actions are proper facts for judicial notice. People v. Sena, 2016 COA 161, 395 P.3d 1148. Court may take notice without hearing. Under sections (c) and (f), the court may take judicial notice while the case is under advise- ment without first giving the parties an oppor- tunity to be heard. People ex rel. Danielson v. Amity Mut. Irrigation Co., 668 P.2d 1368 (Colo. 1983). Scientific propositions accepted as valid in the appropriate scientific community may be judicially noticed by an appellate court, acting on its own initiative. Legouffe v. Prestige Homes, Inc., 634 P.2d 1010 (Colo. App. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 658 P.2d 850 (Colo. 1983). Classification of defendant’s past offense is a question of law, and the court is justified in taking judicial notice when the facts upon which the legal conclusion is based are unchal- lenged. Massey v. People, 649 P.2d 1070 (Colo. 1982). Conditions presenting risk not an adjudi- cative fact. Whether certain conditions in a negligence action present more than an ordinary risk of harm depends upon the circumstances of each case, and is not an adjudicative fact. Larsen v. Archdiocese of Denver, 631 P.2d 1163 (Colo. App. 1981). Meaning of terms within context of consti- tution not subject to notice. In making its final legal conclusion about the meaning of terms within the context of the constitution, the court should be free to accept or reject several rel- evant ‘‘legislative facts’’, such as the dictionary definitions of these terms, the use of these words in other cases, and the probable intent of the drafters of the constitution as indicated by any historical facts. These items, therefore, are not subject to the judicial notice rule. Conrad v. City & County of Denver, 656 P.2d 662 (Colo. 1982). For a court to be required to take judicial notice under this rule, it must, of necessity, be supplied with specific information that is the subject of the request. Otherwise, it is discre- tionary whether a court takes judicial notice. Durbin v. Bonanza Corp., 716 P.2d 1124 (Colo. App. 1986); Martinez v. Reg’l Transp. Dist., 832 P.2d 1060 (Colo. App. 1992). Administrative law judge was not required to take judicial notice of the fact that doctor almost always testified for the defendant, based on a summary of court decisions in which same doctor had been a witness, even if court records were subject to judicial notice, unless the tribu- nal has been supplied with the specific facts, records, or documents that are the subject of the request. Martinez v. Reg’l Transp. Dist., 832 P.2d 1060 (Colo. App. 1992). Rules published in the code of Colorado regulations are a fit subject for judicial no- tice. Westfall v. Town of Hugo, 851 P.2d 299 (Colo. App. 1993). Pleadings, minutes, testimony, and verdict of a case in which defendant’s friend was tried and acquitted is not a matter subject to judicial notice pursuant to this rule as it would require the trial court to second guess the fact finder in the other case as to its reasons for finding the person not guilty. People v. Phillips, 732 P.2d 1226 (Colo. App. 1986). Judicial notice of municipal court order was proper. The fact that the court issuing the order was a municipal court was a matter of general knowledge within the district court’s jurisdiction and it was capable of accurate con- firmation through sources known to the district court. People v. Merklin, 80 P.3d 921 (Colo. App. 2003). Rule regarding fact judicially noticed ap- plies only to adjudicative facts and therefore the classification of a criminal defendant’s of- fense which is a question of law, did not require instruction pursuant to this rule. People v. Hampton, 857 P.2d 441 (Colo. App. 1992), aff’d, 876 P.2d 1236 (Colo. 1994). The resolution of a factual matter at issue in a prior judicial proceeding does not be- come an indisputable fact within the mean- ing of this rule merely as a result of being reflected in a court record, unlike the occur- rence of the legal proceeding or other court action itself. The trial court erred in taking judicial notice that defendant failed to appear in court as required by a condition of his bond. Doyle v. People, 2015 CO 10, 343 P.3d 961. Because the jury was instructed that the judi- cially noticed fact was not subject to reasonable dispute and had already been accepted as true by the court, the error was not harmless, not- withstanding the proper admission into evi- dence of a court record reflecting the court’s earlier finding to that effect. Doyle v. People, 2015 CO 10, 343 P.3d 961. Trial court erred in taking judicial notice of presentence report prepared by the proba- tion department in determining whether defen- dant was previously convicted of a felony. People v. Cooper, 104 P.3d 307 (Colo. App. 2004). The court did not err by taking judicial notice of defendant’s probation status after determining the status from the state com- puter system. Since § 13-1-119 and Crim. P. 55 expressly approve of records kept and main- tained in a state computer system, the court may take judicial notice of the court records con- tained in the system. People v. Linares- Guzman, 195 P.3d 1130 (Colo. App. 2008). Magistrate in kinship adoption proceeding erred in taking judicial notice of guardian ad litem’s report in mother’s dissolution pro- ceeding because mother did not have the oppor- tunity to cross-examine guardian ad litem in the kinship proceeding. A court may not take judi- cial notice of facts on the issue the parties are litigating. However, a court may take judicial notice of its own records and adopt factual findings from a previous case involving the same parties and the same issues. In re C.A.B.L., 221 P.3d 433 (Colo. App. 2009). Court did not err in not taking judicial notice of the dismissal of a previous sexual assault case when the defendant failed to com- ply with paragraph (d) of this rule and there was uncontroverted testimony that the case was dis- missed. People v. Marsh, 396 P.3d 1 (Colo. App. 2011), aff’d, 2017 CO 10M, 389 P.3d 100. A court can take judicial notice of a court’s register of actions for procedural ef- fect. People in Interest of I.S., 2017 COA 155, 415 P.3d 869. Applied in Lovato v. Johnson, 617 P.2d 1203 (Colo. 1980); In re House Bill 91S-1005, 814 P.2d 875 (Colo. 1991).